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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to address to what extent the Conservative Party has re-ignited its interest 
in the broad sphere of social policy since 1997, which some political commentators believe 
the party neglected following the demise of the ‘years of consensus’ from the mid-1970s 
onwards. Having experienced one of its worst ever general election defeats in 1997, the 
Conservative Party spent an unfamiliar thirteen years in opposition, providing an original 
context to this study.  During its sustained exile from national office until 2010, the party 
reviewed the perception of its primarily economic policy agenda, and it has subsequently 
revised its position on various social issues from the late 1990s onwards. 
 
Following the introduction, the first four chapters provide a broad theoretical framework to 
the overall academic study that identifies the key ideas, theories and ideological traditions 
that have shaped and influenced Conservative Party policy-making since the emergence of 
mass democracy in the early 20th century. Links are subsequently made with key policies 
and attitudes that have been associated with the Conservatives while in office throughout 
the 20th century. The three further chapters are more policy-orientated and seek to link 
such ideas and ideological influences with practical policy-making while in power, with 
specific contemporary areas of social policy highlighted as case studies. Chapters five to 
seven subsequently highlight some notable social policy initiatives that the post-2010 
Conservative-led government has developed in opposition and pursued in power, The Big 
Society, The Free Schools programme and the reform of the NHS, and they are framed 
within the context of David Cameron’s depiction of the ‘broken society’. Each chapter offers 
a rigorous concluding judgment relating to just how much ‘change’ the modern 
Conservative Party appears to have initiated within this particular policy sphere.  
 
In chronological terms, the thesis addresses the social policy-making agendas of recent 
governments in order to make comparative analysis. The administrations led by Margaret 
Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, dating consecutively from 1979, 
alongside the David Cameron-led coalition from 2010, are therefore the key periods of 
modern government focused upon. However, as the thesis title suggests, specific attention 
  
 
iii 
iii 
is given to the evolution of Conservative Party social policy development from 1997 
onwards.  
 
Having made the link between ideas, ideology and theory to practical contemporary policy 
developments over seven rigorously constructed chapters, an attempt to reach a measured 
judgment is then provided. The central question of the thesis and the initial issues raised 
within the introductory chapter are again focused on, and the extent to which the 
Conservative Party has changed within this particular policy area is explicitly addressed 
throughout the concluding section, as well as the various social, political and electoral 
dimensions that emerge in the process of constructing such a conclusion.  
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Introduction and Methodology 
 
Background 
 
The Conservative Party’s defeat at the 1997 General Election was a resounding political 
rejection on an unprecedented historical scale1, and in subsequent years the party has 
experienced a significant period of introspection and internal analysis in relation to the 
direction and evolution of its policy-making agenda and its overall ideological identity. The 
confident aura of the Thatcher era of the 1980s, fuelled by a successful election-winning 
formula inspired and moulded by free-market populism along with a sense of ideological 
certainty instilled by the thrusting capitalist agenda of the ‘New Right’, was shattered by a 
shifting public mood and a gradual erosion of popular support as the 1990s progressed. 
Such socio-political changes culminated in the drastic outcome of the 1997 general election 
when the 20th century’s ‘natural party of government’ that had generally acknowledged that 
‘periods of opposition (were) the exception, and office the norm’2, found its once-dominant 
position reduced to a state of utter political disarray, ‘being reduced to a rump’ and 
experiencing its heaviest electoral defeat ‘since the birth of mass democratic politics in 
1918’3. This watershed election result was variously described by sections of the media as a 
New Labour  ‘Triumph’ (The Guardian), a ‘Landslide’ (Daily Telegraph) and a ‘Massacre’ 
(Daily Mail), with the general consensus being that ‘it was all of these’4. 
 
 A long-term spell in national political opposition appeared inevitable given the scale 
of this ejection from office, and such an electoral annihilation at the hands of a revitalised 
and modernised ‘New Labour’ juggernaut would represent the nadir of Conservative 20th 
century political fortunes in terms of both parliamentary seats and wider public support. 
Fundamental reasons for such plummeting levels of popular appeal were inherently rooted 
in the party’s faltering and uncertain ideological vision, a diminishing public perception 
                                                          
1
 The 165 Conservative MPs was the lowest figure for the party since 1906 , cited in David Butler and Dennis 
Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997, (Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1997), Ch.13, p.244 
2
 Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon, ‘The Barren Years: 1997-2005’, cited in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon 
(eds.), Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition Since 1867, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005), 
Ch.11, p.243 
3
 Ibid., Ch.11, p.247 
4
 David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997, (Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 
1997), Ch.13, p.244 
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aligned with the unappealing nature of the party’s policy menu, with the image and identity 
of contemporary Conservatism seeming to be both damaged and eroded in the eyes of 
significant sections of the electorate, apparently reflecting a broader public disenchantment 
in relation to its long-term political agenda. Ultimately, the 1997 Conservative Party 
appeared too concerned with its own internal policy divisions and had grown out of touch 
with the views and interests of a rapidly changing and gradually more diverse British society, 
and this dynamic social change unerringly evolved while the Conservatives were pre-
occupied with the political strains of governance, with a primary focus on the fundamental 
economic restructuring of the country. Consequently, the Conservative Party faced a 
scenario whereby: 
 
‘After nearly two decades of Conservative rule, the needs, anxieties, priorities and 
aspirations of the electorate had become harder for the party to decipher and 
comprehend. Many simply failed to acknowledge how British society had changed in 
the 1990s’5.  
 
Therefore, despite the constant hum of such unerring background social 
developments, the Conservative Party of the mid-1990s largely appeared to be instilled with 
a sense of socio-political myopia and detachment that went to the heart of its definitive 
identity problems as the decade progressed. Consequently, policy-making in terms of the 
key social and economic spheres appeared to be increasingly disjointed and lacking in terms 
of a coherent connected vision prior to 1997, with the party’s key focus appearing to be the 
short-term political survival of John Major’s parlous administration from 1992 onwards, with 
its slender parliamentary majority of just 21 (1992-97), and by ‘December 1996 the 
government lost its majority in Parliament altogether’6. In this context of focusing on its own 
sheer political survival, the Conservative Party in office seemed to be detached from the 
basic demands, concerns and priorities of contemporary external society. It was therefore 
arguably the case that from late 1990 onwards, the Conservative political machine 
experienced a prolonged image and identity crisis triggered by the demise of Margaret 
                                                          
5
 Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon, ‘The Barren Years: 1997-2005’, cited in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon 
(eds.), Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition Since 1867, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2005), 
Ch.11, p.248 
6
 Ibid., Ch.11, p.247 
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Thatcher and her explicit ideological emphasis. The shattering electoral defeat of 1997 
therefore marked the erosive culmination of almost seven years of a post-Thatcher 
hangover that subsequently blighted the party’s fortunes and its ability to make a coherent 
progression from this period of electoral and political hegemony. Such an electoral 
watershed ultimately also represented a turning-point, bringing such matters of identity and 
future policy direction to the absolute forefront of the party’s political priorities, and it now 
faced such challenges firmly located in national political opposition on a likely long-term 
basis. It is within this socio-political context that this thesis is set, seeking to analyse and 
interpret the nature of the response of British Conservatism to this scenario, and the 
subsequent evolution of its key social policies and its broader social attitudes.  
 
Aims and objectives of the Thesis 
 
This thesis has been written with the principal research aim of assessing to what extent the 
Conservative Party has changed in terms of its approach to social policy since 1997. Hence 
the title of the thesis provides the key overarching research question: ‘Warm words or real 
change? Examining the evolution of Conservative Party social policy since 1997’. This 
question needs to be unpicked further as it leads to a number of more precise research 
questions. 
 
1. What is the role of ideology in the Conservative Party’s policy formulation?  This 
particular question will be addressed in chapter one.  
 
2.  What was the prevailing orthodoxy in the Conservative Party towards social and 
economic policy before 1997?  The thesis will establish the main features of the New Right 
school of thought (particularly so in chapter 2). 
 
3. What, and who, have been particularly influential in shaping Conservative Party social 
policy formulation since the 1990s?  Here the focus will be on the work of David Willetts 
(Civic Conservatism), Iain Duncan Smith (social justice), Philip Blond (Red Toryism) and the 
broader evolution of the ‘Big Society’ agenda (covered in chapters 3-5 in particular). 
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4. How has the Conservative Party’s social policy agenda developed since the formation of 
the Coalition Government in 2010 and what has been the impact of the Liberal Democrats 
on such policy development?  In order to make this more manageable the thesis will focus 
on two key areas of reform, namely health reform and schools policy (in chapters 6 and 7), 
with reasons to be provided for why these two cases have been selected. 
 
The Conservative Party has been identified for this study due to its record of 
unprecedented electoral success as a party of government in the modern political era, 
although such a record has been clouded somewhat by its relatively poor electoral 
performances over recent years and from the mid-1990s in particular, a development that is 
somewhat inconsistent with its political hegemony for much of the 20th century. As a 
political movement, the Conservative Party has therefore assumed a pivotal and integral 
position within the British political system over the course of the last century in particular, 
and its prominent role in the broader structure of politics has been summarised by one 
academic as representing ‘one of the great certainties of British politics’7, such has been its 
unerring presence within the higher echelons of power for the majority of the modern 
political era.  The thesis therefore aims to identify and address how and to what extent the 
Conservative Party has sought to adapt its position and attitudes in relation to various key 
social policy issues, and why this review of its policy agenda has subsequently instilled an 
aura of uncertainty and insecurity about the party’s long-term political prospects, to 
complement its existing socio-political vulnerabilities.  Such an analytical approach is based 
on the fundamental premise that the party’s established alignment in relation to broader 
contemporary social policy issues had created an associated negative image by the mid-
1990s, and has been a contributing factor to the party’s recent relative political decline. This 
in turn provides additional context to the party’s image pertaining to social policy, as well as 
offering general enlightenment in explaining the nature of the broader identity and image 
                                                          
7
 Andrew Gamble, ‘The Crisis of Conservatism’, New Left Review, (No.214, November-December 1995), p.3 
http://newleftreview.org/I/214/andrew-gamble-the-crisis-of-conservatism 
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problems facing modern Conservatism, and which has created political and electoral 
difficulties that have been prolonged during the post-Thatcher era in particular.  
 
Such a long-standing and dominant political role has therefore been a hallmark of 
the Conservative Party’s prevailing image, fuelled by its longevity and durability, its political 
pragmatism alongside an impressive record of electoral success, particularly during the 20th 
century when it held national office either alone or in coalition for approximately two-thirds 
of this historical period. However despite such a legacy of political dominance, its electoral 
record in the final years of the 20th century and the formative years of the 21st century has 
been far from impressive, with no outright general election victory achieved since 1992, and 
this scenario has subsequently generated a perception that Conservatism within the 
modern era appears to have become primarily ‘economic’ as opposed to ‘social’ in its policy 
focus, and has accordingly become somewhat de-aligned with the prevailing social moods, 
needs and attitudes of contemporary Britain. This background provides a key context for 
this thesis and the core research questions identified, and a primary challenge of this 
academic analysis will be to see if this assumption of the Conservative Party having a 
primarily economic policy agenda is still a valid and accurate one in the early years of the 
21st century, with social policy often perceived as being neglected in the process.  It is on 
this basis that this thesis subsequently adopts a position from the outset that the party’s 
past record in the area of social policy between 1979 and 1997 is one important factor in 
explaining such poor electoral performance within the contemporary era.  
 
In seeking to assess the various elements that have shaped and influenced the 
Conservative Party’s evolving social-policy making agenda from approximately 1997 
onwards, the thesis focuses on a policy agenda that has been at the bedrock of the party’s 
socio-political strategy and which has been ultimately aimed at refreshing its electoral brand 
and widening its overall political appeal. In reviving and reinvigorating an otherwise 
neglected policy dimension, social policy re-formulation has represented a challenge made 
more difficult by the pressing economic problems and austerity agenda that the post-2010 
government has had to deal with.  Throughout the thesis, the analytical thrust ultimately 
seeks to compare the significance of social policy with that of economic policy-making, how 
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the two dimensions interact and whether one policy area has more electoral potency or 
relevance than the other.  
 
In adopting such an approach and focus, the thesis addresses key influences that 
have shaped the nature and rate of change within this sphere of social policy-making, 
identifying those which have been of most significance and subsequently make appropriate 
connections with the party’s recent electoral misfortune, with particular emphasis on how 
the contemporary Conservative Party has revised and re-formulated its focus on social 
policy since it lost power in 1997. The year 1997 marked the beginning of thirteen years in 
national political opposition following a remarkable eighteen year period in office, and this 
significant period of exile from government was a prolonged historical phase which was an 
unprecedented length of national political opposition for the self-styled ‘natural party of 
government’, and this provides a distinct and original angle to the thesis. In embarking on a 
process of significant introspective policy revision during its time outside government, the 
party has sought to revise and re-invent both its image and core principles for the 21st 
century. Within this context, the party’s modernizing tendency has sought to elaborate its 
own understanding of the key socially-fused concepts of community, society and social 
justice as part of a broader project to ‘de-toxify’ its public image that was somewhat 
polluted among parts of the electorate due to political events and policy developments 
between 1979 and 1997. It is therefore an important and fundamental aspect of the thesis 
that within its core framework, analysis is made as to whether such developments have 
resulted in the presentation of a distinctly new socio-political agenda for the British 
Conservative Party in the early years of the 21st century, or alternatively whether it has led 
to a reversion to more traditional forms of Conservatism and associated policy-making. In 
summary, broad themes and influences that are identified and further assessed for their 
significance as factors within this overall process of social policy evolution and re-
formulation are ideology, pragmatism/statecraft and the practical implications of coalition 
politics. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
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The early chapters are primarily theoretical in nature, seeking to identify and address both 
the philosophical and ideological influences behind this particular sphere of policy-making, 
building up a theoretical framework for the thesis that also features coverage of key 
historical and political developments within this particular aspect of policy-making, and 
which subsequently form the basis for the later chapters that focus on the dynamic 
evolution of contemporary Conservative social policies. In fusing both theory and practical 
policy developments, the thesis aims to comprehensively address to what extent the social 
Conservatism of the modern era represents either continuity or change from the past, or 
whether it is a combination of both. It subsequently seeks to identify just how new and 
original the party’s range of ‘modern’ social policies are.  The chapters have therefore been 
arranged and organised in what appears to be the most logical and coherent overall 
structure, beginning with a theoretical basis and moving on to practical policy analysis in 
order to develop a fluent overall academic argument.  
 
Within such a framework, the first chapter addresses the significance of ideology in 
the formation of Conservative social and welfare policy making and to what extent 
ideological factors have influenced this sphere of policy formulation over the party’s 
modern political history.  Having provided some socio-political context and background for 
the basis of the thesis, this chapter ultimately seeks to address how and why Conservatives 
adopt the broad policy positions that they do on such social policy matters, and ultimately 
assesses whether ideological factors are the key determinant on most occasions. The 
chapter then goes on to explore the difficulties of actually defining what an ideology is, and 
which in turn makes it difficult to attach a clear or definite trail of influence behind the 
overall policy-making process.  
 
Following this early focus on the significance of ideology, the second chapter 
addresses one of the key ideological influences that have shaped modern Conservatism, 
namely the New Right tradition or perspective that has been an influential factor in global 
political developments from the mid-1970s onwards. This chapter assesses how the New 
Right agenda has impacted on Conservative governance and how it has sought to shape and 
mould the party’s economic and social policies in office since 1979. Within this framework 
the chapter offers appropriate analysis as to how positive or negative this specific 
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ideological tradition has been on the Conservative Party’s overall political fortunes and 
popularity, as well as identifying to what extent that it continues to shape and influence 
party policy in the contemporary era.  
 
 Having initially addressed and analysed the broader conceptual significance of 
ideology and how much it has moulded and influenced the development of Conservative 
social policy, before moving on to identify any specific influences of the New Right 
ideological tradition, the thesis then develops further to assess how such ideological 
pressures have shaped the theoretical term of ‘Social Justice’ and its practical meaning. This 
is a political term that is open to debate in what it means in both theory and practice, and it 
has been an area of significant ideological and theoretical debate within the modern 
political era, being a particular influence and dynamic behind the social policy debate within 
contemporary British politics.  The theoretical and philosophical background and origins of 
the concept is discussed and assessed within chapter three, with the specific Conservative 
critique and objections to its traditional meaning explored and analysed in more depth. In 
the connected yet separate chapter four, further assessment is made of how the theory has 
operated on a practical and functional level within the modern political era and how this is 
evident in the formulation and application of contemporary Conservative Party social 
policies. In particular, this chapter assesses how the Conservative-led government from 
2010 has sought to address and distinctly develop the social justice agenda in a practical 
sense, and analysis is subsequently offered regarding the nature of its social policies that 
have developed and been implemented as a result.  
 
 Having covered the theoretical background of such terms and concepts that have 
been influential in shaping the formation of social policy in the early 21st century, the thesis 
moves on to address and identify some practical and relevant policy developments that 
have arisen as a result of the Conservative Party being back in government after 2010. This 
contemporary expression of social Conservatism is initially evident with chapter five, that 
seeks to address, explain and analyse the concept of ‘The Big Society’. It adopts a fusion of 
theory and policy in its focus on a socio-political term generated by David Cameron in the 
early phase of the 21st century as he sought to devise a new and more ‘modernised’ image 
and approach to social policy for his party. The actual meaning and practical implications of 
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the somewhat vaguely-worded policy is explored in more detail, along with an overview of 
how the policy has evolved and made an impact since the Conservatives returned to 
national office in 2010. There is focus on how this framework for social policy formulation 
has sought to develop a distinct role for the state, supplemented by a range of critiques 
from both the left, right and voluntarist perspectives, the latter angle a reflection of the 
third sector and community-level activity that is specifically and fundamentally affected by 
this policy. This chapter therefore serves as a ‘bridge’ between theory and practical policy 
implementation. The thesis then seeks to analyse and assess specific policy areas that have 
derived from this ‘Big Society’ agenda, namely the impact that this social policy ethos has 
had on key areas of public service such as education and healthcare.  
 
 The supplementary policy-based chapters therefore focus on two specific policies 
that have emerged within this modern political agenda, the Free Schools educational policy 
and the reforms to the NHS that have sought to provide a more diverse range of service 
providers within it. Both policies have been specifically selected for this thesis as they 
appear to be key spheres of social policy identified by the Conservative ‘modernisers’ where 
the party’s previous record in office had some negative connotations for some key parts of 
the electorate, and on this basis they are policy areas that have appeared to require some 
specific attention and revision. These policy areas have been selected for detailed study and 
analysis as they have a significant electoral value in terms of the wide range of people, and 
specifically voters, that they impact upon. Both policy areas can therefore be viewed as 
high-profile mechanisms for revising and revitalising the party’s own image in a more 
‘progressive’ and ‘compassionate’ manner, while at the same time addressing David 
Cameron’s observation of a ‘broken society’, and each can be viewed as being totemic 
policy examples that align with the broader principles of The Big Society socio-political 
agenda. Both policies therefore focus on and address two widely-used and integral aspects 
of social and welfare policy in the UK, and both spheres have been subject to significant 
reform and change since the Conservative-led coalition government came to power in 2010. 
In their focus on improving social mobility and addressing a revised Conservative analysis of 
social justice and what this concept entails, both areas of social policy covered feature a 
focus on improved community activity, an enhanced autonomy for local institutions and 
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bodies, and a greater degree of local choice as a means of ensuring the ongoing quality of 
public service delivery for the 21st century.  
 
Both policy case studies can subsequently be viewed as examples of how the 
modern Conservative Party has been striving to make determined efforts to re-engage with 
the concepts of society and community, with the focus of such policies appearing to 
represent a clear illustration of the infusion of ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ within 
contemporary social policy debate. These two specific policies are therefore good examples 
of how modern Conservatism has sought to infuse its core social policy agenda with an 
enhanced degree of autonomy and liberation, as well as aspiring to distinguish its political 
image within a ‘re-imagined’ view of the state. Such a view of the state appears to be 
distinct from the more explicit Thatcehrite emphasis on market forces that was prevalent 
within British Conservatism for much of the 1980s, as it appears to acknowledge that the 
market does not have all of the answers to society’s various challenges and problems. 
However, the Conservative Party’s modernising faction has maintained a suspicion and 
hostility to an over-powerful, centralised and bureaucratic state structure that has prevailed 
in a repressive manner for the majority of the post-war era, and particularly so under 
Labour governments. The analysis within each policy-based chapter ultimately seeks to 
assess whether such social policies have a distinct and original basis in seeking to breach and 
transcend this ‘statist’ post-war consensus while assessing their practical ability to function 
and effectively maintain good quality public service provision.  
 
Methodology  
 
The recent and contemporary focus of this research proposal means that appropriate 
methodology and research methods have been used accordingly, in both qualitative 
(focusing on causes) and quantitative (focusing on data/statistics) terms. Research 
methodologies within the thesis have therefore primarily focused on a number of specific 
sources, notably media and newspaper articles, interviews with figures at the political 
forefront of the social policy agenda, along with a range of interviews, articles, political 
diaries and journalistic commentaries featuring various individuals from the world of 
academia, politics and the political blogosphere. All such sources of information offer 
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valuable yet distinct interpretations of the specific issues raised within the thesis and which 
are analysed and discussed within the various chapters.  It is the qualitative approach that 
has been the prevailing research method within this thesis, and the interviews undertaken 
have ranged from grassroots to elite level of political activity and influence, and have been 
both in person and have also utilised information technology such as e-mail communication 
in order to gather the necessary primary information. Such a qualititative approach has 
featured extensive use of policy documents from the government, political parties and 
think-tanks, as well as Internet-based newspaper archives (from a broad range of titles), 
journal articles and political blogs which have been a vital means of re-enforced the 
contemporary subject content and dynamic nature of the issues being assessed and 
analysed. This emphasis on up-to-date and contemporary elements of the subject area in 
question has entailed that a wide range of newspaper and internet-based documentation 
and archive material has been a vital source in terms of accessing the most contemporary 
and dynamic information on the policy area being studied. This has provided an immediacy 
regarding the subject matter that enhances the status of such media documents and articles 
and instils them with historical value, yet tinged with a more contemporary flavour. Such a 
research approach and the subsequent range of sources used has been both appropriate 
and desirable in terms of addressing and exploring the key research questions and 
associated issues raised within the thesis, and this fusion of influences have subsequently 
created original primary research in relation to contemporary issues and events. This 
utilisation of a wide range of appropriate and varied sources of information provides a 
rigorous approach that aims to counteract bias and subjectivity.   
 
 Government papers and policy documents have an obvious tendency to reflect the 
values and political agenda of the administration of the day, although they are often cloaked 
with an ‘official’ style of more responsible and less explicitly partisan language than those 
that appear from opposition parties and external lobbying groups. Policy documents from 
opposition parties and think-tanks tend to be generally more explicit in expressing their 
political ideology and can employ a more expansive and radical style of language in making 
their key points due to their freedoms from the responsibilities of government, and this is 
evident in the documents that have been accessed as part of this research. In accessing such 
a significant range of policy documents alongside media and newspaper articles via a 
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qualitative method of research for this thesis, it is clearly apparent that the vast majority of 
newspaper articles are going to feature a bias on the part of the person who is writing it, 
reflecting the political ideology or agenda of the organisation that they are working for. 
Indeed, most newspapers with articles quoted within this thesis have a clear agenda and 
associated ideology for their target audience and identified readership, and this is 
acknowledged in how they are cited and analysed.  Likewise, academic articles and primary 
interviews will feature a particular bias and subjectivity on the part of the author or the 
person being interviewed in seeking to promote their specific viewpoint or argument, as are 
the sentiments within documents produced by pressure groups, think-tanks and political 
parties.   
 
In dealing with such likely bias within specific sources, other sources of information 
and other articles relating to the same subject matter have been  specifically looked at and 
rigorously cross-checked to assess the accuracy of any claims, arguments and statistics 
provided by a particular article or interview. This cross-referencing of primary interviews, 
newspaper articles, policy documents, weblogs, as well as TV and media interviews has 
meant that information covered and supporting evidence provided by those with an explicit 
political agenda has been rigorously assessed, reflected on and processed accordingly. In 
adopting such a thorough approach it has been possible for a wider and more diverse range 
of secondary sources to be accessed and utilised in order to challenge or confirm 
information or claims initially derived from a primary source or indeed other secondary 
documents or articles, and this has resulted in appropriate analysis being made and 
subsequent conclusions reached. Such an academically thorough approach has primarily 
utilised rigorous qualitative methods for the following key reason: 
 
‘When we seek to understand or explain how and why a political institution, event, 
issue, or process came about, we are necessarily asking questions that can be 
answered through qualitative methods’8.  
 
                                                          
8
 Ariadne Vromen, ‘Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches’ cited in David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker (ed.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, (Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 3
rd
 edn., 2010), Ch.12, 
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In seeking to find causes and reasons as to what extent Conservative Party policy has 
changed, quantitative use of data and statistical analysis has only been a relatively small 
part of the research but have been used in places (to a lesser degree overall), and  in order 
to reach appropriate conclusions the methodology has ultimately followed a primarily 
qualitative emphasis in order to offer the most practical and logical route towards a sound 
interpretation and balanced evaluation of the information obtained and used for the basis 
of this study. However, the concluding analysis remains interpretive to the extent that 
value-neutral observations are arguably impossible to achieve.   
 
Originality 
 
In placing the focus of the thesis within an overall historical context, the period from 1997 
onwards was therefore something of a unique and significant one in British politics (and 
particularly so from a Conservative perspective), given the party’s unusually sustained and 
unprecedented exile from national office. The issues being analysed within this thesis are 
therefore tinged with this particular and original perspective, as there have been no other 
periods during the age of mass democracy where the Conservative Party have been out of 
national government for such a continuous period. Such a prolonged absence from power 
and three comprehensive general election defeats in succession between 1997 and 2005 
entailed that the historical period being focused on represented the Conservative Party’s 
most sustained period of opposition since 18329, a notable and distinct phase of modern 
history that therefore provides an unprecedented era on which to focus. This sustained 
period away from government subsequently resulted in an introspective root and branch 
review of Conservative ideology and policy in a number of key areas, arguably on a scale not 
witnessed since the Thatcherite policy revolution originating from the mid-1970s onwards, 
and this is another original aspect to this academic study.  
 
                                                          
9
 See Peter Snowdon: ‘The Conservatives may have come back from the brink of annihilation - but the party 
now faces the closest election battle in decades’, March 8
th
 2010, 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/platform/2010/03/peter-snowdon-the-conservatives-may-have-come-
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See also: 
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In the context of such a concerted revision of post-Thatcher Conservative policy 
direction, there has subsequently been significant contemporary conjecture within both 
media and academic circles as to just how extensive it has been in both a practical and 
theoretical sense10. While there have been prominent recent books and articles about 
Cameron, his associated ideas and the modern Conservative Party from academics and 
authors such Bale, Blond, Elliott & Hanning, Jones, Snowdon along with a number of edited 
books about contemporary Conservative policy (Lee and Beech; Edwards; and Heppell and 
Seawright as examples)11, there is no specific book within the current academic market 
whereby a single author has sought to define in practical terms the true nature of 
Cameron’s brand of Conservatism and the specific origins and impact of his government’s 
key social policies since he became Prime Minister in 2010. While such other books cited 
have broadly written about Cameron’s style and focus of ‘Modern Conservatism’, such 
books have either been primarily either descriptive or journalistic in nature, edited 
collections, advocacy12 or essentially historically focused on the Conservative Party’s 
political history up until 2010, prior to the party or David Cameron having the opportunity to 
implement any of its renewed and revised social policy agenda in practical terms. This thesis 
therefore aims to offer further academic value and originality in this respect, in the form of 
a monograph that offers a thorough analysis of the theoretical basis and the practical 
implementation of key Conservative social policy both before and after 2010, featuring a 
policy area that has been somewhat neglected by the party during the post-1979 political 
era in particular.  
 
This academic study therefore addresses some fundamental questions in relation to 
the nature and motives of such an internal policy review, and in its post-2010 emphasis in 
assessing whether it has involved a fundamental and deep-seated revision of traditional 
                                                          
10
 See academics and commentators such as Snowdon (above), Tim Bale, The Conservative Party: From 
Thatcher to Cameron, (Polity Press, London , 2011), Phillip Blond, Red Tory: How Left and Right Have Broken 
Britain and How We Can Fix It, (Faber, London 2010), Francis Elliott and James Hanning, Cameron: Practically a 
Conservative, (Fourth Estate, London, 2012), Dylan Jones, Cameron on Cameron: Conversations with Dylan 
Jones, (Fourth Estate, London, 2008). 
11
 See Simon Lee & Matt Beech (eds.), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edn., 2009), Jason Edwards (ed.), Retrieving the Big Society, (Wiley-Blackwell, 
Chichester, 2012) and Timothy Heppell and David Seawright (ed.), Cameron and the Conservatives: The 
Transition to Coalition Government, (Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012) 
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 See Jesse Norman, The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics, (University of Buckingham Press, 
Buckingham, 2010) 
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Conservative policy-making and ideology in order to embrace a more dynamic policy 
position in line with 21st century values and attitudes. An alternative perspective is that the 
Conservative leadership under David Cameron (from 2005 onwards) has rather reverted to a 
more ‘re-packaged’, cosmetic and cautious image change, and has instead been more 
inclined to embrace ‘statecraft’13, entailing a heightened focus on delivering practical 
governance and competence in office, which in turn has sought to merely modify rather 
than radically overhaul traditional policy positions, and therefore rejecting fundamental 
change in policy-making terms. This viewpoint would argue that in diluting (rhetorically at 
least) some of the overt and explicit ideological emphasis of the past (for example the 
Thatcherite hegemony of the 1980s), Cameron’s Conservatism has instead embraced a 
more pragmatic dimension and approach to its socio-political strategy and broader 
approach to governance, and has merely moderated traditional values and attitudes in the 
name of ultimately securing national office. However, once in office, some commentators 
such as Phillip Blond have argued that it has reverted to ‘Thatcherite’ type14. This dynamic 
debate about the true nature and focus of the approach of modern Conservatism to such 
social policy matters and of the extent that such policy matters have changed since the mid-
1990s will be developed more substantially within the main body of the thesis.  
 
This focus on exploring and analysing the true nature of the apparent  ‘change’ 
within the modern variant of Conservative social policy is therefore a particularly pertinent 
element that is pivotal to the whole thrust of this academic analysis. David Cameron’s 
specific type of Conservatism has been the subject of much political conjecture, particularly 
due to his sustained rhetorical focus on changing the party’s social policy agenda since he 
became Conservative Party Leader in late 2005. However following his significant role in 
drafting the Conservative Party’s broadly right-wing 2005 general election manifesto15, and 
in the context of how the party’s 2010 manifesto was subsequently altered and modified by 
                                                          
13
 See Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft’, Political Studies, 
(1986) 
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 See Phillip Blond, ‘David Cameron has lost his chance to redefine the Tories’, Comment is Free, The Guardian, 
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comparison in both tone and substance16, this has raised legitimate questions about how 
genuine and sincere his apparent endorsement of more socially-orientated ‘compassionate 
conservatism’ has been in more recent years17, and whether such a changed emphasis on 
policy and a new style of governance is due to pure pragmatism and political opportunism 
on his part, or is rather due to a healthily evolving ideological compass and a genuinely re-
branded Conservative Party under his leadership. This analysis of the motives and factors 
behind the altered emphasis in modern Conservatism will be explored throughout the 
thesis, therefore offering further originality in seeking to categorically define and clarify the 
specific type of Conservatism promoted by David Cameron since he became party leader.  
 
A further angle of originality is evident in the fact that the period since 2010 has seen 
the formation of Britain’s first post-war coalition government, featuring the first hung 
Parliament since 197418, and the ’first peace-time coalition since the 1930s’19. The dynamics 
and tensions of coalition government are therefore also an important dimension to be 
addressed within the thesis in terms of how the original and somewhat unexpected 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats has particularly influenced Conservative Party social 
policy evolution.  Such unique circumstances and original elements have been further 
heightened by an atmosphere of unprecedented economic austerity since 2010, and this 
has created an appropriately distinct environment to assess how the Conservative Party’s 
post-1997 key social policies have developed and evolved in practical terms, within the 
context of the long-term post-Thatcherite legacy. For all of the warming words and changed 
rhetoric, at the heart of this study is the question as to whether the Conservative Party 
under David Cameron’s leadership represents a genuinely new and reformed social policy 
agenda in practical terms. This context is central to the approach adopted by this academic 
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 2010 Conservative Party manifesto,’ Invitation to join the Government of Britain’,  
http://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Activist%20Centre/Press%20and%20Policy/Manifestos/Manifes
to2010 
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 See Jon Bernstein, ‘The Staggers: The New Statesman Blog’, ‘Poster Boy Dave and the Coming Campaign’, 
‘The New Statesman, 4
th
 January 2010, 
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John Curtice, Stephen Fisher and Robert Ford, ‘An Analysis of the Results’, cited in Dennis Kavanagh and 
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analysis, providing a pivotal feature to be addressed throughout the main body of the thesis 
and within its concluding arguments in particular. The thesis ultimately concludes by 
returning to the original question and assessing to just what extent, if any, the Conservative 
Party’s approach to social policy-making since 1997 has represented ‘real change’ or 
whether it has alternatively been merely a rhetorical emphasis on carefully-chosen ‘warm 
words’, and whether long-established Conservative attitudes and beliefs to the role of 
government, social justice, the state and civil society have either shifted or remained 
aligned to the party’s traditional and more instinctive approach to such policy matters.   
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The significance of Ideology within the Conservative Party and its Influence on social 
policy-making 
 
The purpose of this initial chapter is develop a fundamental background basis for the overall 
thesis, namely to assess and seek to understand the significance of the role of ideology and 
its inherent influence in the formulation of the Conservative Party’s social and welfare 
policies over the course of the 20th century, with particular focus on the contemporary 
political era, namely from the mid 1970s onwards and the emergence of ‘Thatcherism’ 
through to the Cameron leadership from 2005 onwards. In the context of the overall thesis 
therefore, this chapter seeks to specifically assess and analyse how the contrasting 
pressures of ideological or pragmatic factors have driven and shaped the party’s policy-
making agenda since losing national office in 1997, particularly in the sphere of social and 
welfare policy formulation. Which precise aspect is the most prevalent influence over any 
government’s policy-making processes is clearly a key factor to consider within this debate 
and will probably vary over specific points in time. Within a modern political context 
therefore, the 1980s era of Conservative rule has been perceived as being more ideological 
in comparison to most of the previous post-war era, leading to a phase of policy 
prioritisation within the governing Conservative Party that saw economic policy generally 
given greater emphasis and precedence over the development of social policy, for reasons 
that various observers have claimed were primarily due to ideological factors, although 
practicality was not entirely absent. As a consequence of such an ideologically-tinged, 
economy-centric focus to policy-making, a wider public perception developed that 
‘Conservatives were disinterested in, and unable to offer solutions to, problems beyond the 
economic sphere’20. 
 
Such socio-economic policy friction within the modern political era forms the 
background to the ongoing funding and maintenance issues that lie at the heart of the 
contemporary debate in the early 21st century about the future shape of the British welfare 
state in its most general sense. This overall political context ultimately goes to the heart of 
illustrating what fundamentally motivates the Conservative Party in its pursuit of political 
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office, whether it be an inherent and deep-rooted ideology that drives policy-making, a 
pragmatic reaction to the economic realities and social attitudes of the day or rather a more 
atavistic desire for power at all costs (’the politics of power’21), in line with the party’s 
traditional image as being ‘the natural party of government’. This chapter will therefore 
seek to identify what is the strongest factor that drives the general thrust of Conservative 
social policy in the contemporary political environment. It is usually the case that most 
political groups or organisations in any society are broadly influenced by some sort of 
ideology or fundamental beliefs, and it is these beliefs that will often unite and drive 
forward those that seek political office, and such an unerring and underlying ideology is 
what often distinguishes one party from its rivals for governance in terms of the influence, 
evolution and implementation of policies while in power. At its most fundamental level 
therefore, an ideology can be defined as follows: 
 
‘A set of beliefs about political and social arrangements and intended primarily to 
justify action in respect to this environment…..’22.  
  
Such a core definition also acknowledges that a typical ideology ‘is not a simple 
concept’ and which can essentially be viewed as ‘a collection of aims, arguments and 
assumptions’23 that are not always clear in their meaning. What makes the concept of an 
ideology even more difficult to comprehensively define and wholly explain is that even 
within specific ideological viewpoints there are often significant variations and differences, 
and they can appear to be essentially fluid and dynamic concepts, ultimately ‘a complex 
phenomenon in itself manifesting a notable variety or internal differences’24.  There has 
therefore been a considerable amount of academic and political debate over the years 
about the significance of ideology in influencing how governments of various political 
persuasions have performed while in office. Indeed, there has been much written about the 
ideological influences behind the specific policy-making agenda within mainstream party 
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politics. Within this robust debate over how relevant ideology has been in terms of 
motivating and guiding the actions and behaviour of recent politicians, the conservative 
historian Maurice Cowling has rejected any uncertainty and sought to completely 
downgrade the significance of ideology in wider British politics for much of the past 
century25, dismissing the ‘romanticism of “causes”’26 and instead arguing that ‘high politics’ 
is broadly dominated by a small elite driven not by ideology but by ‘self-interest..... ambition 
and rivalry’27. In promoting this somewhat unorthodox argument within a century of 
swirling ideological debate, Cowling argues that in the modern political era (20th century 
onwards), the senior hierarchy of the main political parties are from similar backgrounds 
and have traditionally had much in common in terms of the main socio-economic issues, 
with fundamental political and ideological differences limited as a result. Cowling’s 
viewpoint can be seen as contentious and open to dispute, particularly from the perspective 
of partisan and tribal politicians who would indicate clear ideological dividing lines between 
the various political parties. However it could be viewed as a valid analysis within the era of 
‘consensus politics’ from 1945 onwards, and in the context of the overall debate that 
assesses how significant ideology is considered to be in the process of governance, it has 
provided a distinct angle of argument that would suggest that perhaps all administrations of 
all political persuasions are ultimately driven by the desire for power and the fulfilment of 
both personal and collective group political ambition, with ideological motives playing a 
limited role.  
 
The impact of a changing British society on Conservative ideology and policy-making  
 
Due to the nature of a fluid and quickly changing society that emerged and became evident 
in the 1990s (much of which had been ostensibly shaped by Conservative policies and 
governance), British Conservatism appeared somewhat disorientated in its reaction to such 
developments, and this dazed and disconnected response culminated in the 1997 electoral 
massacre. In the election’s aftermath, distinct party divisions reflecting rival party traditions 
and factions came to the fore in how to respond to the new political landscape being carved 
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by New Labour. This was initially evident in the guise of high-profile 'social authoritarian' 
and moralistic party figures such as Ann Widdecombe and to a lesser extent William Hague, 
demanding a return to traditional social values, even ‘Victorian’ ones in a bid to revive the 
party’s fortunes via attempts to revert to a more undiluted version of morally-infused social 
Conservatism. This however clashed with the more socially liberal Conservatives of the post-
1997 era, e.g. Michael Portillo and Francis Maude28, often viewed as the ‘modernisers’ who 
wanted the party to absorb the changing social and political landscape and ‘adopt a much 
more liberal line on “lifestyle” issues such as gay marriage and multiculturalism’29, and 
effectively embrace much of the ‘modern’ Blairite social policy agenda. Contemporary 
academics and commentators analogously alluded to this division over social and moral 
issues as akin to societal divisions between ‘Mods versus Rockers’,30 and such divisions went 
to the heart of the typologies of Conservatism analysed by Heppell (2002)31, who 
highlighted a three-dimensional model, which identified the party modernisers as 
embracing a broadly liberal line on ‘social, sexual and moral policy’, with the traditionalists 
taking a more conservative position on such matters.  Such a contemporary liberal variant of 
Conservatism has been typified by recent comments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, who in publicly supporting moves to legislate in favour of gay marriage, 
warned the Conservative Party in late 2012 that ‘ditching the policy would be toxic 
electorally’32. 
 
This sense of friction between traditionalists and modernisers reflected the common 
perception that the party lacked a core and consistent ideological identity in the post-
Thatcher era, and was also somewhat detached from changing public attitudes. This 
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somewhat precarious political position was aligned with a basic need for political survival 
during the precarious Major years and a subsequent brutal removal from national office 
that was exacerbated by two further general election defeats in 2001 and 2005, and such 
factors ultimately instigated a period of sustained self analysis within the Conservative 
Party. Such a process is arguably a natural response by any political movement to such a 
series of significant electoral setbacks, and some academics and commentators such as 
Seldon and Snowdon have viewed the party in this period of the late 1990s as ‘suffering 
from a crisis, battered by years of uncertainty about the party’s identity’33. This post-
Thatcher state of turmoil and ideological haze was an unfamiliar one for the Conservative 
Party to be in the context of the general sense of political certainty during long periods of 
government for much of the 20th century. Thatcher’s insertion of ideology and conviction 
into a party that had previously embraced pragmatism and consensus created a significant 
identity crisis on her departure from the political frontline in 1990, and this disruption to the 
party’s equilibrium appeared to culminate in a sense of almost bewildered detachment from 
contemporary society in the years immediately before and following 1997.  
 
Such a dislocation from the general public mood as outlined above (on social issues 
in particular) resulted in thirteen years in the relative wilderness of national political 
opposition which subsequently provided the Party with the necessary time that it required 
in order to adequately reflect and focus on what it essentially stood for in terms of its core 
beliefs, its overall identity, its ideological direction and what its key policy agenda should be 
based upon and influenced by. This sense of confusion over its identity had been a key 
legacy for the Conservative Party when the Thatcher era ended in 1990, with the ideological 
certainties and political dominance of the 1980s creating subsequent problems for the 
party’s overall equilibrium in later years, and in this sense on an ideological and policy level, 
‘Thatcherism posed as much of a challenge for the Conservatives as it had done for 
Labour’34. In a broader historical context, the cataclysmic watershed of three successive 
electoral setbacks forms a significant backdrop and an original aspect to the chronological 
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period in question, along with the distinctive and contemporary policy issues being 
analysed.  
 
Policy development and renewal has subsequently evolved in an unprecedented 
manner and has focused on a whole range of socio-political issues, with the Conservative 
Party in opposition having to pragmatically acknowledge and embrace a plethora of 
ostensibly ‘popular’ economic and social policies implemented by the Labour governments 
of both Blair and Brown up until 2010. It has particularly been in the area of social policy 
that some of the most fundamental Conservative ideological soul-searching since 1997 has 
appeared to take place, within the policy sphere that broadly incorporates issues such as 
welfare, education, the NHS and more ‘modern’ environmental policy dimensions, and it is 
traditionally perceived to have been a sphere of public policy where the Conservatives have 
been eclipsed by the Labour Party and its more active and interventionist ‘social’ agenda. 
Subsequently there has been a general perception of a left-of-centre hegemony and 
influence over the evolution of social policy and a more ‘socially just’ policy direction within 
modern British politics, and that non-Conservative administrations have led the way in 
terms of initiatives and setting the agenda in this sphere.   This can be said to have 
originated from both the ‘years of consensus’ after 1945 when the post-war Labour 
government set the policy agenda in this sphere, as well as the New Labour approach to 
public service reform since 1997, and the development and implementation of various social 
policy initiatives have traditionally demanded a more interventionist, statist focus that is 
more aligned with the Labour Party’s approach to statecraft and governance.  
 
Accordingly, during the 1980s in particular these were not policy areas that the 
Conservative Party appeared to give as much focus, priority or emphasis to in comparison to 
the fundamental problem of sorting out the country’s ‘broken economy’ as they saw it, 
although concerted attempts to streamline the size and scope of the welfare state in 
particular were a long-term focus of mainstream Conservatism during this period. The party 
in office instead sought to mould a long-term ‘neo-liberal economic settlement’35 that 
fundamentally shifted the economy’s balance from the public to the private sector, and 
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which has been largely sustained to the present day. A recurring criticism of this period of 
Conservative government is however that social policy (particularly in terms of addressing 
long-term poverty and welfare reliance) was somewhat neglected in comparison to 
economic matters, ultimately being denied the appropriate attention and policy-making 
focus that it required. This was within the overall political context of the Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher pursuing a revised and more ‘free market’ approach to both economic 
and social policy-making, in ‘seeking to roll back the scope of the welfare state and therefore 
revers(ing) some of the more compassionate achievements of the post-1945 consensus’36. 
Subsequently, this perception of neglect of social and welfare policy in terms of intellectual 
influence and policy-making thrust, has led to a broad acknowledgment within political 
circles that many aspects of contemporary social policy within mainstream British politics 
have been associated with and shaped by the left-of-centre values of some post-war Labour 
governments, particularly given the Labour Party’s more traditional ‘social’ core agenda, in 
contrast with the Conservatives’ more ‘economic’ focus (since 1979 in particular).  This is 
the distinct perspective and context that this thesis is written from, namely the extent of 
social change, the sustained period of Labour government and its significant policy-making 
impact, coupled with the Conservatives’ correlated and unprecedented exile from national 
office.  The thesis therefore ultimately seeks to analyse the extent of both change and 
continuity in the formation of Conservative social policies since the late 1990s onwards 
amidst a period of fluid and dynamic social attitudes in the UK, which on the basis of recent 
evidence generally appear to have a more socially liberal outlook, yet which also somewhat 
paradoxically support cutbacks in welfare expenditure while at the same time desiring 
increases in taxation and wider public spending37.   Within such a context, the thesis 
therefore seeks to identify and address the main driving forces behind the evolution of this 
specific social policy approach within this framework of complex social changes, namely 
whether it has been the persistent presence of traditional ideology, the emergence of 
genuinely new and innovative political ideas aligned with a genuine brand of New 
Conservatism, or alternatively a reversion to pragmatic statecraft.  
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Statecraft as a model of governance 
 
The Conservative Party in particular has often been viewed as being the least ideological of 
the mainstream British political parties, unlike its principal Labour opponent being 
unburdened by an emotional attachment to a theoretical ideology with a coherent vision of 
the future such as socialism. It has therefore been seen by academic observers as essentially 
‘a pragmatic rather than an ideological party’38, and one modern politician has observed 
that it is inherently a pragmatic political viewpoint that 'has never settled on a conclusion’39.  
Such an interpretation of the British Conservative Party focuses on its beliefs in an organic 
and gradually changing political and socio-economic model, aligned with the image ‘of a 
slowly evolving society’40. Given this broad perception that Conservative administrations 
have therefore traditionally been less ideological and more inclined to ‘pragmatic 
adaptation’41 in their approach to governance in comparison to Labour variants for much of 
the twentieth century, there has been some specific academic analysis regarding the 
ostensible key motivations of Conservative governments and their associated policy-making 
within the post-war period in particular, notably since the Thatcher era from 1979 onwards. 
Within this context, one contemporary Conservative commentator has highlighted the vital 
importance of political office to the Conservative approach to governance, remarking that 
‘Conservatism, unlike socialism, is not merely a bundle of ideas, or a disposition, or a way of 
viewing the world. Rather, it must be realised in government to have substance’42. Two 
notable contributions to this academic debate relating to the Conservative Party’s 
fundamental attitude and motivation towards governance include the notion of ‘statecraft’ 
as developed by Jim Bulpitt43 in the early 1980s, and also the analysis of the origins and 
                                                          
38
 Heppell, T. and Hill, M., ‘Ideological Typologies of Contemporary British Conservatism’, Political Studies 
Review, Vol. 3, p.335, (2005).  See also Robert Leach, ‘British Political Ideologies,  (Prentice Hall Europe, Hemel 
Hempstead, 2
nd
 edn., 1996), Ch.5, p.101 
39
 Jesse Norman, The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics, (University of Buckingham Press, 
Buckingham, 2010), Ch.5, p.90 
40
 Robert M. Page, ‘The Conservative Party and the Welfare State since 1945’, Ch.2, p.24, cited in Hugh Bochel 
(ed.), The Conservative Party and Social Policy, (The Policy Press, University of Bristol, 2011) 
41
 Ibid. 
42 Paul Goodman, Executive Editor of Conservative Home website, ‘It's two years away, but the 2015 election 
is already lost’, The Daily Telegraph, 29
th
 December 2012,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/9770710/Its-two-years-away-but-the-2015-election-
is-already-lost.html 
43
 Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft’, Political Studies, 
(1986), p.21 
  27  
 
alleged key factors in the party’s ostensible political hegemony for much of the 20th century, 
as outlined by Andrew Gamble44in the mid-1990s, with both academics covering a different 
end of the Conservative Party’s 18-year monopoly of national political office (1979-97). In 
analysing the early period of the Thatcher years, Bulpitt argues quite simply that ideology 
has played a marginal and secondary role in the Conservative Party’s political performance 
over the modern political era and that its main focus for governance has been ‘statecraft’, 
essentially: 
 
‘the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing 
competence in office’45.  
 
Bulpitt’s position essentially claims that in wielding office and moulding policy, the 
Conservative Party has an historical tendency to take a pragmatic approach and react to 
circumstances rather than follow a clear ideological plan or blueprint while in political office, 
preferring to deal with the ‘high politics’ of public office rather than focusing on grassroots 
political influences.  In similar yet distinctive vein to Cowling’s ideology-free analysis of party 
political motivations while in power, Bulpitt’s viewpoint ultimately relegates ideology 
behind pragmatism and managerial competence in explaining the motives and influences 
behind Conservative political behaviour for the majority of the modern political period, 
particularly from the mid-19th century onwards. In one sense it therefore acknowledges an 
elitist model of politics like Cowling, rejecting the significance of ideology as determinant of 
political action and instead seeing Conservative administrations as essentially representing 
‘a philosophy of government or a ruling-class ideology’46. This argument therefore suggests 
that flagship Conservative policies of the 1980s such as privatisation were not part of a 
grandiose ideological vision but were in fact low-key priorities at the start of the party’s 
tenure in office and only gained momentum due to circumstantial developments as the 
decade progressed. This view represented a rejection of those that viewed Thatcher as an 
ideological crusader, although it must be noted that Bulpitt wrote in the early part of the 
                                                          
44
 Andrew Gamble, ‘The Crisis of Conservatism’, New Left Review, (No.214, November-December 1995), 
http://newleftreview.org/I/214/andrew-gamble-the-crisis-of-conservatism 
45 
Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft’, Political Studies, 
(1986), p. 21 
46
 Robert Leach, British Political Ideologies, (Prentice Hall Europe, Hemel Hempstead, 2
nd
 edn., 1996), Ch.5, 
p.101 
  28  
 
1980s when a considerable amount of Margaret Thatcher’s ideological emphasis and 
rhetoric had yet to appear.  
 
Bulpitt’s analysis therefore concluded that statecraft was the key driver of 
government policy-making and formulation and overall actions in office, essentially the 
need for a political party to prove its competence in office in the shorter term order to 
ensure a credible and competent reputation and subsequently a long-term maintenance of 
political power. Bulpitt’s view is partially acknowledged by Philip Norton in a further analysis 
of Thatcher’s period in office carried out in the latter phase of the 1980s, and Norton’s study 
equally rejected the perceived ideological predominance of Thatcherism, instead arguing 
that the Conservative Party of the 1980s vintage again adhered to ‘something central to 
Conservative thought: circumstance’47 (as opposed to a focused ideology). In this context, 
Norton claimed that most MPs during the Thatcher era were essentially party loyalists who 
would primarily support the leadership as opposed to adhering to any clear ideological 
position, and such an argument again emphasised that the Conservative Party in office has 
had a tendency to focus on a pragmatic approach alongside short-term events and 
developments, rather than following a clear pre-ordained blueprint of designated political 
actions within a long-term ideological focus.  Many political commentators have 
subsequently offered competing analysis and assessments as to the nature of the 
ideological influences on the Conservative Party throughout the 20th century, with one more 
modern political viewpoint arguing that the party has generally tended to explicitly reject 
ideology for a more pragmatic and instinctive political approach (at least until the Thatcher 
era 1975-90): 
 
‘Conservatives are wary of grand statements of principles and beliefs. Many attribute 
the political success of British conservatism to its pragmatism- its concern with 
political practice not political theory’48.  
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Such an analysis adheres to the inherently pragmatic and flexible root of 
Conservative policy-making, notably that its desire for power and government tends to 
outweigh aloof and detached philosophies associated with the theorising of hostile and 
more abstract ideologies such as socialism. On this basis it has been argued that 
Conservatives forcefully reject and ‘have nothing to do with theory, ideology and 
abstractions’49, and as an established political movement, over the course of modern 
politics it has therefore generally been viewed as adopting a pragmatic approach to 
governance that tends to over-ride and transcend ideological considerations. Conservative 
academics and theorists such as Oakeshott have referred to this pragmatic vision as 
representing a practical approach to politics that rejects incomprehensible theories and 
rationalist ideologies that are often detached from everyday life50. In this sense, such an 
interpretation of conservatism is that of a political outlook not guided by some overarching 
ideological blueprint, but instead which seeks to proceed ‘without a pre-conceived plan or 
dogma, taking advantage of circumstances and building on successes’51, and indeed 
ultimately seeking to both manage and adapt to the tide of change within society. Indeed, 
any ideological attachment is often viewed as a negative thing among some conservative 
schools of thought, with the 19th century Conservative Leader Benjamin Disraeli dismissing 
contemporary ideological alternatives such as socialism as being  ‘mechanistic’ as well as 
being ‘bleak and materialistic’52 in their essentially rational analysis of society. In seeking to 
modernise the Conservative Party’s image as a political force within the late 19th century, 
Disraeli established a pragmatic tendency within British conservatism that embraced various 
social and democratic changes taking place, and alternatively favoured ‘pragmatic 
empiricism’53, in short, deliberately keeping ideology as a low-profile and often an 
anonymous feature of the Conservative Party image and appearance. Consequently for 
much of the 20th century, this pragmatic streak within the Conservative Party remained 
dominant, and certainly until the Thatcher era from the mid-1970s onwards, the party 
succeeded in ensuring that any tendencies towards ‘Conservative (ideological) exhibitionism 
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has..... often taken the form of veiling such matters in a decent obscurity’54, possibly due to 
the regular outbursts of internal division evident within the more ideological Labour Party 
since its emergence from the early 1900s onwards.  
 
The Legacy of One Nation Conservatism 
 
In this context of seeking to mould an explicitly alternative approach to an ideological 
emphasis on policy-making, Disraeli adopted a somewhat vague ‘One Nation’ brand of 
Conservatism that was more in tune with a pragmatic governing instinct and general 
‘paternalistic’ social responsibility as opposed to any specific blueprint for governance or 
policy-making. Indeed in his 19th century novel ‘Sybil’ (The Two nations), Disraeli coined the 
origin of this phrase by alluding to: 
 
‘Two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as 
ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in 
different zones, or inhabitants of different planets….. The rich and the poor’55. 
 
However, some of those more sceptical of Disraeli’s ostensibly noble and moralistic motives 
have claimed that the great Conservative statesman was fully aware of the significance of 
protecting his own ‘class’ and the maintenance of the traditional social order, and this in 
itself was a form of underlying and implicit ideological influence that ultimately moulded his 
overall style and approach to governance56.  
 
Nevertheless, the social basis of Disraeli’s analysis of a divided and class-ridden 
Britain resulted in a political remedy that required paternalistic state intervention and 
progressive and enlightened social policies, a reaction that appeared to be influenced by a 
fusion of humanitarian concern for the broader social welfare alongside a degree of party 
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political calculation.  Such a non-ideological emphasis established a political seam that 
would run deep in the Conservative Party for many years to come, and for much of the 20th 
century this meant that there were clear distinctions in the differing attitudes towards 
ideology between the Conservative Party and its main political rival for much of this 
historical period: 
 
‘Since its formation in 1900, Labour has been the ideological and sectional party in 
British politics..... (and) it was comparatively easy for the Conservatives to appeal to 
all sections of the nation, while their “dogma-light” approach allowed a continual 
update of policies.....’57.   
 
In short, such an analysis of the Conservative Party’s approach to governance 
reflects a tendency for its adherents to be scornful of Labour’s traditional inclinations 
towards a more ideological agenda, and instead seems to prefer the approach that ‘doctrine 
and theory were subordinate to political calculation’58 and indeed, circumstance.  In this 
context of facing an ideology-driven principal political opponent, some fifty years after 
Disraeli was in office there emerged the figure of Stanley Baldwin, Conservative Prime 
Minister on three separate occasions in the inter-war years and who was the era’s dominant 
political figure. He further embraced this tradition and firmly rejected the ideological 
approach to governance during a period of inter-war class tensions and the growth of 
socialism. Baldwin, whose own son became a Labour MP59, was ostensibly non-ideological 
to the extent that he ‘even thought socialism and capitalism did not really exist’60, and he is 
therefore associated with the ‘One Nation’ conservative tradition by virtue of such a 
political approach. In pursuing this political style, Baldwin developed a paternalistic image 
that emphasised the national interest over divisive class divisions and the ideological 
differences that were prevalent in this era, although despite cultivating this approach, he 
did preside over the 1926 General Strike, one of the bitterest class-based disputes of the 
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20th century. This ‘One Nation’ tradition did however soon appear to reach a particular 
zenith of influence within the party’s internal structure with the publication of ‘The Middle 
Way’61 in 1938, Harold Macmillan’s rejection of the ‘laissez-faire’ attitudes espoused by 
some Conservatives during the ‘hungry thirties’, and an affirmation of the party’s moderate 
‘centrist’ image, which sought ‘to save capitalism from itself’ by rejecting the un-regulated 
free market as a ‘combination of misery and inefficiency’62.  
 
However, despite this non-ideological and paternalistic tradition being broadly 
associated with the liberal, moderate and left-wing of the party, it has always attracted an 
eclectic mix of supporters to its cause, including free-market Conservatives such as Enoch 
Powell, who became a key Thatcherite influence and acolyte in his later years.  What 
ultimately bound the ‘One Nation’ Conservatives together was a primary focus ‘not in 
economic but in social policy’63 with a paternalistic approach to maintaining strong 
communities alongside adequate and benevolent welfare policies in particular.  In this 
context, in the post-war years after 1945, ‘One Nation’ politics remained at the forefront of 
Conservative governance and political behaviour while in office, embracing ‘an active state 
approach’ that ‘saw the state as the key player in ameliorating social problems’64.  As a 
consequence of this non-ideological tradition and heritage, it was said that for much of its 
modern existence, and up to the emergence of Thatcher’s ‘New Right’ in the mid-1970s in 
particular, that there was a notable limitation of ideological focus within the Conservative 
Party and that ‘Conservatives were always non-doctrinaire, pragmatic and capable of 
adjusting to the exigencies of the moment’65.  
 
Such a well-established and historical tendency within the Conservative Party had 
therefore been established over many decades, and it had been broadly associated with a 
pragmatic and moderate approach to governance, with the development of fluent and 
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innovative social policies emanating from the centralised state a key aspect of this 
‘paternalistic’ political outlook.  Established figures within the post-war Conservative Party 
between the 1950 and 1970s such as Macmillan, Butler and Heath appeared to be generally 
imbued with the over-riding post-war consensual mentality66, and this moderate political 
viewpoint appeared to reject the extremities of left and right-wing ideological conflict and 
appeared to gladly embrace the ‘years of consensus’ after 1945, regardless of the prevailing 
social-democratic slant of the period that was a source of grievance for the ‘New Right’ of 
the party in later years. Indeed, this right-of-centre party faction viewed such a policy 
settlement in a resentful ideological sense, ultimately rejecting its values and emphases as 
being part of ‘democratic socialist consensus’67.  In this context, the overt ideological 
tendencies of ‘Thatcherism’ that erupted in the 1980s were viewed by many of the party’s 
established ‘grandees’ as a political aberration, a dynamic break with the steady evolution, 
conventional methods and ‘organic’ approach of Conservative governments of the past, and 
whose legacy was perceived as destructively disrupting the Conservative Party’s natural 
equilibrium for the next twenty years.  
 
Thatcher and ideological Conservatism 
 
There are therefore some academics and commentators (Norton and Bulpitt to varying 
extents), who would argue that contrary to the wider perception of some parts of the media 
and the wider public, the perceived Thatcherite dominance of the 1980s was something of 
an illusion in terms of its long-term impact and that the majority of Conservative politicians 
continued to adhere to a less ideological approach. In this context, while the Thatcherites 
may have seized the party leadership in 1975 and sought to inject a more ideological 
direction to governance, the reality was that the ‘Thatcherites’ were actually ‘in a minority 
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within the party’ and that there was ‘no Thatcherite hegemony within government’68. This 
argument would claim that the Conservative Party from the mid-1970s onwards was in fact 
a balanced and diverse body that reflected the varying political traditions of the party, and 
that the explicit ideological emphasis towards governance of Thatcherism was in fact a 
fundamental detachment from an inherent and historic non-ideological Conservative 
pragmatism. However, the political reality was that Thatcher and her close allies held the 
reins of the party leadership from 1975 onwards, and in policy terms such an ideological 
focus arguably created a less balanced and conciliatory style of government after 1979, 
consequently appearing to regard the post-war settlement regarding social policy issues and 
the related aspects of broader public welfare as less of a priority than the need to address 
economic matters, and this would exacerbate the potential for further social divisions in the 
process. An interesting ‘fused’ interpretation of Thatcher’s motives has been offered by 
Andrew Gamble, who acknowledges that there was no intricate blueprint for power, but 
perhaps instead a more strategic vision: 
 
‘Thatcherism is sometimes presented as though in 1979 there existed a set of policy 
blueprints ready for immediate implementation. No actual policy process could ever 
work in that way. What distinguished the Thatcher government from its predecessors 
was not detailed policy plans but its strategic sense of its long-term, objectives and 
its pragmatism concerning the means to achieve them’69.  
 
However there have been politicians and commentators who challenge this 
politically ‘pragmatic’ interpretation and emphasis to declare that core ideological beliefs 
have indeed been at the root of the party’s electoral performances over the course of 
modern history and have indeed been the ultimate driving forces behind how the party has 
functioned while in office. A further analysis by Andrew Gamble examined the Conservative 
Party’s fortunes during a particular nadir of the party’s modern history during the mid-
1990s. He argued that far from lacking an ideological bedrock of inherent beliefs, the 
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Conservative Party was in fact traditionally aligned with some fundamental political 
principles (‘The Pillars of Conservative Hegemony’70) which according to Gamble were The 
Constitution, The Union, Property and Empire (nationalism)71. Such pillars will certainly have 
driven the Thatcher ‘New Right’ project in a broad direction, without offering precise policy 
formulation. However Gamble’s argument was that by the mid-1990s the Conservative 
Party had seen its association with such principles and ‘pillars’ weakened by their ostensible 
lack of relevance to changing public attitudes, which could provide a key explanation for the 
party’s significant electoral malaise of this period. However while Gamble’s position did 
accept the importance of core ideological foundations in driving the party’s policy 
formulation and behaviour in office, he did not accept that such changing social and political 
developments should detract from the fundamental priority of winning elections and 
governing competently in the process (the basic tenets of the ‘statecraft’ theory72).   
 
This particular interpretation of Conservative motivations for governance, with more 
emphasis on the significance of ideological thought and a set of beliefs, was most explicitly 
exposed and highlighted by the ideologically-driven years of Thatcherism during the 1980s. 
This counter-argument to the pragmatic approach to holding office has been partially 
acknowledged by some cerebral Conservative politicians such as David Willetts who has 
suggested that: 
 
‘Conservatives do indeed have political principles- but they have emerged from 
political practice. Conservatives like their ideas made flesh in particular historical 
figures and circumstances’73.  
 
Such an analysis as espoused by contemporary Conservative politicians such as Willetts 
appears to suggest that a specific variant of ideological principles derive from empirical 
experience of political office, and this interpretation has also been re-affirmed from a more 
academic and politically neutral perspective as reflecting a scenario that: 
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‘….. while formally eschewing abstract doctrine and the policy blueprint, 
Conservatives have usually been prepared to admit to a certain perhaps instinctive 
approach to politics, a rather vaguely formed disposition or “mode of feeling”’74.  
 
This particular analysis therefore suggests that Conservatives do have inherent 
principles that derive from deep-rooted experiences, instincts and lessons from the past, 
and this in turn informs and directs contemporary policy-making in an appropriate 
‘ideological’ direction from an essentially empirical basis. This approach is said to have 
ideological implications in that it often seeks to defend the existing status quo in the 
process, and in this distinct interpretation of conservatism, the UK Conservative Party (even 
before the Thatcher period) has tended to broadly provide a political viewpoint that is more 
than just a movement that resists change, but is alternatively a movement that over the 
course of the 20th century has developed policy whose: 
 
‘ideological content was derived from the doctrinal motivated values that 
underpinned their policy prescriptions, which were designed to enable the 
Conservative Party to defend the existing social order’75.  
 
This particular interpretation by Heppell and Hill aligns a degree of ideology with a 
defence of a status quo ostensibly skewed in favour of Conservative interests, and is said to 
inspire the political actions of Conservative politicians and their formulation of policy 
despite the absence of a clear blueprint for action in dealing with various circumstances and 
occasions that an ideological creed or explicit doctrine would perhaps provide.  Any sense of 
ideology therefore derives from the actual activities and pragmatic experiences of previous 
spells of governance, and it is therefore argued by academics like Leach that any existence 
of a ‘conservative ideology has to be substantially inferred from the actions of Conservative 
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governments’76.  Consequently, an ideological guidance and tradition can be said to emerge 
from the practical and empirical realities of the everyday governance of the past, not from a 
detached and abstract philosophy that may never have been practically applied to everyday 
situations. This criticism could be applied to the explicitly ideological concepts of socialism 
or social democratic theory as is ostensibly the case for the party’s main political rivals, the 
Labour Party, although this analysis could perhaps be open to debate after the political 
pragmatism of the New Labour era (1997-2010). This emphasis on practical experience 
ultimately influencing future administrations is not dissimilar to Bullpitt’s basic analysis of 
the significance of ‘statecraft’, although unlike Bulpitt it promotes the existence of key ideas 
and principles over mere pragmatism and managerial competence. This more ideological 
emphasis would ultimately argue therefore that the Thatcherite ideological emphasis of the 
1980s was ‘not some kind of aberration..... (but) the adoption of an agenda consistent with 
tradition’77,  
 
However, given the broader context of a perceived absence of clear ideological 
direction during the post-war years (particularly in relation to Heath’s government from 
1970-74), a direct and recurring internal party criticism of the Conservative governments of 
this period has been that in attempting to run the machinery of government with such a 
pragmatic 'managerial’ ethos, figures such as Willetts argue that such an approach to 
governance can be viewed as an affront to the party’s intrinsic ideological traditions: 
 
‘A Conservative cannot simply approach politics in such a managerial spirit. There is 
bedrock of principle on which a Conservative government has to rest’78.  
 
In this context of enshrined and deep-rooted principles, it has therefore been argued, (and 
cited as both a strength and a weakness) that there are some notable examples of 
Conservative administrations that have been vehemently ideological, for example: 
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‘The Conservative Governments of 1979-97 ..... were fervently ideological and 
truimphalist’79. 
 
This specific historical period, particularly during the Thatcher years of power between 
1979-90, witnessed explicit ideological influences coming to the surface on an 
unprecedented scale, evident in the clear influence of the academic F.A Hayek and his 
seminal anti-collectivist work ‘The Road to Serfdom’80, along with the developing views of 
the economist Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics in the shaping of 
policy-making during this sustained period of Conservative government. Indeed, in sharp 
conflict with Bulpitt’s alternative theory that pragmatic ‘statecraft’ (and not ideology) was 
the main driving force behind much of the Thatcher period of government81, there do exist 
strong suggestions to the contrary, not least deriving from the direct sentiments of the 
dominant political figure of this period herself (as recalled by a contemporary Cabinet 
Minister): 
 
‘JA (Jonathan Aitken) remembers one or two specifics about MT (Margaret Thatcher) 
at these meetings..... she did say at an early one, “We must have an ideology. The 
other side have got an ideology, by which they can test things, we should have one as 
well”’.82 
 
While such comments could perhaps be interpreted as reflecting a somewhat 
simplistic and adversarial approach to politics from one perspective, at another level it does 
indicate that Thatcher recognised the significance of ideology in presenting a clear, focused 
and coherent message to the electorate within the political climate in which she operated, 
as well as acknowledging its significant function of establishing a cogent political identity in 
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the process. Subsequently, the Thatcherite ideological focus on core economic issues and 
key political priorities such as monetarism and the control of inflation led to a situation 
whereby the Thatcher government progressively ‘…..inserted into Conservative policy ..... a 
dogmatic tone that had previously been lacking’.83  ‘One Nation’ critics from the left of the 
Conservative Party, derided by the Thatcherites as ‘Wets’, fully acknowledged the more 
explicit ideological direction of the post-1979 Conservative government from the outset, 
despite being firmly opposed to the approach that Thatcher was taking : 
 
‘….. the 1979 government had an ideology (or something very like one)….. and 
attempts to reach consensus or compromise would merely adulterate truth with error 
and reproduce the deficiencies of previous governments’.84 
 
 Such an ideological approach to governance that appeared to stem from the inferred 
failures of previous Conservative governments (in both economic and social policy terms) 
antagonised some factions of the contemporary party. In particular, the ‘One Nation’ wing 
of the Conservative Party were collectively concerned with the specific implications for 
social policy and related welfare issues in particular, primarily due to the apparent 
downgrading of such issues as political priorities from 1979 onwards in comparison to other 
areas such as taxation, industrial relations and law and order.   Such was the impact of this 
ideological shift and the wider repercussions for society of the Thatcherite economic focus 
on retrenchment in the early 1980s, and in this context therefore, this post-1979 approach 
represented a marked contrast to previous post-war Conservative governments as it 
focused on ‘reversing the collectivism of the post-war years’85.  This was specifically the case 
in its rejection of the (social-democratic) consensus politics of the previous thirty years, 
‘consensus’ being the anathema to ideology and conviction, a term dismissed by Margaret 
Thatcher as being associated with those who had abandoned ‘all beliefs, principles and 
values’86. Thatcher’s disdain of consensual, relatively high-spending previous 
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administrations (of all parties), was coupled by a rejection of their limited and timid 
ideological direction. This Thatcherite analysis of the perceived financial profligacy of 
successive post-war governments was aligned to an over-generous welfare state that 
encouraged dependency, and this would have significant implications for the formulation of 
both economic and social policy-making during the watershed political decade of the 1980s.  
 
In this context, over the course of the 20th century the Labour Party’s more explicit 
adherence to socialist principles has meant that it has often received a stronger association 
with ideology and theory, with the Conservative links to this aspect of political behaviour 
often downgraded by comparison. This has been due to a traditionally reduced Conservative 
emphasis on this aspect of influence over political activity and the formulation of policy-
making, with many from this political viewpoint opting for a more pragmatic and adaptable 
approach to such matters instead.  However, many political and media commentators have 
argued that such a situation has perhaps reversed in recent years, particularly with the more 
ideological approach of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, who imposed ‘an ideological 
dogma upon the traditionally non-ideological Conservative Party’87. This notably contrasted 
with the New Labour stance from the mid-1990s onwards, which was broadly and 
deliberately  ‘ideology-light’ in its political approach, particularly under Tony Blair from 1994 
who preferred dealing with policy formulation on a more flexible and pragmatic basis. 
However, despite the desire by some acolytes to instil an unerring element of ideology and 
theory into the doctrine of Thatcherism, commentators such as Letwin have firmly rejected 
its claim to have theoretical aspects, primarily due its unerring pragmatism and focus on 
dynamism and ‘vigorous virtues’88: 
 
‘Thatcherism..... never pretended to consist in an academic analysis of politics at any 
level of abstraction. Its concern has been with action. Thatcherism has not got what 
it takes to be a theory’89.  
 
Modern Conservatism and future approaches to governance 
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Ultimately, in the context of this wider debate about the influence of pragmatism, ideology 
and theory on various post-war Conservative governments in particular, the key question is 
how much weight have ideological and theoretical influences had on driving Conservative 
ideas and policies (notably social and welfare policies) since the late 1990s, as opposed to 
the alternative approach of greater and more flexible pragmatic influences. The subsequent 
analysis has therefore focused on whether ideology or pragmatism has been the main factor 
in shaping the party’s social policy agenda in the modern political environment, or 
alternatively a fusion of the two. This question is particularly pertinent in the context of the 
revolutionary economic upheaval that Britain experienced during the 1980s, a decade in 
which fundamental economic restructuring appeared to take precedence in terms of 
government policy-making, with questions subsequently asked about how much attention 
and innovation was given by the governing Conservative Party to social policy and the 
promotion of ‘civic society’ by comparison. This debate has therefore been specifically 
prominent following the legacy of the Thatcherite socio-economic ‘revolution’ of the 1980s, 
and then in the aftermath of the 1997 electoral disaster, when the Conservatives had to re-
invent their core policy agenda and their overall political identity.  
 
In the post-Thatcher era, the debate about ideology has continued to generate much 
internal party debate focusing on whether more or less ideological emphasis and focus is 
desirable in future Conservative administrations, with an uncertain overall analysis as to 
whether the prominence of ideology will strengthen or weaken the party’s overall identity 
and practical electoral appeal in the long-term. Some academic analysis has subsequently 
asserted that in the wake of a decade of apparent certainty in the art of governance and 
statecraft that was arguably the source of the party’s political success in the 1980s, the 
party in fact struggled to administer power in a similarly competent way from 1990 
onwards: 
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‘The electoral decline and fall of the Conservative party in the immediate post-
Thatcherite era demonstrates that contemporary British conservatism has been 
characterised by a failure of party statecraft’90.  
 
This particular viewpoint (with added hindsight), would therefore appear to draw a contrast 
between the key argument put forward by Bulpitt in the early 1980s that Thatcher’s key 
political focus was the achievement and maintenance of ‘statecraft’ (rather than an 
ideological crusade), as well as Norton’s analysis of the late 1980s that pragmatic party 
loyalists prevailed over the Thatcherite ideologues within the Conservative parliamentary 
ranks and maintained a responsible and moderating influence over the direction of 
governance in the process. The revised post-Thatcher viewpoint of Heppell and Hill suggests 
instead that Thatcher’s over-emphasis on ideology and its associated rhetoric the longer she 
was in office ultimately eroded the potential for successful and sustained ‘statecraft’ and 
damaged the party’s’ delicate internal equilibrium, and as a consequence the party’s 
traditional unity was severely weakened. This in turn adversely affected its political fortunes 
in the long-term, culminating in the intra-party policy divisions of the 1990s and the 
electoral carnage of 1997 that led to thirteen long years in political opposition until 2010. 
This long-term Thatcherite legacy has therefore gone to the heart of the party’s definitive 
ideological identity and emphasis, although the argument put forward by Andrew Gamble 
suggests that ideology could indeed complement competence in office and not be a 
substitute for it, stating that Thatcherism represented a revised version of party statecraft 
that sought to promote more explicit conservative ideological principles. However Gamble 
did acknowledge in the late 1980s that ‘the short-term success of Thatcherite conservatism 
as an instrument of party statecraft would not be sustainable over the longer term’91, an 
argument ostensibly vindicated in his 1995 analysis92 which painted a more pessimistic 
picture of Conservative political fortunes.  
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This debate over the importance and emphasis of ideology within British 
Conservatism has ultimately influenced the context of David Cameron’s leadership since 
2005, and specifically how his brand of post-Thatcherite ‘modern’ Conservatism ultimately 
comes to be defined in both social and economic policy terms as well as electoral 
performance. Cameron has therefore sought to pursue a delicate balancing act of utilising 
occasional Thatcherite rhetoric while simultaneously embracing a pragmatic position on 
various socio-economic issues and emphasising greater emphasis on a distinct model of 
community-based ‘compassionate conservatism’ (evident in ‘The Big Society’), an approach 
aligned with more explicit public concern for the poorer members of society where it is 
considered politically expedient and appropriate93. This quixotic fusion of contrasting 
Conservative traditions has therefore often made Cameron’s agenda elusive and difficult to 
attach a specific label to, being somewhat distinct from both the traditional left and right of 
the party’s ‘ideological’ spectrum.  This fundamental question of the relative importance 
and influence of ideology in relation to the formation of party policy is therefore a dynamic 
and significant area of contemporary socio-political debate, and in assessing the evolution 
of specific Conservative Party welfare and social policies over the period of Coalition 
government (from 2010 onwards) and in future years, political observers will continue to 
analyse to what extent such policy has been shaped by explicit ideology as opposed to the 
pragmatism of ‘statecraft’, or possibly a fusion of both.  
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The Impact of the ‘New Right’ on the Conservative Party’s social policy agenda 
 
Following on from the initial chapter on ideology in a general and broader sense, this 
chapter seeks to explain and analyse the development and evolution of the specific ‘New 
Right’ ideology in its guise as a fairly contemporary and modern variant of Conservative 
political thought. As a viewpoint with a global context and influence, it sought to revive the 
values of the liberal ‘free-market’ economic environment of the mid to late 19th century, 
while seeking to dismantle the post-1945 welfare settlement. This ‘neo-liberal’ economic 
outlook subsequently established itself as a distinct influence within the British Conservative 
Party during a specific period of its political dominance in the 1980s, rejecting much of the 
party’s paternalistic social policy of the post-war period in the process.   In therefore 
emphasising precisely what the beliefs and key principles of this specific brand of 
Conservatism are, it is necessary to analyse its origins and to assess how it has developed as 
a specific political concept within the modern political framework, along with how it focused 
and attached itself onto the British Conservative Party’s policy-making agenda under the 
leadership of Margaret Thatcher from 1975 onwards. In particular, attention will be focused 
on how the New Right’s ideological thrust influenced the welfare and social policies of the 
Thatcher government between 1979 and 1990, and how it potentially continues to influence 
party policy in this area to the present day.   
 
The Origins of the New Right 
 
Having seized control of the direction of the Conservative Party in the mid-1970s, the 
challenge for the advocates of the ‘New Right’ was to craft and influence specific policies 
that could be implemented while in power, although this would be a significant challenge as 
Thatcher and her ‘New Right’ vanguard were only a minority clique of the wider 
parliamentary Conservative Party94, and far from politically secure in the early years of her 
leadership. Nevertheless, the Thatcherite or ‘New Right’ viewpoint heavily influenced the 
party’s sustained spell in political office from 1979 and subsequently throughout the 1980s, 
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pushing the Conservative administration of the 1980s in a more explicitly ideological 
direction in comparison to the conventional pragmatism that many commentators and 
observers had associated with the party’s approach to governance for much of the 20th 
century (see chapter one). The particular historical period from 1979 onwards witnessed the 
ideological edge of the ‘New Right’ wielding increasing power and influence within British 
politics, absorbing popular support in the process and being clearly in the ascendancy in 
terms of public opinion and electoral support. The ‘New Right’ had emerged as a 
transatlantic political presence and was therefore increasingly influential on a global level 
from the mid-1970s onwards, ultimately reacting to both international and specifically 
domestic political and economic events with its own proposed policy remedies to address 
the various socio-economic problems of the time. It reflected a philosophical strand of both 
British and international (notably American) conservative thought that rejected the inherent 
structure of the post-war consensus in relation to the perceived excessive levels of state 
intervention and regulation of the mixed economy, along with the high levels of taxation 
and corporatist trade union power, and which argued instead for a smaller state and 
reduced taxation within a neo-liberal ‘free-market’ economic framework95. It was therefore 
argued by advocates of the ‘New Right’ perspective that only in such a neo-liberal 
framework could maximum wealth be both created and shared efficiently across society, 
free from the constraints of an interfering and repressive state, therefore creating a 
scenario where: 
 
‘..... the less well-off are indirectly aided by the rich through the “trickle-down effect”, 
whereby the expenditure and investment of the wealthy percolates downwards and 
outwards to the rest of society, and thereby generates employment and finances 
welfare provision’96.  
 
This viewpoint appeared to promote a greater meritocratic and entrepreneurial model of 
society, and despite its ‘free-market’ emphasis, it still acknowledged the need for some 
variant of a welfare state to exist, albeit a less vast and bureaucratic one. Under this ‘New 
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Right’ political vision therefore, welfare provision would be funded and moulded by the 
dynamism of the ‘neo-liberal state’ and its economy, but while it offered the prospect of 
greater organisational efficiency and less bureaucracy, as a consequence it would also be 
potentially less comprehensive, a negative implication for the more vulnerable members of 
society who generally use such services more often. Those on the political left have 
consistently questioned the effectiveness and fairness of such a free market focus and 
‘trickle-down’ approach in spreading wealth and providing an effective welfare service in 
practical terms, and have ultimately argued that the neo-liberal economic and social model 
is in fundamental conflict with the more egalitarian vision as promoted and idealised by 
socialists and social democrats. The neo-liberal argument would certainly acknowledge that 
a more egalitarian model of society is not the likely outcome from such an economic 
structure (as developed further in chapter 3), but this is viewed as both a natural and 
desirable outcome of such economic liberalism, as the ‘New Right’ variant of conservatism 
views inequality as a natural state of affairs, as outlined below: 
 
‘The (economic) liberal will therefore distinguish sharply between equality of rights 
and equality of opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality of equality of 
outcome on the other’97. 
 
 This growing intellectual and theoretical influence culminated in a sustained period 
of political popularity and hegemony due to the perceived failures of the post-war ‘social-
democratic’ model of a mixed economy, with ‘New Right’ politicians such as Ronald Reagan 
and Margaret Thatcher gaining a political foothold from the mid-1970s onwards and holding 
political power in the USA and Britain respectively for most of the 1980s. In this political 
context, during the 1980s the Thatcher government in Britain was heavily influenced and 
intellectually consolidated by the neo-liberal agenda of economists such as Milton Friedman 
and F.A Hayek98. Friedman was associated with the ‘Chicago School’ (University of 
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Chicago)99, while Hayek was attached in academic terms to the ‘Austrian School’100. Despite 
such varying geographical origins, both economists fundamentally rejected the Keynesian 
post-war economic settlement101 that had been consolidated across much of the western 
world for approximately three decades since the mid-1940s, arguing that this ‘social-
democratic’ model of the state represented a ‘source of coercion’102 in relation to the 
autonomy of the individual citizen. They instead advocated economic de-regulation, greater 
promotion of ‘free-market’ capitalism and its associated culture of enhanced individual 
economic liberalism and personal freedoms. The international works of Friedman and Hayek 
in turn influenced Thatcher’s own British sources of ideological and political inspiration and 
prophecy, notably Enoch Powell, described by one commentator as ‘the heretical voice of 
the fifties and sixties’103 in terms of questioning the post-war consensus. As a primary British 
source of Thatcher’s political agenda, Powell espoused a devout and idealized faith in a 
society influenced by the principles of economic liberalism, genuinely believing that due to 
the ‘statist’ nature of the post-war settlement, there was subsequently a growing and real 
threat as ‘to whether a free society was to survive in Britain or be destroyed by socialism’104. 
Powell’s vocal and sustained critique of the post-war consensus was bolstered by the 
Institute of Economic Affairs105 (IEA, founded 1955 under the considerable influence of 
Hayek), and which sought to challenge the Keynesian post-war settlement. This body was 
bolstered by the emergence the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)106 in 1974, co-founded by Sir 
Keith Joseph, Alfred Sherman and Margaret Thatcher, who established it as ‘an institutional 
base for the dissemination of (their) revisionist agenda’107 that sought to challenge the post-
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war political consensus. Such bodies promoting economic liberalism would challenge the 
cost and scope of the British welfare state and its various policies, an increasingly relevant 
issue in an era of growing economic difficulties. Powell’s rhetoric alongside the pamphlets, 
seminars and publications of both the IEA from the 1960s onwards, and Joseph’s CPS from 
the mid-1970s, subsequently set the scene for ‘Thatcherism’ to emerge as a credible 
political entity within British politics: 
 
‘Arguably, Keith Joseph did as much as any other single person around the world to 
reshape the debate about government and marketplace, to take a variety of ideas 
and bind them together into a powerful critique of the mixed economy and, in the 
course of things, help shape them into a political programme. That agenda, in turn, 
was articulated and put into effect by his most important student, Margaret 
Thatcher. She made the ideas "happen."’108 
 
Thatcher’s administration therefore sought to practically develop this socio-
economic blueprint and subsequently aimed to steer Britain in a new and distinct ‘neo-
liberal’ political direction, offering a stark contrast to the bulk of the historical period since 
1945, which was essentially an era that had been anchored in the apparent certainties of 
the Keynesian analysis of post-war economics and society. However, such certainties had 
become distorted and undermined by major global and domestic economic failings by the 
late 1970s, and Thatcher sought to challenge them with her own brand of ‘conviction’ 
politics. However Thatcher’s own ideological certainties were not explicitly present from the 
outset of her period in office and would develop further as her confidence and political 
power grew as the 1980s progressed. She was however guided by some fundamental 
certainties from the outset that would shape her political legacy to the present day: 
 
‘Thatcher believed that modern Conservatism was barely distinguishable from the 
social-democratic path forged by successive post-war Labour governments. In her 
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view, Britain had lost its economic dynamism and, as a consequence, a culture of 
decline and dependency had been allowed to take hold’109.  
 
Yet in pursuing the approach to governance that it did, this post-1979 administration had to 
formulate, develop and implement some crucial and distinctly original policy decisions as 
Britain reached a critical socio-economic crossroads in terms of the sustainability of its long-
term levels of taxation, public spending and overall public service and welfare provision.   In 
therefore seeking to transcend and move the country on from a period viewed by the ‘New 
Right’ as being stagnant and regressive in its entrenched left-of-centre socio-economic 
agenda, Thatcher desired to lead a crusading and more ideological administration that 
would revolutionise the direction and emphasis of policy-making in the UK, dragging the 
gravity of British politics back to the right-of-centre from its perceived social-democratic 
predominance in the process. By enthusiastically embracing this ‘New Right’ approach to 
governance and providing a much more economic-centric edge to the government’s policy 
agenda in the process, in later years Thatcher would subsequently be described as ‘the most 
controversial prime minister in post-war British history’110, primarily due to the way that her 
ideological crusade vehemently rejected the post-war consensus and radically shook up the 
existing political order from the early 1980s onwards.  
 
Within a distinctly British political context, the ‘New Right’ movement ultimately 
evolved as a potent political force in a typically conservative pragmatic and circumstantial 
manner, as its emergence and prominence as a key influence within the British political 
sphere was ‘not originally an ideological conversion but more a response to events’111. The 
‘events’ that the British New Right variant sought to respond to was the tumultuous climax 
of the sustained ‘years of consensus’ from 1945 and which had dominated the political 
landscape for approximately thirty years. However, there was a  growing mood emerging in 
the 1970s that post-war British governments of all political persuasions broadly taxed and 
spent too much, had failed to address Britain’s post-war economic decline and industrial 
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inefficiencies, and that the ‘corporatist’ nature of trade union power was out of control. This 
led some to label the country as ‘the sick man of Europe’112 and such a mood came to a 
shattering crescendo in the winter of 1978/79, when rampant trade unionism heralded the 
‘Winter of Discontent’ and the apparent crippling of the British system of government, with 
even prominent Labour figures acknowledging the alienation of public opinion in the 
process: 
 
‘Garbage piled up and rotted in this streets…..picketing and closure of schools, 
and…..action preventing the burial of the dead, affronted the nation’113. 
 
This scenario appeared to vindicate the alternative political and economic agenda 
espoused by the ‘New Right’ thinkers of the period such as Keith Joseph, and as a 
consequence of such sustained industrial and economic disruption, a significant public 
backlash was evident in the 1979 General Election when the Conservatives were elected on 
a higher than average swing114, with Labour punished for its trade union links and its 
association with high ‘tax and spend’ policies. The specific policy-making agenda and 
political priorities of the incoming government from 1979 onwards was therefore focused 
on the development of innovative policies to instigate a long-term restructuring of the 
British model of government from its traditional post-war collectivist appearance, and 
instead moved in the direction of a more individualist overall structure. Such a political and 
socio-economic vision was shaped by some initial ideology but also influenced by the 
vagaries of circumstance: 
 
‘Thatcherite policies did not spring out of nothing. The way was prepared for them by 
a confluence of ideas, activities and circumstances’115. 
 
  In particular, such circumstances derived from the perceived expense and 
inefficiencies within the size and scope of the post-war state that had been identified from 
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the vantage point of the New Right’s perspective in political opposition from 1974 onwards, 
bolstered by the work of Joseph, the IEA and CPS, etc.  Now with its recently-acquired and 
notable influence over the party leadership, from the mid-1970s the radical ‘New Right’ 
identified the ever-growing and increasingly expensive welfare state as an area that needed 
significant reform and retrenchment in the context of the industrial unrest and negative 
economic growth of the 1970s. This political approach  marked ‘a major departure from the 
political consensus on welfare…..(and) also a fundamental change of direction for the 
Conservatives’116, who had previously supported its somewhat bloated and bureaucratic 
existence for the majority of the post-war ‘consensus’ period. Many within the ‘New Right’ 
were therefore clearly sceptical and even contemptuous of the scale of British welfare 
provision, increasingly identifying it with Britain’s sustained post-war economic difficulties. 
Such an attitude would ultimately have significant implications for the traditionally 
bipartisan approach in maintaining the generous image of the post-war British welfare state, 
and in adopting such an approach, the Thatcher administration sought to transform Britain 
from the epoch of consensus politics that had been dominant for the post-war era, with the 
premier making ‘no secret of her dislike of political consensus between the parties’117 that 
had existed for much of the post-war period118. Such an attitude applied to the issue of the 
welfare state along with many other aspects of post-1945 British politics, and in this 
context, the ‘New Right’ Thatcherite crusade should be understood as ‘a libertarian project 
bent on destroying the “liberal consensus”’119 within British politics and society. This notably 
different agenda simultaneously sought to erode what it perceived to be a dormant period 
of post-war history by pursuing a contrasting ethos for governance that aligned ‘the notion 
of conviction with the metaphor of movement and direction’120. This was in order to instil 
the necessary dynamism and broader electoral appeal into the Conservative Party’s political 
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agenda from 1979 onwards, as argued by Letwin’s notion of the ‘vigorous virtues’ that were 
an essential component of the Thatcher policy agenda121. Such a conviction-based 
‘libertarian’ angle emphasised greater economic freedoms and a reduced role for the state 
as a result.  
 
The Economic Implications of the New Right policy agenda 
 
Consequently the overall thrust of policy-making after 1979 appeared to take on a greater 
economic focus as opposed to a social one, although there were explicit social and welfare 
policy implications for an economic approach tinged with such a distinctly ‘New Right’ and 
neo-liberal flavour. Due to the concerns of both the ‘New Right’ and moderate left in 
relation to the long-term rising costs of the overall British welfare state by the mid-1970s, 
the development and innovation of social and welfare policy was often downgraded and 
initially overlooked as a policy priority by the incoming government from 1979. During the 
period from 1945 to the mid-1970s, there was broad bipartisan agreement on the levels of 
public spending and investment in social policies and public services, and within this 
context, from a long-term UK perspective the years since World War Two witnessed the 
state taking on a gradually increased degree of social responsibility for British citizens, 
reflected in progressively increased levels of welfare provision. This in turn led to enhanced 
levels of government spending and economic activity to support extended social policies, 
and as a consequence of such trends during this historical period UK government spending 
as a percentage of GDP steadily grew until it reached a peak of 48.9% in 1975122. This zenith 
of government expenditure prompted the Labour government of James Callaghan to 
acknowledge that Keynesian economics linked to an ever-growing state and its associated 
generous and costly range of social policies was no longer economically viable or sustainable 
for the foreseeable future123, even before the advent of Thatcherism in office.  
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Margaret Thatcher’s administration ultimately had an ideology-driven political 
strategy, despite the party’s traditional aversion to such an approach to governance.  From 
this perspective it was shaped by a coherent set of ideas and primarily focused on the 
perceived need to tackle such fundamental and deep-rooted structural economic problems, 
a side-effect of the generous welfare provision that had become more prominent as the 
post-war years had progressed. Yet according to one commentator, such an economic 
emphasis did not mean that Thatcherism was only about economics, but was rather: 
 
‘not so much an economic policy as a way of doing economic policy- or, more 
precisely, a way of not doing economic policy’124.  
 
The Thatcher government with its New Right hue subsequently placed a greater 
emphasis on developing and radically restructuring economic policies (a distinct approach 
from the mainstream post-war era) in order to address and tackle the high-spending social 
policies of successive governments of previous decades, and such an emphasis on financial 
retrenchment appeared to relegate the scope and potential for social policy innovation in 
the process. Social policy and economics certainly fuse in many areas of contemporary 
global politics, particularly so in welfare provision whereby the scale, cost and overall scope 
of welfare services are often inherently linked to the health of the contemporary economy. 
It has therefore been a recurring challenge of modern British political administrations to 
achieve a satisfactory balance between these different nuances within the overall policy-
making process, and socio-economic priorities and agenda will often change as governments 
change, as subsequent governments in the post-Thatcher era have proven. The 'New Right' 
emphasis on economics could still be clearly seen in one of its first major forays into British 
social policy, when the Thatcher government abolished the link between pensions and 
earnings in 1980, a move that appeared to be primarily motivated by economic factors 
rather than social ones, namely as a means of saving money. 
 
Thatcherite critics of Keynesianism claimed that it had served its purpose in 
promoting a short-term stimulus to encourage post-war recovery, but in the long-term it 
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simply increased levels of taxation, inflation, and public spending as an overall percentage of 
GDP, all of which are factors that restrict long-term economic growth according to the 
monetarist perspective. As a consequence, by the advent of the 1980s Britain’s post-war 
economic performance had been sluggish compared to other western nations, and 
according to the ‘New Right’ analysis, this had restricted the scope and effectiveness of 
social and welfare policies, primarily due to reasons of economic inefficiency. In general 
political terms therefore, social policy programmes and priorities could be broadly moulded 
and influenced by various economic forces and conditions at a particular period in time, and 
such economic pressure was certainly evident in determining the scale of social policy 
expenditure of the Labour government (1974-9), particularly in its twilight phase following 
the significant cutbacks imposed following the IMF’s intervention in 1976125. This period 
marked the end of the so-called ‘Golden Age’ of economic growth126, initially sparked by the 
1973 global oil crisis and culminating in rising unemployment, surging inflation and 
significant cuts in UK public spending and areas of social and welfare policy in the late 
1970s, which in turn prompted the ‘Winter of Discontent’ and the emergence of ‘New Right’ 
theories into the realities of political power. 
 
As a reaction to such global socio-economic developments and trends that were 
increasingly evident the 1970s progressed, the New Right’s advocates enthusiastically 
promoted monetarist theory (as espoused by its founding father Milton Friedman127), and in 
doing so sought to generate significant hostility to unnecessary government ‘interference’, 
evident in excessive ‘welfarism’, high levels of public expenditure, rising levels of inflation 
and significant economic regulation. As an economic theory, it therefore ostensibly offered 
a less ‘statist’ approach and alternatively pursued a greater emphasis on ‘marketisation’, 
generating greater fiscal and monetary flexibility in the process for those governments that 
adhered to its principles, and in adopting this approach the Thatcher government endorsed 
a ‘neo-liberal ideological assault on the post-war settlement’128.  This viewpoint ultimately 
argued that instead of targeting zero unemployment (as the prevailing post-war social-
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democratic model of governance had done), the market would determine a natural rate of 
unemployment and inflation would instead be prioritised, ultimately reducing the scope of 
the government’s traditional role in post-war economic management, which had 
consequences for social and welfare policy provision in the process.  In this context, the 
New Right’s influence sought to ‘nurture the values and attitudes needed to maintain 
capitalism in the new circumstances’129, with such circumstances being the 
acknowledgement of the failure of post-war Keynesian economics, exacerbated by the 
impact of the globalised slump on the British economy. Within such a context, Friedman’s 
monetarist doctrine therefore claimed that by rejecting interventionist and ‘futile attempts 
to push unemployment to zero (it would) no longer trigger inflationary spirals’130, and the 
fact that such sentiments appeared to be shared by both the incumbent British Labour 
Prime Minister and a neo-liberal economist within the same era seemed to affirm that there 
were severe implications for the long-term sustainability of the post-war model of social 
policy delivery due to such a diagnosis. The New Right’s agenda argued that the basic 
framework of Britain’s economy needed to be drastically revised and its welfare scope 
reduced in order to ensure a more effective and efficient management in the future. 
Inflation peaked at 26% during the mid-1970s and according to the analysis of the ‘New 
Right’ this was primarily due to decades of post-war economic intervention, with the 
government sustaining and subsidising inefficient industries and surplus jobs in the name of 
social harmony, but often in defiance of the demands of the free-market. This is a lesson 
that appeared to have been digested by Margaret Thatcher’s administration from an early 
stage of its existence: 
 
‘For the growing number of Conservative neo-liberals, emboldened intellectually by 
the ideas and critiques adumbrated by the New Right, many of the economic 
problems being experienced by Britain during the 1970s..... were a consequence of 
successive post-war governments, Conservative and Labour alike, not allowing “the 
market” to function freely’131.  
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This suggested that a radically different ‘free-market’ approach to economic 
management and policy-making would be pursued from 1979 onwards, and the Thatcherite 
reaction to the spiralling socio-economic trend of inflation that peaked in the mid-1970s 
was to explicitly reject the interventionist and statist nature of the Keynesian doctrine, and 
instead preach a return to liberal economics of the ‘Victorian era’, in line with Thatcher’s 
overall adherence to Victorian social and economic values of thrift and self-help. In this 
context, ‘Thatcherism’ represented a firm view that the basic economic policies and 
principles associated with the social democratic model of government that had dominated 
post-war Britain had to be rejected ‘in order to relaunch Britain as a successful capitalist 
economy’132, and in doing so the Thatcher administration represented a ‘New Right’ 
reaction that was vigorous in its ideological backlash to the socio-economic conditions of 
the time.  From this specific political perspective it was ‘a necessary response to the perilous 
state Britain was in prior to Thatcher’s electoral victory in 1979’133, and this required a ‘free 
economy and a strong state’, as described within Andrew Gamble’s notable analysis of the 
New Right agenda134, with its fusion of economic liberalism and social conservatism.  Such a 
marked change of government direction, with a distinct and contrasting political outlook 
from what had gone before triggered a clear shift towards fiscal retrenchment, 
marketisation and streamlining of public services and a significant review of overall 
government spending levels. This approach has been summarised by Gamble as requiring a 
‘strong state’ to instil the necessary structural framework that allows a government to 
impose its values and political tendencies, but at the same time allow capitalism to flourish 
by seeking to actively 'unwind the coils of social democracy and welfarism that had fastened 
around the free economy’135.  Indeed, Gamble’s interpretation of the New Right’s key aims is 
that a strong state is an essential factor for capitalism to work at its most beneficial and 
effective, being ‘dynamic and productive’ yet still reliant ‘upon institutions that the market 
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itself cannot generate spontaneously..... (leaving) a major role for government’136. The new 
Prime Minister from 1979 onwards clearly sought to rebalance the distinctly Keynesian slant 
of the political consensus that had been firmly established in the years following 1945, and 
in doing so the state was required to play a key role in fashioning the appropriate socio-
economic conditions and political structures. The post-war model of social democratic 
government was therefore condemned by the New Right acolytes as being fundamentally 
flawed, being a system that was ‘alien to the Thatcherites..... To them, Keynesianism was 
anathema’137. This would have drastic implications for social and welfare policies in 
particular, and from this ‘New Right’ perspective the creaking socio-economic structure of 
Britain needed to be radically altered and from the most radical Thatcherite perspective, 
perhaps even needing to be dismantled and re-built in a completely new guise. It was in this 
context that the 1980s witnessed ‘concerted attempts..... to refashion the welfare state’138.  
 
The New Right’s Influence on Margaret Thatcher and her social policies in office 
 
This socio-economic environment allowed Margaret Thatcher to initiate a range of scathing 
economic cutbacks in public spending as part of her ‘monetarist experiment’ from 1979 
onwards, a key and novel dimension to her ‘New Right’ agenda during her early years in 
power. By the  start of the 1980s, immediate short-term social consequences of such an 
austere approach to reducing the cost and scope of public service provision were fairly 
severe in terms of social unrest. It therefore appears that the clearest evidence of a 
correlation between economic and social policy can be seen when extreme economic 
pressures or a period of recession put strains on the maintenance and ongoing funding of 
key social policies within the overall structure of the welfare state and its associated services 
and provisions. Therefore, when such severe economic factors lead to cutbacks in the 
funding of welfare and social policies, there are often potentially serious social 
repercussions. Subsequently, in the aftermath of Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey 
Howe’s controversial 1981 ’retrenchment’ Budget in particular, the extent of such discord 
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that followed was such that ‘throughout 1981, Britain was a country nowhere near to being 
at peace with itself,139 with many inner-cities such as Liverpool, Bristol and London erupting 
and providing the backdrop to extreme and destructive rioting and social unrest, reflecting 
the mood of dissent among poorer social groups towards the sharp reductions in 
government spending programmes.  Accordingly, the more moderate ‘One Nation’ faction 
of the Conservative Party were alarmed at such direct and brutal social implications of 
Thatcherism, claiming that on two fronts, ‘economically and socially, the government was 
steering for the rocks- and hit them’140, their fears appearing to materialise with ‘Riots in 
Brixton a month after the budget and in Toxteth in July showed they had good reason to be 
worried’141. Such fears of widening social unrest contrasted sharply with the views of the 
Thatcherite ‘New Right’ ministers within government, most prominently Norman Tebbit, 
who in the midst of such escalating unemployment and social disharmony proclaimed that:  
 
“I grew up in the '30s with an unemployed father. He didn't riot. He got on his bike 
and looked for work, and he kept looking 'til he found it”142. 
 
This less sympathetic Thatcherite (New Right) reaction to such social unrest 
therefore contrasted sharply with the ‘One Nation’ Conservative viewpoint, and such 
differences marked a key fracture within the Conservative Party of this period in relation to 
economic policy and its social consequences. There has been much political debate as to 
whether the early phase of Conservative government from 1979 merited more failure than 
success (on various levels), and political commentators and academics ranging from Willetts 
to Letwin have appeared to identify this initial period of Thatcher’s Conservative 
administration as clear proof that the government was pursuing a ‘New Right’ inspired 
policy agenda that was ‘above all, economic’143. As a consequence social policy, social issues 
and broader welfare reform were seen as relatively neglected and even expendable in some 
cases in the name of initially balancing the books and achieving greater long-term economic 
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efficiency. As Letwin argues when she refers to the ‘vigorous virtues’, such an emphasis on 
economic liberalism and dynamism grew in its boldness and ideological vigour the longer 
Thatcher was in power, and it was during her second term (1983-87) that her definitive 
socio-economic agenda became most evident in its more economic slant, as her overall 
policy focus became ‘increasingly committed to the privatisation of public services and the 
reduction of public expenditure….. on the welfare state’144. Margaret Thatcher’s primary 
economic focus is often epitomised by the statement she made in the wake of her third 
election victory in 1987 that “There is no such thing as society”145, a phrase used out of its 
full context but which nevertheless appeared to emphasise her focus on economic 
individualism as opposed to a more prominent social agenda. However, those who worked 
closely with her during this period do not accept that social policy was abandoned to the 
extent that critics have claimed, as explained below: 
 
‘In her early days…..  (she was) pre-occupied with the economy and industrial 
relations and she turned to social policy in the mid-80s when welfare reform and then 
education became a priority. So it is true that it wasn’t a priority early on, but it 
became more of a priority later….. there was a caricature of Thatcher that came from 
the notorious ‘Woman’s Own’ quote- she was not really saying that she rejected 
society, she really attempted to correct a misapprehension about her views on 
society’146.  
 
Despite such a determined defence of her attitudes and outlook regarding social 
policy matters,  there have continued to be critical academic interpretations of the 
Conservative Party’s record in this broad policy area during the 1980s, re-enforcing the 
perception that Conservatives of the New Right variant were ‘not interested in society, and 
were merely concerned with economics’147, culminating in the socio-economic outcome that 
‘under-funding on public services was one of the key legacies of Conservative social policy in 
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the 1980s and 1990s’.148. There were however of course clear social consequences to the 
revolutionary economic policies pursued by the Thatcher government, often perceived as 
being negative, which again emphasises the intrinsic symbiotic link and overlap between 
economic and social and welfare policies in most models of contemporary politics. 
According to one contemporary Conservative activist looking back at this period, the need 
for radical medicine to the British economy meant that ‘the inevitable consequence of this 
was that social policy took rather more of a back seat than perhaps it should. The 
generalised perception of Conservative welfare and social policy throughout this period is 
thus probably negative’149. Having acknowledged such negative perceptions however, there 
were nevertheless tensions within the New Right itself between the Conservative neo-
liberals who wanted more radically de-regulated public services and those of a more 
authoritarian nature who favoured maintaining a ‘strong state’ as alluded to by Andrew 
Gamble. There were ultimately some distinct flagship social policies that emerged from such 
ideological tensions, an example being the acceleration of council house sales that proved 
to be very popular with many voters150. However, with welfare and social policies ultimately  
directly affected (often in an adverse way) by the government’s desire to shrink both the 
size and scope of its economic footprint, this would arguably set a precedent for future 
Conservative administrations in the pursuit of restructuring and reforming welfare and 
social policy while cutting public spending, with potential parallels evident in the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition administration that took office with an explicit 
‘retrenchment’ agenda in May 2010.   
 
Some Conservative figures of the moderate ‘One Nation’ wing, a faction of the party 
that was steadily overlooked and sidelined during the Thatcher period, have indeed 
acknowledged the apparent downgrading of social policy during this era, regretfully 
commenting on how it was in fact unfairly sidelined and somewhat neglected: 
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‘We do not make enough of our social record..... Why not develop our ideas about 
choice and better provision as a genuine social policy we are proud of?’151 
 
It ultimately transpired that the need to secure a restructured economic model that would 
deliver a specific kind of long-term stability was awarded greater political emphasis during 
the 1980s, but the focus on providing greater choice within social policy would nevertheless 
develop as the decade progressed and would significantly shape post-Thatcher Conservative 
thinking (and indeed wider politics) within this policy sphere.  During the 1980s such a 
focused emphasis on economic restructuring as the primary medicine for addressing 
society’s deep-rooted problems remained more obviously to the forefront of government 
policy direction, although despite this, it has been argued by academics such as Howard 
Glennerster that the Thatcher decade ‘was a decisive one for social policy’, although it was 
only after she had departed from office in 1990 that ‘distinctive legislative changes were 
placed on the statute book’152. However, despite this suggestion that social policy and 
related welfare issues were somewhat revitalised under John Major’s administration from 
1990-97, it has been acknowledged in the midst of this post-Thatcher period that it 
remained a low priority in policy terms and that future party leaders would have to grapple 
with it much more earnestly: 
 
‘The new theme of more fundamental change in Britain’s welfare state..... will fall to 
the younger generation of Conservatives to elaborate’153.   
 
This line of analysis will certainly have struck a chord with the Conservative politicians and 
‘modernisers’ of David Cameron’s ilk, who having surveyed the wreckage of the 1997 
general election defeat gradually sought to steer the Party back on the road to electability 
and a wider public appeal. This focus on the need for a refreshed and more attractive social 
policy agenda has marked a revised interpretation of the New Right’s legacy in terms a 
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practical and long-term welfare policy focus, and this has particularly resonated with David 
Cameron’s leadership agenda from late 2005 onwards.  
 
Modern Conservatism and links to the New Right Legacy 
 
Such an historical example of how the New Right tradition explicitly influenced the last 
sustained period of Conservative government and how it in turn created clear divisions 
between different sections of the Conservative Party has had contemporary repercussions 
in terms of how the party should function in office while implementing its policy-making 
agenda from 2010 onwards. Fears of repeated scenes of social unrest have been expressed 
in the context of the proposed economic cutbacks in 2010-11 to deal with Britain’s large 
economic deficit154, with similarly negative implications predicted for the implementation 
and delivery of social policy across the country. However such internal party divisions and 
tensions have perhaps initially been less apparent amidst the scenes of public unrest in 
response to the economic retrenchment imposed to tackle the national deficit from 2010 
onwards, e.g. over the protests at student tuition fees increases in late 2010. However, the 
extreme social unrest and rioting of summer 2011 (arguably linked to significant reductions 
in government spending) 155, may have more significant implications for the social policy 
agenda for the remainder of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s time in office, 
with some more moderate Conservatives and Liberal Democrats fearful of the potential 
unrest that could be caused by ongoing draconian cuts to key public services.  
 
While such gloomy and pessimistic contemporary parallels with the 1981 Budget 
have been highlighted by many on the left of the political and academic spectrum following 
the post-2010 economic cutbacks, the ‘New Right’ interpretation of events offers the 
alternative viewpoint that on a purely economic and fiscally responsible level, ‘The budget 
of 1981 is considered the epitome of soundness, an exercise in rigour that laid the 
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foundations for the strong economic recovery’156. This budget can therefore be viewed as of 
one of this historical period’s most significant socio-economic developments and is an 
episode used as a benchmark by the ‘New Right’ and the ‘fiscal’ Conservatives of the 
present day, offering a blueprint for Conservative administrations in how to deal with tough 
economic conditions and implementing the necessary measures of retrenchment while 
maintaining stable overall governance. Indeed many Conservative politicians within the 
coalition government from 2010 onwards would ultimately aspire to similar concerted and 
high-profile efforts to balance the books over the course of the 2010-15 administration, 
hoping to create a similarly restructured economy and accompanying socio-economic 
change in the early years of the new century157. It has however been noted by various 
political commentators that David Cameron appears to be the first Conservative Party 
Leader since 1997 who has sought to place more explicit focus on the need to acknowledge 
and address the social implications of the neo-liberal economic model in a way that the 
Thatcher regime perhaps did not: 
 
‘Cameron’s emphasis on social issues was intended to demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding his continued support for the neo-liberal economic agenda….. he 
accepted that the party had ignored the adverse social consequences that 
accompanied such radical social change’158.  
 
Cameron’s revised focus on the social implications of neo-liberal economics and a 
smaller state may however sit uncomfortably next to the social unrest witnessed across 
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Britain in the middle of 2011. David Cameron’s attitude on this subject has appeared to blur 
the extent of his Conservative identity, given that he has consistently expressed a ‘One 
Nation’ style paternalistic concern for the poorer members of society, but has also 
acknowledged the need for significant economic cutbacks aligned with the ‘New Right’s’ 
general analysis, broadly adhering to the neo-liberal economic model.  There ultimately 
appears to be some inconsistency and a sense of paradox within the Cameron socio-
economic prescription, and how this circle can be squared in policy terms during the course 
of his premiership remains unclear, and will perhaps evolve further in the face of events and 
circumstances.   
 
The Long-term Social and Political Consequences of the ‘New Right’ Policy Agenda 
 
Given such an unconvincing and somewhat uncertain legacy in the sphere of social and 
welfare policy from the 1980s onwards, the Conservative Party’s more explicit economy-
focused approach employed during this period ultimately had some harsh consequences in 
terms of broader social harmony, evident in the social unrest throughout the period such as 
the inner-city riots of 1981, the Miners’ Strike of 1984-5 and the poll tax protests of 1989-
90.  In this context and as a modern-day comparison, parallels can be made between the 
policy priorities of the early phase of Conservative government from 1979 onwards and also 
the proposed economic cutbacks of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition as outlined 
from May 2010 onwards. Such an approach has the potential to generate similarly negative 
implications for long-term levels of welfare provision159 and the broader social fabric, and 
there has already arguably been evidence of this in autumn 2010 with the various protests 
against the increase in university tuition fees160, alongside the more serious social unrest 
across much of urban Britain in the summer of 2011161.   As a consequence of such episodes 
of social turmoil in the 1980s, David Cameron’s generation of 21st century Conservatives 
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have been sensitive to criticisms that have aligned them alongside previous Tory 
administrations regarding the perceived neglect of poorer, urban areas and their inhabitants 
who on the whole are reliant on greater levels of state provision and welfare support, and 
who were adversely affected by funding cutbacks for various welfare policies during the 
1980s in particular162. However it remains unclear as to whether the approach to 
retrenchment from 2010 onwards has been specifically influenced by the legacy of the ‘New 
Right’ socio-political agenda or whether it has anything different to offer from the 1980s in 
terms of enhanced ‘compassion’ in ensuring adequate levels of social policy and welfare 
provision, while also maintaining social order in the process.  The broader social 
consequences of the summer riots of 2011 may reflect a deep-rooted negative public 
reaction to government austerity measures, creating the potential for a link to be made 
between the socio-economic approach of the New Right and the style and model of 
governance adopted by the Cameron administration.  
 
By contrast to its perceived neglect and indifference to social policy, during the 
1980s the Conservative Party appeared to have established a broadly positive reputation of 
economic competence as a key component of the radical ‘New Right’ agenda it pursued 
within this decade. Economic credibility therefore appeared to be the cornerstone of its 
political dominance, and this reputation was a key factor in the party’s impressive 
achievement of four election victories in a row between 1979 and 1992, with economic 
competence perhaps the crucial factor in its success in the particularly closely-fought 
general election of 1992163. This reputation of economic competence had been carefully 
cultivated by the New Right’s policy agenda that had featured privatisation, tax cuts and 
concerted anti-inflationary measures pursued throughout the 1980s. However, this 
reputation was shattered following the debacle of ‘Black Wednesday’ on 16th September 
1992, ‘the day the pound toppled out of the ERM….. a political and economic calamity’164. In 
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the wake of this event John Major’s Conservative government found that its former 
superiority on economic policy matters (as established during the 1980s), was eradicated by 
a fundamental lack of public trust on this vital issue. New Labour subsequently eclipsed the 
Conservatives in terms of economic reputation as the 1990s progressed, and the outcome 
of the 1997 general election was arguably sealed some years beforehand on the basis of 
such fundamental economic factors affecting electoral fortunes165, although issues such as 
sleaze and party divisions would also later transpire.  The disruptive legacy of ‘Black 
Wednesday’ could therefore be viewed as a major breach from the New Right’s economic 
blueprint, and it certainly played a key part in the Conservatives seeking to widen their 
overall policy appeal and extend their emphasis on social issues after 1997, as they were no 
longer as reliant on a relatively formidable economic record.  
 
Given the electoral annihilation of 1997 and further heavy defeats in 2001 and 2005, 
it became apparent that not only had the Conservative Party lost its previously unrivalled 
mantle of economic probity and competence, but perhaps more significantly, the party was 
also perceived as being out of touch with significant swathes of contemporary British 
society, particularly in relation to key aspects of the modern lifestyle and the associated 
social policies that had become important determinants in many people’s voting habits. This 
perhaps indicated that just as ‘Keynesianism’ had appeared to have served its purpose as a 
socio-economic model by the mid-1970s, so therefore had the principles and policies 
associated with Thatcherism and the ‘New Right’ by the mid-1990s, although Conservative 
politicians were often resistant to such suggestions, including the ‘modernisers’ within the 
party leadership after 2005, (in government from 2010)166, along with key groups of 
backbenchers such as the more traditionalist ‘Cornerstone’167 group of more socially 
conservative MPs. This went to the root of the Conservative Party’s troubled and uncertain 
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identity in the post-Thatcher period from 1990 onwards, with rival influences grappling for 
the party’s soul and its future political direction. In some respects it can therefore be argued 
that while society appeared to have evolved and developed during the party’s eighteen 
years in power (1979-97), the Conservative hierarchy, its broad attitudes and the wider 
party structure had seemingly failed to adapt and mould its own social policy agenda and 
social outlook accordingly. This was despite there being evidence of some notable 
demographic shifts across society in terms of gender politics, greater sexual diversity, more 
non-conventional family models and higher levels of multi-ethnicity within an overall more 
diverse and tolerant British social structure. This became evident in ongoing electoral 
difficulties and lack of broad appeal, as outlined by a Conservative MP at the start of the 
21st century: 
 
‘My children..... are all bright and ..... in their mid or late twenties, and probably 
natural Tories. But none of them would ever vote Tory. They think the party is totally 
out of touch. All the stuff about gays is totally incredible to them..... We have not 
selected a woman or an ethnic minority candidate for a single winnable seat. That’s 
the sort of party we have become’168.  
 
Once the Conservative Party was firmly consigned to opposition after 1997, this 
definitive electoral development provided party reformers and modernisers with a 
significant impetus to reform and explicitly re-align the party’s ‘post-Thatcher’ position in 
relation to some specific key issues and areas of social policy in particular, without 
abandoning Thatcherism and the ‘New Right’ legacy entirely. Therefore although the 
Thatcherite focus on neo-liberal economics, free-markets and Euroscepticism seemed to 
have been broadly maintained as key political tenets of Conservative identity, social policy 
had also ostensibly become a key competing factor in determining the nation’s broader 
political agenda and electoral behaviour. This renewed focus on devising distinct social 
policies and liberalising the party’s collective social attitude was further influenced by the 
fact that by the early 21st century, despite economic setbacks like ‘Black Wednesday’, there 
was broad cross-party agreement in support of the Thatcherite ‘neo-liberal’ economic 
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agenda that appeared to have been irreversibly established following the sustained period 
of Conservative government in the 1980s. By default therefore, social and welfare policy 
issues now required enhanced political attention after being somewhat sidelined by the 
New Right’s hostility to the perceived dependency culture engendered by the post-war 
social and welfare policies.  The New Right’s economic agenda of the 1980s had ultimately 
shifted the broader political debate and wider public mood in favour of the Conservative 
‘New Right’ political perspective, but the diverse social trends and developments of this 
period were less aligned with New Right values and therefore somewhat undermined the 
Conservative Party’s long-term electoral position. It is within this context that David 
Cameron’s leadership of the Conservative Party since late 2005 has from the very outset 
accepted and embraced the evolution of contemporary British society as an integral aspect 
of his determined vision to reverse the tide of repeated electoral defeat: 
 
‘David Cameron has stated his desire to “rebalance” the Conservative Party because 
“towards the end of the 1980s we did become too much the economics party”. He 
felt able to do so because of his conviction that his party has won the battle of ideas 
in political economy, and that New Labour’s success was very proof of that’169.  
 
This viewpoint acknowledging the need to specifically address and give greater 
emphasis to welfare and social policy echoed those of party heavyweights who had 
preceded Cameron in holding prominent positions within the party following the loss of 
office in 1997. In 1998 Michael Portillo, the former Thatcher Cabinet Minister and Shadow 
Chancellor (2000-2001) had claimed (as part of his transformation from a ‘New Right’ 
disciple of Thatcherism to a socially liberal Conservative), that the Tories needed to address 
welfare reform, particularly ‘getting away from the sense of entitlement’170 evident in some 
welfare recipients, as well as tackling the negative image of some aspects of the party’s 
approach to welfare policy. Even William Hague (party leader 1997-2001), and viewed as 
being less socially liberal than the post-1997 Portillo, accepted that the ‘Tories cannot any 
                                                          
169 Simon Lee, ‘Convergence, Critique and Divergence: The Development of Economic Policy under David 
Cameron’, cited in Simon Lee & Matt Beech (eds.), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edn., 2009), Ch.5, p.78, adapted from Dylan Jones, Cameron on 
Cameron: Conversations with Dylan Jones, (Fourth Estate, London, 2008), p.288 
170
 Michael Portillo, Interview with Hugo Young, 24 September 1988, cited in The Hugo Young Papers: A 
Journalist’s Notes from the Heart of Politics, (Penguin, 2009), p.573 
  69  
 
longer be just an “economic party”..... (and) implied a desire to open up on the welfare and 
other social issues’171. Therefore, despite such ostensible success in shaping the country’s 
long-term economic values and infrastructure during the watershed decade of the 1980s, 
there was a growing feeling by the early 21st century that the required focus on social issues 
had been somewhat neglected during the period of Thatcherite political hegemony, and 
that the Conservative Party had been responsible for ‘shirking responsibility for industrial 
and social issues where it ought to act’172. Such apparent neglect, lack of priority and limited 
interest in social issues ultimately appeared to result in the Conservatives developing a 
sense of disconnection with the mainstream electorate’s general social values and 
expectations that had been shaped as a reaction to the dramatic economic changes of the 
1980s.  This culminated in uninspiring and disconnected social policies that were 
unappealing to significant swathes of society, and which offer one key explanation for the 
major loss of electoral support the party experienced from 1997 onwards.   
 
This post-Thatcher, New Right legacy generated the phenomena of the 
Conservatives increasingly perceived as being ‘out of touch’ with broader society at the end 
of the 20th century, a 100-year period that the party had dominated in political terms. This 
was observed by major Conservative donor Michael Ashcroft after the 2005 General 
Election when he warned that despite a modest electoral improvement (an increased vote 
of 0.7%), the level of popular support for the party was effectively ‘flatlining’ and had risen 
minimally in eight years (1.7%)173. Ashcroft subsequently concluded that there needed to be 
urgent ‘modernisation’ and radical reform of Conservative Party values and identity if the 
party was to make any kind of significant electoral recovery174 within a post-Thatcher British 
society. Such deep-rooted limitations in wider public support was arguably influenced both 
by the negative economic performance of the last Conservative government, along with a 
perceived unpalatable and unsympathetic approaches to challenging socio-economic issues 
such as unemployment, the benefits system and welfare reform.  A concerted attempt to re-
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balance this approach has been evident since Cameron’s seizure of the leadership in 2005, 
with its ‘modernising’ emphasis on: 
 
‘protecting core services ahead of tax cuts..... (and being) at ease with modern 
Britain, with a multicultural society and with people who had different lifestyles and 
sexual preferences’175.  
 
Such an introspective analysis and subsequent desire for a fresh strategic approach 
aligned itself with existing external opinions about the Conservative Party image, identity 
and wider public perception in the aftermath of the dominant ‘New Right’ era, and 
specifically the Thatcherite association with conservative Victorian social attitudes, a 
position that could often be aligned with intolerance.  At the 2002 Conservative Party 
Conference, Party Chairman Theresa May accepted that the party needed to extend its 
popular appeal and effectively 'catch up’ with the changing British social agenda that had 
evolved considerably while the party had been in power up until 1997. In this context, May 
controversially acknowledged that many people had negative memories of the previous 
Conservative government and some of its social attitudes:  
 
“There's a lot we need to do in this party of ours. Our base is too narrow and so, 
occasionally, are our sympathies. You know what some people call us - the nasty 
party”176. 
 
Such a brutal self-assessment is perhaps a reflection of the fact that in the three 
general elections between 1997 and 2005, the Conservative Party and its New Right focus 
on economic neo-liberalism appeared out of touch with the aspirations, social priorities and 
contemporary attitudes of modern, multicultural, heterogeneous Britain, often abruptly and 
instinctively opposed to the Labour government’s ‘social liberalism’177 and its associated 
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bureaucratic measures, yet having little in terms of a constructive alternative agenda to 
offer. Thus, the New Right vocabulary and rhetoric that was politically appealing during the 
1980s now appeared to hinder efforts to articulate a coherent and persuasive Conservative 
Party programme or image in terms of an innovative and coherent set of social policies. For 
example, in a throwback to the Thatcherite ‘Victorian’ mentality on both social and 
economic issues, after 1997 the party opposed issues such as adoption rights for gay 
couples, initially opposed the minimum wage178 and also the ‘targeted’ tax credits policy 
aimed at poorer social groups, often creating adverse headlines in the process when its own 
stance appeared out of touch with a more benevolent and tolerant public opinion179. 
Conservative Party modernisers have therefore attempted to detach themselves somewhat 
from the intolerant and moralistic aspect of the New Right’s legacy, fully conscious of the 
party’s ‘weak standing with the electorate, particularly on health and welfare issues’180, and 
in turn have sought to progressively and pragmatically develop a more appealing image for 
moderate floating voters under David Cameron’s leadership since 2005. The New Right’s 
intense ideological emphasis ultimately appeared to have de-stabilised the party’s internal 
equilibrium in the long-term, affecting the long-term balance of its policy focus. By the start 
of the 21st century this ultimately led to demands for re-alignment and the ‘detoxifying’ of 
the Conservative image181 in relation to the more negative aspects of the New Right’s 
legacy, and an opportunity to address its ‘divided ideological legacy.....(of) economic 
liberalism (and) social conservatism’182.  Cameron has therefore purposely sought to 
eradicate negative perceptions by revising the party’s position on some key social and 
welfare policy issues and therefore making: 
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‘major attempts to distance the Conservatives from their image as the “nasty” or 
“uncaring” party..... to “decontaminate” the brand’183.  
 
New Right Influences over the Conservative Party’s policy agenda in the 21st century 
 
In seeking to speak with a more ‘compassionate’ and liberal tone on social and welfare 
policy-making in particular, the Conservative Party in the early years of the 21st century has 
aspired to adopt a modernised, pragmatic and ‘reformist’ policy approach, adapting and 
accepting much of Labour’s increased investment in public services and the associated 
increased taxation agenda since 1997. This was a consequence of ‘New Labour’s politics of 
dominance in the area of public services’184 and the associated electoral success in the form 
of three successive general election victories. Election results between 1997 and 2005 
would therefore suggest that the electorate broadly supported this enhanced attention to 
public services as espoused by Blair and Brown, although the Conservatives consistently 
demanded greater efficiency in the use and expenditure of public finances in terms of 
supporting associated social and welfare policies.  In responding to such political realities in 
a pragmatic and flexible manner, the Conservatives have adapted their image and renewed 
their focus on refreshing their policy agenda within this specific sphere. This has resulted in 
a departure from the more ideologically robust ‘New Right’ stance of the 1980s, although in 
seeking to revitalise the Conservative Party brand, David Cameron has been careful not to 
completely detach himself from the Thatcher influence and legacy185 and alienate sections 
of his party in the process, in rhetorical terms at least. Nevertheless, the more socially 
liberal and tolerant ‘modernising’ tendency within the Conservative Party has notably 
progressed under the leadership of Cameron since late 2005, arguably at the expense of the 
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economic neo-liberals, and possibly as  a consequence of the  difficult years of William 
Hague’s leadership (1997-2001) and also the Iain Duncan Smith era  (2001-3) in particular186. 
During this phase of national opposition (1997-2003), the party appeared particularly 
confused about its political identity and reverted to speaking primarily to its core supporters 
and its media allies, with its popular vote remaining static accordingly: 
 
‘Between 1999 and the 2001 election campaign, Conservative policy changed 
direction to focus on bolstering the Party’s “core” support..... the leadership 
appeared increasingly to shape policy in response to the latest headlines in the Daily 
Telegraph and Daily Mail’187.  
 
Yet despite such an approach under Cameron that has been intent on widening the broad 
appeal and revised policy agenda of modern, post-Thatcher Conservatism, even in 2010 the 
party’s level of popular support was disappointing in comparison to former levels of 
electoral approval, rising less than 6% between the electoral nadir of 1997 and the return to 
national office in 2010188. David Cameron subsequently moved into Number 10 ‘with a 
smaller proportion of support from the electorate than any previous Conservative prime 
minister’,189 although marginally more than Tony Blair’s level of support on his third election 
victory for Labour in 2005. This reflected the Conservative Party’s image problems within 
some sections of society, suggesting an inability to eradicate the wider public’s memories of 
some unpopular policies from its previous spells in office.  
 
While such statistics of declining contemporary political support may provide 
succour to those Thatcherites from the New Right tradition who seek a return to the 1980s 
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populist brand of Conservative policies, these bleak electoral statistics ultimately indicate 
the long-term decline in popular support for the Conservative Party, the ‘natural party of 
government’ for much of the 20th century. This illustrates the dilemma facing any incoming 
Conservative government and its efforts to re-mould distinct and radical social and welfare 
policies along with a greater degree of decentralisation and economic efficiency fuelled by 
its ‘Big Society’ vision. With such limited, falling and volatile levels of popular support, this 
fragile public mood is likely to further undermine the Party’s popularity if it pursues the 
streamlining economic reforms it claims are necessary to tackle the national deficit amidst a 
lingering recession and global economic crisis, significantly hampering its room for 
manoeuvre in its social policy-making agenda. However, amidst the financial and banking 
crisis from 2008 onwards, the Conservative leadership’s decision to adopt the language of 
retrenchment and to de-align from the Labour administration’s spending plans suggested a 
move in the direction of the Thatcherite ‘neo-liberal’ approach of the 1980s. In 
pragmatically adapting to the economic fluctuations of the time, Conservative politicians 
were able to argue with greater confidence for ‘small government’ and inserting some clear 
divisions and differences between the two main parties in the process on both economic 
and social policy. This approach has been viewed by some as an opportunity for the 
Conservatives to re-assert their case for the New Right’s agenda of a smaller state and 
reduced expenditure on key welfare and social policies, with a prolonged recession and 
global financial crisis creating the appropriate conditions for this. This strategy came to its 
most explicit fruition when having returned to office at the head of a coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats in May 2010, £17.5 billion was initially trimmed from the welfare bill 
alone in the Emergency Budget that took effect from October 2010190. This appeared to 
reflect in economic terms at least, that the party had retained some core Thatcherite New 
Right principles, particularly regarding the modern party’s ‘historic scepticism towards public 
spending’191.  Therefore, in this revised analysis of the country’s economic policy-making 
approach: 
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‘’Cameron ditched his previous pledge to match Labour spending levels..... (and) 
rediscovered virtues in Margaret Thatcher, the woman hitherto largely airbrushed 
from history in his speeches. Cameron and Osborne made themselves champions of 
fiscal conservatism, opening up the biggest divide on economic policy between the 
parties for more than a decade’192.  
 
In this context of a re-evaluation of Conservative economic and social priorities and levels of 
public expenditure, there appears to have been an apparent reversion to the Thatcherite 
language of retrenchment amidst a major recession, and Cameron appears to have revised 
and re-defined his approach to the promotion of ‘compassionate conservatism’ in practical 
policy terms, taking the opportunity to relegate and downgrade the former dominance of 
the centralised state. Utilising the language and rhetoric of social responsibility and 
community action, Cameron has therefore initiated flagship policies such as ‘the Big Society’ 
which despite criticisms of its vagueness, has symbolised a willingness to take the 
ideological argument to Labour about how to operate both economic and social policy 
within a tighter financial strait-jacket, seeking to reclaim the Conservative Party’s economic 
reputation while simultaneously seeking to infiltrate Labour’s traditional hegemony in 
electoral terms on social and welfare policy matters.  
 
The long-term challenge for the contemporary Conservative Party in the early 21st 
century remains to convince key socio-economic groups within the electorate that it seeks 
to pursue a credible agenda of reform, modernisation and innovation of social and welfare 
policies for this specific historical era, and that a simultaneous economic approach moulded 
by fiscal conservatism, retrenchment and a nod to the New Right’s neo-liberal traditions, is 
in fact a genuine attempt at balancing the nation’s books and restoring a degree of stability 
and order to the nation’s finances. Such an approach has however had to be reviewed by 
changing economic circumstances, as: 
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‘The politics of the welfare state has been changed by the economic downturn. As a 
Times leader put it (2008), “Compassionate conservatism is a more difficult 
proposition in a recession”’.193  
 
In pursuing this approach therefore, the New Right’s legacy of fiscal conservatism has re-
appeared on the political horizon, and David Cameron’s modern Conservative Party has 
been hampered in its socio-economic outlook by the challenges of a global economic 
recession, making it even more difficult to fulfil their primary aims of streamlining the British 
welfare model in a compassionate way in order to simultaneously maintain sustainable and 
genuine welfare and social policies.  
 
In cultivating a more compassionate image, the Conservative Party’s leadership of 
the early 21st century will be wary of the potential dangers and hazards in preserving this 
appearance while engaged in a political agenda focused on retrenchment, reflecting the 
prevailing socio-political mood since the party returned to national office in 2010. There are 
therefore both potentially negative perceptions and radical implications of pursuing welfare 
reform amidst a recession, as identified by some elements of the ‘New Right’ from the 
1970s onwards: 
 
‘In many countries, a conservative resurgence accompanied the economic turmoil of 
the late 1970s. Conservative parties gained strength, and within these parties 
leadership shifted to those most critical of the post-war consensus on social and 
economic policy. These newly ascendant conservatives viewed the welfare state as a 
large part of the problem..... In short conservatives viewed retrenchment not as a 
necessary evil but as a necessary good’194.  
 
This suggestion of a sense of political opportunism amidst economic uncertainty among 
acolytes of the New Right has been observed by academics including Andrew Gamble, who 
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has stated that dissident figures on both the left and right of politics in the 1970s who were 
disillusioned by the apparent failings of the post-war consensus, subsequently ‘welcomed 
the political space created by the recession and the possibilities for refashioning institutions 
and redesigning policies in radical ways’195. Gamble has referred to this development as 
being part of a ‘crisis of social democracy’196 which gave the more pro-capitalist  ‘New Right’ 
agenda an opportunity to fill a socio-political vacuum with a model of government more 
aligned with the principles of free-market liberal democracy instead, namely a ‘free 
economy and a strong state’.  Within such a socio-political context, the New Right’s attitude 
and legacy in terms of the possibility to radically restructure of the welfare state has meant 
that contemporary groups of floating voters have remained more sceptical of the 
Conservative Party’s position towards social policy and ensuring adequate welfare provision 
in recent years (evident in declining levels of popular support at recent general elections). 
This is based on perceptions that the Conservative Party did not sufficiently invest in or 
focus on the core welfare state during the 1980s, and have therefore sought to pursue a 
‘broader decontamination strategy' in this respect197.   
 
In such a context the new generation of Conservative politicians have to convince a 
wider and more sceptical audience of their genuine interest and benevolent concern in both 
the maintenance and innovation of credible social policies (within a revised post-Thatcher 
image), as part of their overall strategy to establish a sustainable model of welfare provision 
for the 21st century. This may be a challenge given that there is evidence from within the 
Conservative Party’s 2010 intake of MPs of a notable appetite ‘for the Thatcherite agenda of 
tax cuts, continued marketisation and downward pressure on public spending’198.  In this 
context it would therefore appear that some within the Conservative ranks have seen an 
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opportunity or a ‘necessary good’ (as was ostensibly the case in the 1970s) for radical socio-
economic restructuring and the resurgence of a Thatcherite ‘rolling back’ of the state and 
the instillation of some ‘vigorous virtues’ into the British welfare model as a consequence of 
economic difficulties faced.  Public opinion towards this approach is open to conjecture, as 
there appears to be significant fluidity in public attitudes towards taxation and public 
spending, with some recent analysis indicating a shift towards increased support for 
retrenchment, particularly so as the New Labour years in office progressed, ‘with ‘strong 
evidence for a decline in support for tax-funded increases in state provision and hardening of 
public attitudes towards welfare recipients’ 199 during the Blair/Brown era. However such 
increased scepticism of Labour’s perceived financial profligacy from 1997 onwards has not 
appeared to automatically translate into an enthusiastic endorsement of alternative 
Conservative models of economic retrenchment, perhaps evident in the inconclusive 
outcome of the 2010 General Election200.  Such apparent wider suspicion of Conservative 
public spending proposals on social and welfare policies has been heightened by the 
economic slump and associated employment insecurities of those who may come to rely on 
its provisions, and in such a context Cameron’s ongoing focus in this policy sphere will be to 
convince the electorate that the maintenance of core services can be complemented by 
greater economic efficiency within a framework of fiscal conservatism.  The New Right re-
structured some key components of the established post-war welfare state in Britain during 
the 1980s, but a more radical restructuring of core public services and reduction of welfare 
expenditure remained an uncompleted aspiration of the ‘New Right’ project during its 
decade of political ascendancy. The failure to fulfil its idealised vision of welfare and social 
policy provision was fundamentally due to reasons that remain to this day, ‘that the 
structural impediments involved are little short of immense’201 and also that ‘a crucial 
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constraint on the Conservatives was the sheer popularity of welfare institutions’202. Public 
opinion and significant bureaucratic impediments were therefore key factors that ultimately 
prevented the New Right’s imprint on British society and policy-making from being as deep 
as it could have been during its period of political hegemony throughout the 1980s. This 
raises the key question as to whether the same impediments are in place in the early years 
of the 21st century should similar policy reforms be pursued.  
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Modern Conservatism and Social Justice in Theory 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address and analyse the meaning of the concept of social 
justice and how it has influenced the formulation of Conservative Party social and welfare 
policy in the contemporary political environment, focusing on policy evolution of recent 
years, and particularly since the party comprehensively lost power in 1997. Social justice is 
an ambiguous phenomenon that has proved to be a dynamic, ambiguous and flexible term 
in the modern political arena, with its different interpretations forming the basis for 
significant debate among the various political parties and politicians of the modern era from 
approximately 1979 onwards. A concise yet fundamental definition of this crucial political 
term can be expressed as: 
 
‘The morally justifiable distribution of material rewards….. often seen to imply a bias 
in favour of equality’.203 
 
Such emphasis on equality implies an ‘egalitarian’ concept that has subsequently developed 
into a pivotal political issue that has become increasingly prominent in British political 
debate over recent years, and which in turn has shaped and influenced the formulation of 
both social and economic policy of the mainstream political parties, and which has retained 
significant resonance and appeal with key parts of the electorate. Its conventional political 
interpretation suggests the need for an active and interventionist role for the state as the 
mechanism that can deliver and ensure that this variant of ‘justice’ entails, and the concept 
has consequently been of significance to contemporary Conservative fortunes in particular, 
as recent polling has indicated that there is: 
 
‘greater scepticism about the Conservatives’ broader policy agenda, which to some 
extent supports the data from the British Social Attitudes survey..... (indicating) 
relatively high levels of support for state provision’204.  
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Such public attitudes have indicated scepticism about the Conservatives’ broader social 
policy agenda, alongside evidence of firm support within society for a positive and fairly 
active role for the state205. This political trend has led to an enhanced and inflated emphasis 
on the concept of social justice and its associated vocabulary, and it has subsequently been 
increasingly utilised as a rhetorical device by mainstream politicians of all parties, with the 
desirability of achieving a policy-making outcome ostensibly based on the principles of social 
justice an increasingly influential element of contemporary political debate. However, given 
that the concept of social justice is not always clear in its meaning and is open to political 
interpretation, what its precise principles are has also been a key aspect of the political and 
philosophical debate that its usage has generated.  
 
Although somewhat vague in terms of its precise meaning, ‘social justice’ has been a 
key feature of the evolution and formulation of both social and economic policy within the 
modern political era, and all political parties and viewpoints have been affected in various 
ways by its influence. On its most basic level, it ultimately appears that the conventional and 
widely-held interpretation of social justice is fundamentally aligned with the values of 
fairness and equality, bolstered by an active role for the state in achieving such aspirational 
outcomes.  In this context such terms and phrases have tended to be more generally used 
and emphasised by politicians of the left and centre-left of the political spectrum, who have 
in the modern political era appeared more comfortable in the use of such associated 
rhetoric. Subsequently, the term and its associated vocabulary have been viewed as an 
ideological accessory of the left and centre-left for most of its usage within the modern 
political era. Within such a ‘conventional’ interpretation, the role of the state has 
accordingly been traditionally viewed as a fundamental tool as a means of achieving social 
justice, either by government social or economic policy and/or via state intervention to 
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achieve a more egalitarian or ‘socially just’ outcome in terms of addressing long-term 
inequality and poverty within society. This aspect has re-affirmed the leftist hue of the 
concept and as a result of such trends, many Conservatives, both politicians and 
commentators, have come to be critical and even resentful of the left’s monopoly and 
specific interpretation of this term, being sceptical of its ‘egalitarian’ meaning, along with its 
actual effectiveness and practicality in the process. In short, egalitarianism and fairness are 
concepts that have been regularly used as the conventional justifications for social justice as 
part of an ‘emotional appeal206’ by mainly left-wing politicians, and this has presented 
politicians who are dubious of its meaning and interpretation with a challenging dilemma in 
how they can develop an alternative analysis that negates such emotive implications yet 
which can offer a challenging and distinctive alternative with popular political support.   
 
In the context of a traditional Conservative political perspective therefore, a concept 
such as ‘social justice’ that appears to be skewed in favour of a state-generated 
egalitarianism creates potential difficulties in terms of being enthusiastically embraced as an 
aspirational or idealised model of society. Indeed many Conservative academics and 
politicians have condemned this left-of-centre interpretation of social justice that seeks to 
promote enhanced levels of social equality as being ‘one of the central prejudices of modern 
British politics’ that emerges in practical form as a flawed ‘belief that it is the proper function 
of the British state to influence the distribution of wealth for its own sake’207.  This 
Conservative position therefore fundamentally rejects the philosophical basis behind the 
conventional view of social justice, namely its emphasis on greater egalitarianism and a 
more ‘statist’ style of governance as a consequence, fundamentally questioning the need for 
such an approach to public policy-making in the process. Joseph and Sumption in particular 
argue that in practical terms an inflated role for the state is a natural consequence once this 
concept is established as a key guidance for government policy-making208, and the position 
of such Conservative and free-market thinkers, academics and politicians have therefore 
preferred to endorse a position that favours a  less interventionist approach as far as the 
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role of the state is concerned, instead focusing on the value of individual capabilities which 
involve ‘privileging liberty, (compared to) socialists prioritising equality’209.   
 
Conservatives are therefore traditionally sceptical of the concepts of egalitarianism 
and conventional social justice due to the fact that, as already alluded to, both are political 
terms that are viewed as being aligned with the left of politics and the socialist or social 
democratic tradition and vision of society. Consequently, many Conservatives have a deep-
seated ‘wariness of egalitarianism210’, in that they feel it is part of a left-wing myth that 
justifies a particular version of social justice that relies on significant state provision to 
achieve its aims, and within an overall social model that argues that equality of outcome is 
both desirable and achievable. This perception and interpretation of how society should 
ideally function is rejected as a ‘myth’ by many of those within the ‘New Right’ faction of the 
Conservative Party that has come to prominence over the past thirty-five years, and who 
are notably strident in articulating a viewpoint endorsed by many conservative politicians 
and thinkers across the world, namely that inequality is ‘natural and inevitable, a fact of life 
which cannot be altered, and which therefore should be readily accepted, rather than viewed 
as a problem to be eradicated’211. Indeed, stemming from this scepticism of egalitarian 
vocabulary and sentiment, some Conservatives with links to the Thatcherite New Right 
tradition have subsequently referred to social justice as a ‘slippery term’212, open to 
ambiguity and representing an inaccurate vision of how human nature operates in practice.  
This conventional ‘social-democratic’ interpretation of social justice therefore ultimately 
represents a clear and fundamental distinction from the core Conservative principles of the 
post-1979 era, namely the need for greater individualism and enhanced economic freedoms 
that entail greater competition, extended choice and better value for the individual. 
Conservative critics of the leftist use of the term argue that the implications of this approach 
are a growth in ‘statist’ regulation, which in turn creates a state-instigated outcome that 
could also be viewed as unjust from a free-market perspective. The New Right have 
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therefore argued that such ‘un-natural’ and impractical desires for greater equality of 
outcome directly led to the bureaucratic and interventionist tendencies of the state that 
were a prominent feature of the post-war years of consensus between 1945 and the mid-
1970s.   
 
Conservative views of liberty and equality 
 
Most Conservatives would therefore view political and economic liberty as of a much 
greater value than the achievement of greater social and economic equality213, the latter 
being a concept which is generally viewed by those on the right of politics as being an 
idealistic theory that is ‘undesirable and unattainable’214 in practical reality.  They instead 
emphasise the importance of securing and maintaining economic freedoms from the 
potentially dominant and repressive power of the state as the key mechanism by which 
individuals can progress within society. Some Conservative thinkers and politicians would 
link this broad scepticism towards the likelihood of achieving a society based on collectivism 
and equality with the more pessimistic outlook towards human nature in general that is 
often associated with the more right-wing variant of politics. This is a viewpoint that dates 
back to the 17th century analysis of Thomas Hobbes and his demands for strong government 
to deal with “nasty, brutish” mankind, due to his negative perception of human nature215 
that is inherently unable to behave harmoniously to other individuals. Conservative-minded 
thinkers and politicians over the centuries have developed a position that views the 
aspiration towards greater socio-economic equality as an unrealistic notion contrary to this 
savage and competitive nature inherent within human beings, and are therefore only willing 
to tolerate greater individual freedoms if bolstered by the framework of a strong state to 
regulate society and keep order216.   
 
On a contemporary basis, this viewpoint is fuelled and further consolidated by the 
influences and pressures of a capitalist, competitive society, and it is  for this reason that for 
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many conservatives of both past and present, ‘inequality is ultimately rooted in human 
nature itself’217, and the somewhat ‘idealistic’ socialist emphasis on blaming external social 
and material forces for inequality, e.g. the unregulated and arbitrary forces of capitalism, is 
therefore a fundamentally flawed analysis of socio-economic norms within contemporary 
society. The Conservative, and particularly the ‘New Right’ perspective argues that such a 
socialist interpretation of the promotion of greater equality is in fact contrary to some basic 
and fundamental tenets of both human behaviour and the ‘invisible hand’218 of the free-
market, and while the capacity for social mobility is a concept that should be a perfectly 
wholesome aspiration for a dynamic ‘vigorous’ society, this is not the same as greater 
equality, which should not be.  As a supplement to this Hobbesian analysis, this ‘New Right’ 
conservative philosophical perspective argues that within an environment of general 
individual freedom regulated by the state’s rule of law, it is a further inherent aspect of 
human nature for there to be such natural inequality among individual citizens due to the 
fact that ‘some people innately possess more ambition, intelligence or talent than others..... 
(and this) unequal distribution of such characteristics inevitably results(s) in an inherently 
unequal society’219.  
 
The mainstream Conservative political viewpoint towards equality (incorporating 
both One Nation and Thatcherism) therefore regards both ‘equality’ and the traditional left-
wing view of ‘social justice’ as vague, unrealistic and illusory concepts that defy some basic 
aspects of human nature relating to competition, material well-being, individual talent and 
self-interest, which it can be argued are the key factors that ‘individuals are motivated 
primarily by’220. As a result of such differing skills and talents, a natural social hierarchy is 
said to emerge, further supporting the notion that neither equality nor an egalitarian 
version of ‘social justice’ are either achievable or indeed desirable goals221. Indeed there are 
some Conservatives who would argue that when the state attempts to equalise social 
conditions or to restore greater social justice by intervention, it is often distorting and 
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disrupting the intentions of the ‘free market’ or the natural social order, and it therefore 
actually functions in an unfair and unjust manner, with even moderate conservatives such 
as Ian Gilmour222 acknowledging such consequences of this explicitly interventionist 
approach to governance. This viewpoint objects to a state-led redistribution of resources in 
accordance with the principles of ‘social justice’ for the principal reason that ‘in a morally 
pluralistic society, any principle of distribution is subjective and contentious’223 and the 
state’s motives can therefore be seen as somewhat arbitrary and open to question.  
 
Despite this sceptical critique of social justice, particularly from the perspective of 
the New Right in its position of political hegemony in the 1980s, the concept has stubbornly 
refused to be suppressed within contemporary political debate and has sought to continue 
to influence and shape the motives behind policy formulation. In the post-Thatcher political 
era in particular from approximately 1990 onwards, politicians across the political spectrum 
sought to offer a distinct and refreshed political image and they increasingly appeared to 
compete in terms of being seen as ‘fair’ and ‘just’ in their formation and expression of both 
social and economic policies and how they impact on society. From John Major onwards, 
post-Thatcher Prime Ministers have both in implicit and explicit terms sought to gradually 
pacify the tone of their social policy agenda rather than adopt a more abrasive ideological 
emphasis as seen during the Thatcher era, perhaps an acknowledgment that the New 
Right’s socio-political approach in 1980s Britain had created the wider perception that socio-
economic inequalities were becoming more evident224. Indeed having condemned New 
Labour for presiding over the continued expanding gap between rich and poor during its 
thirteen year term of office225, modernising Conservatives from the Cameron inner-circle 
have openly spoken about the contemporary need to reduce such a growing disparity226.  
Therefore in adopting a more emollient tone in relation to this policy area, there is certainly 
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potential for 21st century Conservatives in utilising the emotive language often aligned with 
the concept of ‘justice’ in order to positively connect with key groups within the wider 
electorate, although the Thatcherites of 1980s vintage have generally appeared less willing 
to embrace such an approach. This is primarily due to their specific concerns with the left’s 
use and interpretation of the term ‘social justice’, principally because it symbolises a 
political and philosophical retreat from the New Right’s perspective of a ‘just’ society, due to 
the fact that: 
 
‘.....the only clear and consistent meaning one can give to the rhetoric of social justice 
is the pursuit of ever-greater material equality. That is the issue’227. 
 
The New Right’s anti-egalitarian stance therefore succinctly and particularly 
summarises the distinct Thatcherite scepticism towards this term of ‘social justice’, namely 
that social justice appears to imply and even demand an egalitarian distribution of material 
resources, and it is this approach that many modern Conservatives find undesirable, ‘unjust’ 
and unrealistic, and which is ultimately contrary to the fundamentally ‘selfish’ and 
competitive instincts of human nature and the ‘natural’ inequalities that exist within all 
societies. In this context, the post-1979 Thatcherite Conservative tradition has 
fundamentally rejected the left’s conventional and more communitarian interpretation of 
this concept, and for the majority of this modern historical period the British Conservative 
Party has been broadly united on this issue despite divisions elsewhere, rejecting the left’s 
interpretation of social justice as being essentially a form of ‘reverse discrimination’. Such 
sentiments were a particularly evident feature of the party’s 1987 manifesto, which many 
would argue is arguably the most explicit expression of Thatcherite political strength at its 
electoral zenith: 
 
‘Reverse discrimination is itself an injustice and can have no place in a tolerant and 
civilised society..... it would undermine the achievement and example of those who 
had risen on their merits’228.  
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In this context, the Thatcherite vision of social justice is significantly different from 
the left’s traditional interpretation, and as the dominant form of Conservatism from the 
mid-1970s it has therefore adopted and embraced a model of society and social behaviour 
from a notably different political perspective. This viewpoint has placed greater emphasis 
on individualist meritocracy as being at the centre of achieving greater social justice, and 
from this different political angle ‘social justice is interpreted as a reward for individual 
success, rather than as welfare ideology has it, the equal treatment of all’229. As a result of 
such scepticism towards traditional notions of social justice and an enhanced focus on 
economics, individualism and a variation in abilities, it has been subsequently acknowledged 
from an often critical stance that ‘Thatcherism scarcely had a social policy’230 throughout her 
sustained period of governance. However, despite the apparently clearer focus on a radical 
restructuring of economic policy, this is perhaps a somewhat exaggerated and unfair 
analysis given that there clearly were social policies developed during the years 1979-90, 
with some significant attempts to reform and scale back the size of the welfare state in 
particular, notably from the mid-1980s onwards.  The ‘New Right’ or ‘Thatcherite’ position 
would therefore argue that the principle of social justice has been ‘hijacked’ and 
manipulated by elements of the left as part of their specific formulation of the concept.  
Consequently left-of-centre politicians have sought to depict themselves as having 
enhanced and more enlightened social policies due to them being associated and influenced 
by their interpretation of ‘socially just’ principles, moulded by the ethos of a more active 
and interventionist welfare state.  
 
Equality can therefore be viewed as a key component of the social justice agenda, 
and it is ultimately an ambiguous concept that is open to interpretation from the various 
political positions, with the left more traditionally focused on generating a greater equality 
of outcome using state intervention. The Conservative ‘New Right’ viewpoint has opposed 
such an interpretation of state-generated enhanced equality due to its belief that such an 
approach is in conflict with the human realities of individual ability and competition, 
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alongside their philosophical tendencies towards the achievement of a smaller state model. 
They have instead emphasised the importance of equality of opportunity, individual 
freedom and the associated meritocratic principles. The paternalistic ‘One Nation’ 
Conservatives, dominant for much of the post-war period of ‘consensus’ between 1945 and 
1975, have broadly accepted the relative definition of poverty and accepted the role of the 
welfare state to raise the levels of absolute poverty for the poorest members of society, 
although they have been more willing to embrace a more generous and interventionist state 
in the name of maintaining social order.  However, given their preference for a more 
hierarchical, class-based, ordered society, with a benevolent upper social hierarchy seeking 
to provide a generous level of paternalistic government support for the lower classes, they 
have rejected the New Right’s focus on dynamic social mobility between classes.  While the 
late 19th century Disraelian brand of British Conservatism focused on the duty of the state 
and the governing classes assisting the poor and to manage the more extreme examples of 
inequality231, this has created some friction within Conservatism between the One Nation 
tradition and the New Right variant ‘about how far inequality should be permitted to 
develop’232. However the mainstream Conservative viewpoint across all traditions has 
generally reached the ultimate conclusion as the 20th century has progressed that inequality 
is an inevitable consequence of the different talents and resources of individual citizens 
within a competitive, capitalist-orientated society. Nevertheless, there is a strong 
Conservative paternalistic tradition that argues that it is perfectly possible to support the 
development of distinctive social policies and a relatively active model of state welfare 
provision, yet reject the ultimate ‘egalitarian’ motives and aspirations of the left-of-centre 
vision of a contemporary welfare state and its associated version of social justice. This latter 
Conservative approach, primarily representing the ‘One Nation’ tradition would therefore 
appear to firmly reject the socialist-orientated notion that if ‘one does not believe in 
equality, one must oppose the welfare state’233.  
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The ‘One Nation’ paternalistic Conservative tendency, with its traditional emphasis 
on significant state intervention alongside a more explicit collective social conscience in the 
form of a generous welfare state, has never embraced the sentiments of the left-wing 
interpretation of social justice and its focus on greater levels of equality in terms of material 
rewards and/or outcome. This political perspective has perhaps been more focused on 
reducing the extent or the scale of the gaps in inequality in order for the maintenance of an 
unequal social model to be deemed acceptable to the rest of society, and such a view ‘did 
not mean any acceptance of equality, but it did entail an acknowledgement that socio-
economic inequalities needed to be kept within boundaries or limits’234, primarily to ensure 
the long-term prospects of the established governing class235. This justifies the ‘One Nation’ 
Conservative support for a relatively generous welfare state, and therefore despite many 
differences with the ‘New Right’ Thatcherites over various social and economic issues in the 
modern political era, this moderate faction of Conservatism has never embraced equality 
and has indeed broadly endorsed a similar position on this issue, namely that ‘inequality is 
an inevitable and immutable fact of life’236 based on birth, individual qualities and socio-
economic circumstance.  
 
It is therefore due to this sense of ideological detachment from the evolution of the 
modern meaning of social justice (with its leftist and abstract implications), that many 
contemporary Conservatives of all ‘factions’ have had some difficulties in expressing or 
articulating a coherent range of views about it. Most Conservatives would therefore reject 
the post-war Rawlsian theory of ‘justice’ within society, a significant socio-political analysis 
of the modern era that argues that equality and co-operation is a natural state of affairs at 
the beginning of most societies, and which therefore seeks to justify redistributive social 
justice and enhanced fairness and equality via the intervention of the state and appropriate 
legislative measures237. Conservatives do not in general accept this purely hypothetical 
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analysis about an imagined ‘state of nature’, arguing instead that in terms of equality being 
the alleged ‘natural state of mankind ..... there is scarcely any instance in recorded history in 
which mankind has actually experienced it’.238 This viewpoint again emphasises the 
Conservative attitude that rejects left-of-centre hypothetical situations, and instead 
endorses practical realities, and in doing so acknowledges that inequality and a clear social 
hierarchy is an inherent part of the natural order of things that can be justified in 
behavioural, social and civic terms, and which automatically concludes that a greater 
equality of outcome certainly cannot be given the same amount of credence based on the 
practical experiences of most modern societies.  
 
Conservatives of all variations and across different nationalities have therefore 
sought to revise and counteract the liberal left’s version of ‘social justice’, with one 
particular alternative justification being the development of the ‘social market’, a pro-
capitalist concept that emphasises how communities can thrive and benefit in positive social 
terms from a fluid and accessible free-market environment that can ostensibly deliver a fair, 
balanced and stable society in the process without excessive government intervention. This 
contrasts with the more ‘statist’ and ‘interventionist’ conclusions reached by the left-of-
centre variant of social justice, and the concept of the ‘market’ and its importance has 
therefore created an alternative ‘capitalist’ framework that can offer the potential for a 
more appropriate structure for the achievement of a socially just society. Such a viewpoint 
ultimately represents a capitalist approach to challenging and demolishing the egalitarian 
arguments and implications of the left-leaning social justice theorists and academics, 
instead emphasising ‘the mutual dependence between the free market and the 
community’239 in creating and sustaining a more just social order in the long-term. 
Originating within 20th century and specifically post-war western Germany and with strong 
continental links, the concept of the social market has led to the emergence in recent years 
of significant think-tanks such as the ‘Social Market Foundation’240 (founded 1989), seeking 
to specifically influence the development of both social and economic policy within 
contemporary British politics, and in the process seeking to steer policy-making towards a 
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mixed economy, with a less statist focus and a more economically-liberal direction where 
possible.  This concept, focusing on the development of a choice-based quasi-market within 
the provision of public services, has been influential in shaping the contemporary political 
debate within the modern Conservative Party and its revised approach to how the state 
delivers key public policies.  This has been particularly prevalent during the post-Thatcher 
era, with many of the party’s modernisers recognising the importance of maintaining 
capitalist free-market values, while at the same time acknowledging the importance of 
stabilising community structures in a way that was perhaps overlooked during the Thatcher 
hegemony of the 1980s.   
 
The New Right and the Neo-Liberal view of Social Justice 
 
Social justice is subsequently a dynamic term that is open to interpretation within political 
circles, and this ambiguity means that its meaning in practice has generated significant 
disagreements throughout the course of the modern political era. In basic terms those on 
the left of politics envisage a direct and essential role for the state in creating greater social 
justice, while those on the right argue for a less ‘statist’ or ‘interventionist’ approach, with 
less regulation and more reliance on the laws of the free market. Indeed, within the 
Conservative Party, a fairly new tradition of conservatism has sought to promote a 
significantly revised version of the concept, namely The ‘New Right’ Thatcherites who 
actively contributed to ending the ‘years of consensus’ from the mid-1970s onwards by 
vigorously promoting the merits of a more marketised approach to public service delivery 
(and in turn creating a ‘social market’), at the expense of a universalised and generously 
state-funded welfare provision and its associated attempts to deliver social justice. This 
viewpoint argues that laissez-faire capitalism is incompatible with a traditional ‘liberal-left’ 
social justice agenda where the interventionist nature of the state is viewed as a vital tool 
for achieving the desired outcome of greater equality. Many within the New Right tradition 
such as Hayek, Friedman and Thatcher have therefore interpreted ‘social justice as social 
welfare’241 in the context of its practical application, and as a result have attached to it some 
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associated negative implications in terms of its conventional application for contemporary 
society.  
 
The ultimate ideological thrust that has attempted to reduce the power and 
expenditure of the modern state and its attempts to shape social justice as the 20th century 
progressed can be found in the legacy of F.A Hayek, a key philosophical and ideological 
influence on the evolution of Conservative social and economic policy-making, particularly 
during the era of Margaret Thatcher’s administration in the 1980s.  The Austrian economist 
Hayek has been a notable influence within the specific ‘neo-liberal’ economic tradition of 
modern Conservatism, forming part of the broader New Right agenda that has promoted a 
smaller role for the state in both economic and social policy matters has sought intellectual 
succour from the Hayekian perspective in pursuing this political outlook242. In promoting a 
socio-political agenda that was an ‘amalgamation of economic liberty and social 
conventionalism’243, Hayek had a key role in instigating a distinct agenda for both British and 
international Conservatism in the mid-20th century in the face of a statist, socialist onslaught 
after World War Two. The New Right has derived particular inspiration and guidance from 
Hayek’s distinct and somewhat unorthodox revised analysis of the concept of ‘social justice’, 
which condemned the left-of-centre interpretation of it as representing a paradox and a 
‘mirage’ that was not as attainable or desirable as those on the ‘socialist’ left of politics 
claimed it to be. The Hayekian ‘Austrian school’ view ultimately argues that the 
conventional view of social justice with its emphasis on an active state is an illusion 
constructed to suit a specific political agenda framed by interventionist social democrats, 
and it can subsequently be rejected as a purely hypothetical concept that is fatally flawed on 
both an intellectual and practical basis, primarily due to its promotion of a socio-political 
model that is not aligned with economic or social realities or indeed human nature (of the 
competitive and brutal Hobbesian variant)244.  This anti-collectivist perspective therefore 
proclaims that ‘there could be no injustice perpetrated against those in poverty’245, given 
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that they had reached such a social status not though some punitive consequences of a 
repressive and deliberate government policy, but rather due to factors such as individual 
ability, personal circumstances and socio-economic influences beyond their control.  From a 
modern perspective, Hayek's view of social justice can therefore be summarised in 
contemporary terms as a reflection of the belief that: 
 
‘Returns from the market were not moral returns and we shouldn’t see them as 
moral returns, but if a pop star earns more than a nurse it’s not that the pop star is 
morally superior to a nurse, but it’s just that the distribution of economic returns in a 
market economy does not align and is not supposed to align with a set of moral 
judgements’246. 
 
This anti-redistributive position rejects rationalist socialist morality along with the 
egalitarian conclusions of Rawls, ultimately citing that it would drive people towards 
‘serfdom’247. Such a viewpoint has been further espoused in a post-Hayek context 
particularly by Robert Nozick, whose contemporary intellectual analysis emerged in 
response to the Rawlsian position, and argued for the ‘inherent superiority of markets over 
all other forms of social organisation’.248 Nozick has therefore sought to justify the 
inevitability and justification of inequality deriving from a ‘state of nature’ by instilling a 
moral streak of how ‘just’ such a scenario was, an ultimate consequence of free exchange 
and varying individual abilities within the free market environment249. Within such a 
context, Gamble’s ‘free economy’ that depicts how the Thatcherite socio-economic model 
of society emerged during the 1980s is therefore said to have been achieved by a 
significantly reduced role for government and greater individual freedoms and less state 
regulation as a result, and this in turn provides the principled framework for an associated 
neo-liberal version of social justice that was ‘achieved through the daily plebiscite in the 
market’250 rather than the interventionism of politicians in pursuit of ‘artificial’ 
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redistribution of resources. Neo-liberals such as Hayek alongside the more libertarian 
outlook of Nozick therefore developed a critique that alluded to a perception that social 
justice was a ‘mirage’ in its traditional liberal sense, claiming it to be an empty and 
meaningless doctrine due to its emphasis on rewarding individuals in accordance with an 
artificial and socially-imposed (statist) moral framework, rather than focusing on their talent 
and variable individual abilities which are allowed to ultimately flourish by the economic 
liberalism of the free-market. In turn the neo-liberal New Right has proposed its own 
morality-fused framework to generate an alternative version of social justice, one that was 
essentially market-driven and that ‘was buttressed by the revival of moral arguments 
against equality’251. In adopting this distinct and more unconventional interpretation of 
social justice and eroding the liberal-left’s moral monopoly regarding the concept in the 
process, this libertarian analysis has sought to fundamentally challenge the subjective liberal 
morality that has bolstered the traditional interpretation of the concept, arguing that if ‘the 
moral merit of each individual is hidden, and can be known by no one’252, then on such a 
basis how can the state have sufficient knowledge to determine how social justice should be 
formulated and goods redistributed in the wider social interest?  
 
Clearly rejecting the potentially egalitarian and redistributive principles of ‘natural’ 
justice imposed by Rawls several decades later, Hayek’s own argument dismisses the 
artificial nature of the left’s version of ‘social justice’ as the driving force behind its idealised 
model of welfare policy, with the New Right concluding that such an approach inevitably 
results in a bloated and bureaucratic model of a welfare state.  The Hayekian model instead 
promotes an idealised ‘neo-liberal’ economic influence in creating the appropriate political 
model and its associated society, shaped by limited powers of regulatory intervention and 
which in turn moulds a revamped ‘New Right’ version of social justice which demands that 
the market is the ultimate determinant of people’s wealth and status, featuring dynamics 
that are driven by individual spontaneity and economic liberalism, not the ‘dead hand’ of 
the monolithic state253. This interpretation of social justice therefore places ultimate faith in 
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the forces of laissez-faire capitalism and a less regulated state as being the best and most 
effective guarantors of a fair and ‘socially just’ outcome, working from the basis that the 
very concept of social justice is ‘a vague and contested idea’254. The neo-liberal view of 
social justice therefore seeks to allow individuals to achieve their most appropriate socio-
economic status on the basis of merit, while being fundamentally aligned with a model of 
government that promotes the dynamism of a ‘free economy’255 and a minimised amount of 
government regulation and intervention in economic matters, for ‘using the welfare state to 
realize an ideal of social justice is, for neoliberals, an abuse of power’256. Critical academics 
such as Raymond Plant257 who approach neo-liberalism from a left-of-centre perspective 
and who believe it will eventually succumb to a more social democratic outcome, have 
viewed the concept of a wholly neo-liberal state with some significant scepticism and 
identify unstable elements within it in terms of delivering practical and effective 
governance.  
 
Such a neo-liberal analysis and approach to social justice therefore views such 
regulation of economic activity as an unnecessary encroachment on individual freedom, 
while also rejecting what is viewed as an ‘artificial’ redistribution of wealth as advocated by 
the social democratic model of welfare provision. According to free-market critics, the left’s 
approach to delivering social justice is hindered by the often bloated size and structure of 
the state bureaucracy that is an essential corollary for achieving this socio-economic 
aspiration. As a consequence, for much of the post-war period, Conservatives claim that 
social justice and greater equality have not been achieved in the way the liberal left have 
desired it to be.  The Hayekian and ‘New Right’ analysis has subsequently identified 
fundamental problems in achieving the conventional (liberal) post-war version of social 
justice by its reliance on utilising a bureaucratic and ‘statist’ model of government and 
embracing ‘social-democratic’ principles and associated political institutions as the key tools 
for achieving such a socially ‘just’ outcome. New Right thinkers and academics have 
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therefore dismissed the state’s proposed regulatory role in such matters as forming the 
basis of an analysis that is deeply flawed in terms of explaining and tackling social inequality 
and injustice. Writing about the neo-liberal state from a more left-of-centre political angle, 
Plant has subsequently observed a core belief of this viewpoint that there is a cheaper and 
more efficient alternative to the interventionist state’s approach to enhancing social justice, 
namely: 
 
‘The neo-liberal state on the contrary without such a distributive agenda is 
committed to a more objective and less expansive form of safety net welfare 
provision’258. 
 
Such a neo-liberal model therefore rejects the redistributive capacity of the state 
along with its associated bureaucracy, and in turn ultimately questions whether the 
conventional interpretation of ‘social justice’ and its associated and subjective formulation 
of the welfare state is a legitimate basis by which society can function or be driven, as: 
 
‘Since only situations which have been created by humans can be called just or 
unjust….. what is called ‘social’ or ‘distributive’ justice is indeed meaningless within a 
spontaneous order’259.  
 
Hayek ultimately devised this rather original and unconventional alternative analysis of the 
modern social-democratic variant of social justice and simultaneously defended 
individualism in the face of a ‘statist’ onslaught, defying the socio-political orthodoxy of 
post-war British politics in the process. Hayek was therefore said to have ‘placed social 
democrats on the defensive’260 in seeking to justify their previously dominant and subjective 
interpretation and manipulation of social justice and the perception that it was an 
appropriate theory to address the accepted social injustices of contemporary society, even 
going as far as questioning the very practical meaning of the concept.   During the 1980s in 
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particular, this ‘neo-liberal’ critique of social justice was revitalized and proved to be highly 
influential within the dominant political administrations of Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in 
the USA.  Subsequently, during the 1980s when the Thatcher government and its distinct 
political agenda dominated the British political landscape, this background theoretical 
framework offered a wholly individualistic and somewhat unorthodox interpretation of 
social justice, with the ‘New Right’ in government practically challenging its traditional 
definition in the process, as follows: 
 
‘Any form of distribution of social goods not based on individual attainment, which 
would introduce compensatory elements or appeal to a collective social 
responsibility, is excluded from the intention of social justice’.261  
 
This approach therefore sought to fundamentally re-assess the perceived reasons for 
the existence of poverty and inequality within wider British society, along with the 
established mechanisms for dealing with it. Indeed as the decade progressed, such an 
approach to this aspect of government policy-making created a political landscape that 
featured a ‘distinctively Thatcherite approach to poverty and social justice’262, offering an 
ostensibly more objective viewpoint that contemptuously dismissed social democrats as 
being motivated by the ‘politics of envy’ in their advocacy of the mantra of social justice as a 
means of ameliorating long-term poverty. At the same time, ‘One Nation’ Conservatives 
were dismissed for their implicit  justification for redistributive social justice, an attitude 
fuelled by their heightened social consciences and a degree of paternalistic guilt at having 
levels of wealth that the majority of the population did not. It was in the context of such a 
legacy that members of the Major administration of the 1990s, including ministers with 
politically moderate reputations such as William Waldegrave, appeared buoyed by the 
ideological conflict and eventual victory of the previous decade and were therefore arguing 
for a fairly radical review of traditional social and welfare policies, primarily: 
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‘a move towards the insurance principle, together with an element of compulsion- i.e. 
people being obliged to provide for themselves’263.  
 
This fairly radical revised policy agenda broadly sought to explore the development of 
continental models of national insurance along with inspiration from the American 
individualist welfare model, as opposed to the post-war British focus on universal welfare 
and associated social policies.  This approach represented a notable shift of mood in this 
policy area, appearing to represent an ideological victory for the influence of the ‘New Right’ 
during the 1980s. It was therefore an increasingly common demand from radical and open-
minded thinkers within both the Conservative Party and the fledgling New Labour 
movement in the mid-1990s, and such developments align with the view of some academics 
who argue that the Conservative approach to dealing with ‘poverty and social justice 
actually became more radical after 1990’264, in its rejection and scepticism towards the 
hegemonic role of the state as the sole provider of welfare provision. The escalation of this 
school of thought as the 1990s progressed is evident of the relatively low-profile viewpoint 
(in defiance of the critical and pessimistic perception of the Thatcherites), that John Major 
was in fact a more effective and practical advocate than his predecessor in pursuing the 
neo-liberal approach to public service provision and in turn embracing the ‘New Right’ 
version of social justice265, and this is perhaps evident in the argument that ‘a process of 
ideological realignment….. occurred during the Conservative leadership of John Major’266, 
suggesting that the party became more confident and uniform in its free-market rhetoric 
and focus. 
 
The essential Hayekian influence that sought to shape such political developments 
was the notion that ‘government activity (to be) limited primarily to establishing the 
framework within which individuals are free to pursue their objectives’267, and this 
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automatically implies a limited role of the state, along with a reduced financial and 
bureaucratic scope.  This view clearly saw the importance of a basic government role to 
provide the outline framework of state activity, but with a broader and more explicit degree 
of individual freedom existing within such a sphere of relative autonomy. While the 
Thatcher era sought to earnestly embrace and pursue such principles of socio-economic 
conservatism, the twenty years that followed from 1990 were perhaps less consistently 
loyal to this Hayekian vision of the world, particularly in relation to the increased curve of 
public spending that developed the longer that Labour was in power.  Following the 2010 
General Election result, while not necessarily endorsing Hayek’s vision of a shrunken state 
with the same enthusiasm of the Thatcherites in the early 1980s, Cameron and his Liberal 
Democrat coalition partners were provided with the opportunity to transform their vocal 
criticisms of Labour’s legacy of ‘statism’ and ongoing welfare dependency into the concrete 
implementation of their own distinct political remedies for the country’s various social ills.  
 
Civic Conservatism 
 
Such a burgeoning alternative debate in relation to the traditional interpretation of social 
justice and conventional post-war British welfare provision developed throughout the 1990s 
and continues to generate lively political discussion up to the present day. However, despite 
this attempt to construct alternative views of welfare provision and a radically different 
interpretation of social justice during their eighteen years of dominant political rule (1979-
97), contemporary political opponents of the Conservative Party during this period were 
unimpressed and somewhat sceptical as to how wider society and civic community interests 
were positively served by the Conservative Party’s more ‘neo-liberal’ and less ‘statist’ 
approach to government delivery of social policy. The clear suggestion from political 
opponents was therefore that as a consequence of such an economics-driven political 
agenda, social and welfare policy was somewhat neglected and this has been evident in 
comments from rival political figures from the modern era: 
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‘He (Ashdown) thinks the Tories are utterly bereft of any ideas about 
society/community. Willetts and his Civic Conservatism268 is the exception- but they 
don’t want to know’269.  
 
Such comments indicate how attempts to re-brand and re-ignite the Conservative Party’s 
distinct interpretation of ‘society’, social justice and innovative social policy-making both 
during and after the Thatcher era have been dismissed by opposition politicians as being 
devoid of coherence and direction. However, the ‘Civic Conservatism’ referred to above did 
emerge as something with sufficient distinction to engage the attention of the political 
classes, as a post-Thatcher theory devised in the 1990s by the Conservative politician David 
Willetts, a cerebral figure with a background as a political advisor and with the reputation as 
an ‘intellectual’, a factor that ostensibly provided some credibility to the theory. Willetts’ 
model of ‘civic conservatism’ sought to articulate an alternative model of a ‘civil society’ 
that focused on the significance of the relationship between the individual and key political 
institutions (as opposed to just the monolithic state). Such a 'civic’ focus therefore sought to 
free individual citizens from the tentacles of excessive state regulation and control, while 
also not being wholly reliant on the neo-liberal laissez-faire ethos of free-market economics, 
and which valued the importance of individual civil action, community activity (localism) and 
greater diversity of public service provision in relation to the potentially dominant powers of 
the all-encompassing state. It ultimately sought to restore the public’s faith in the 
Conservative Party’s approach to the management and delivery of key public services, for 
the principal reason that in the dying days of the Major government in the mid-1990s, ‘the 
Conservative Party was perceived by the voters as indifferent or even hostile to public 
services’270. In espousing this reformist position Willetts appeared to signal a rejection of the 
Thatcher mantra of the late 1980s that “there was no such thing as society”, despite having 
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a reputation as a figure from the right-wing of the party.   During the New Labour era from 
1997, Willetts developed this critique and offered specific criticisms of ‘New Labour’s 
reliance on the state and public spending’, instead seeking to emphasise the important role 
of ‘the voluntary efforts of citizens themselves’271. Within this context, there subsequently 
emerged a revised and adapted shape to this specific vision of Conservative social policy, 
rejecting the monolithic state yet embracing the value of ‘society’ and the need for viable 
and good quality public services, while fusing individualism and the power of community-
driven actions in an appropriate balance. This would ultimately create a distinct message 
when formulating social and welfare policies, namely: 
 
‘the need to show that such a thing as Civic Conservatism exists and is vital. A real 
difference between the parties’272.  
 
Willetts’ role in this evolution of ‘civic conservatism’ and a new variant of social 
policy was a significant one given that he appeared to be revising his one-time Thatcherite 
scepticism of the traditional social-democrat interpretation of social justice.  However, this 
approach did not represent a point-blank acceptance of the traditional liberal variant of this 
concept, but instead reflected an ongoing pragmatic right-of-centre need to devise a new 
and distinctive approach to the role of the community, wider ‘society’ and the 
interpretation of social justice and a subsequent formulation of appropriate social policies 
to reflect the changing socio-political landscape. As the 1990s progressed, there was a 
growing perception among political opponents in particular that Margaret Thatcher’s 
administration had appeared to express a degree of neglect and ‘indifference to social 
justice’273 during its eleven and-a-half years in office, and as a consequence the Conservative 
Party’s attitude to this concept lacked clarity and focus in comparison to the New Labour 
agenda that sought to promote it more explicitly and vigorously from the mid-1990s 
onwards. This somewhat negative image and attitude towards such a pivotal political 
concept lingered on and attached itself to the Conservative Party throughout the 1990s and 
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beyond, generating some electoral unpopularity in the process, as ‘the Conservative 
Party..... seemed for some time unable to learn the lessons of defeat in 1997 and to move 
away from its Thatcherite position and its influences on the development of social policy 
within the Conservative Party’ 274. ‘Civic Conservatism’ was therefore the initial and 
formative response in re-moulding party policy in this specific sphere,  seeking to offer a 
more balanced and less ‘statist' political approach, yet which nevertheless retained its own 
basic principles and a focus on ‘community’ as a compromise concept that was opposed to 
the rival poles of rampant ‘statism’ and libertarian ‘individualism’. This desire to instil the 
importance of enhanced individual civil choice in relation to the power of the state (a legacy 
of the Thatcher era),  would also have a significant bearing and a moderating influence over 
the New Labour approach to welfare and social policy provision from 1997 onwards.  
 
The emergence of New Labour from the mid-1990s onwards, followed by its 
subsequent convincing accession to power in 1997, accelerated the need for the 
modernising and reforming elements within the Conservative Party to re-visit the party’s 
conventional and well-established position on maintaining low taxation and resisting 
increased public spending that had been cemented during the 1980s, due to increasing 
evidence ‘that the public were increasingly willing to see increased public expenditure and 
improved public services rather than tax cuts’275. In reaction to such socio-political 
developments, and implicitly challenging the Thatcherite legacy in the process as part of a 
more long-term strategic perspective to formulating a coherent approach to this policy area, 
the post-2005 Cameron Conservatives in particular appeared to pragmatically modify their 
attitude towards the more traditional and mainstream interpretation of social justice and its 
associated policy-making implications, as opposed to completely rejecting it out of hand. 
This has involved acknowledging that it has some positive aspects, and in reacting to the 
New Labour agenda from 1997 and the longer-term centre-left traditions of the British 
welfare state model, this revised Conservative approach has been clearly evident in recent 
comments by some of the party’s prominent politicians: 
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“At its best, New Labour was recognition that the values of enterprise and aspiration 
could be fused with commitment to social justice and fairness. The party that best 
represents that fusion now is David Cameron’s Conservative Party.” 276 
 
Such fulsome praise for New Labour’s emphasis and clear focus on social justice as 
voiced by Michael Gove, a ‘modernising’ Conservative politician viewed as a key ally of 
David Cameron’s and part of the inner circle of his leadership, appeared to transmit a clear 
message that the Conservatives would embrace many post-1997 social policy initiatives, 
while seeking to instil their own enterprising agenda into the political formula.  Within such 
a context, Cameron has subsequently been described as being ‘more open than his 
predecessors to socially inclusive welfare policies’277, and as a result both he and his 
frontbenchers have utilised the associated political language and vocabulary. This 
evolutionary and modernised political attitude has reflected the party’s adherence to a 
more centrist and ‘social’ political agenda since Cameron gained the leadership in 2005. 
Indeed, the use of such ‘Blairite’ and ‘social democratic’ language and the acknowledged 
policy fusion of enterprise with interventionist social justice have appeared to represent a 
resurrection of Cameron’s previous claim when seeking the party leadership that he was 
“heir to Blair”278. Such an explicit willingness to focus on and talk about the concept of social 
justice on Labour’s territory as it were, signalled a dilution of the Thatcherite tradition and 
the view of society as inspired by both F.A Hayek and Enoch Powell in particular, both ‘anti-
collectivist thinkers….. who were fundamentally opposed to this idea’279 (of social justice). 
This revised stance in the sphere of social policy among the Conservative ‘modernising’ 
tendency, which appears aligned with a more moralistic and communitarian outlook, had 
initially originated in a public context in mid-2005, when prior to becoming party leader 
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Cameron stated: “We do think there’s such thing as society, we just don’t think it’s the same 
as the state”280, a provocative rebuke to the much-quoted sentiments expressed by 
Margaret Thatcher in 1987.  However, the modernising Conservatives of the Cameron era 
do not endorse the more explicitly egalitarian implications and consequences of ‘social 
justice’ as it is viewed by the traditional left, and the record of the previous Labour 
government in this key policy sphere has been condemned as being ‘greatly flawed’281, 
indicating an explicit rejection of the liberal-left’s broad approach to achieving social justice. 
 
This apparent repositioning on social policy issues has raised issues as to whether 
the modern Conservative Party has a markedly different approach to this subject than the 
last period of Conservative government, or whether its policy proposals are more an 
example of style over substance. In this context, Cameron’s greater willingness to talk about 
poverty and social issues can be interpreted as an implicit criticism of the somewhat limited 
Thatcherite social agenda and outlook that was established during the 1980s, and an 
attempt to soften and re-define the Conservatives’ image on social policies in the process. In 
doing so, this modern Conservative outlook relating to social policy has sought to promote a 
new model of Civic Conservatism for the 21st century and in doing so detach the party from 
the primarily hostile interpretation of social justice that was provoked among many 
Conservatives of Thatcherite pedigree, who have feared that the party’s focus on what they 
perceive to be such vague concepts has symbolised a retreat from traditional Conservative 
values within shifting political attitudes and developments. Instead there has been instilled 
a communitarian emphasis that indicates a more positive view of human nature, although 
one observer has appeared to adopt a more sceptical view that not much has changed from 
the 1980s in relation to such matters and that ‘The 'Big Society' concept that Cameron is 
promoting is an attempt to reject Thatcherism in the eyes of the voting public, while 
reaffirming it in practice’282. 
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 Despite the above interpretation that Thatcherism remains a potent presence,  such 
bold expressions of modern and ‘new’ Conservatism have appeared to unsettle the party’s 
New Right and neo-liberal elements who view such a modernised and revamped 
interpretation and acknowledgment of social justice and ‘society’ as an unnecessary 
concession to the ‘collectivist’ left of centre political tradition in the UK, moving in the 
direction of Blair’s New Labour agenda and a departure from the free-market legacy of the 
1980s. The New Right viewpoint fundamentally believes that social justice should not be 
about statist, egalitarian ‘levelling’ and intervention, but rather develop in line with more 
traditional Conservative values of ‘incentives, self reliance and independence’,283 promoting 
meritocracy and embracing a downgraded and minimalist role for the state in the process. 
The alternative emphasis of a more regulated approach to the delivery of social policy and 
social justice from the centre, with a detachment from the more ruggedly individualist 
Conservative values of the Thatcher era, was evident within the social policy agenda of New 
Labour since 1997, and has been an influence on David Cameron’s approach to this policy 
area since 2005.  Right-wing fears that Cameron was absorbing too much of New Labour’s 
approach on this issue led to a subsequent revival of the New Right’s critique of ‘a social 
justice that ran counter to nature’284, with its explicit rejection of statist, interventionist 
tendencies seeking to engineer individual social fortunes and conditions. In embracing the 
vocabulary and language of the New Labour agenda in this policy sphere (in rhetorical terms 
at least), Cameron’s approach has sought to make the Conservative Party more attractive to 
floating voters, but in doing so has threatened to alienate a specific faction of his own party.  
 
Ultimately, Michael Gove’s complimentary sentiments about New Labour and their 
influence on the evolution of modern Conservatism, while being somewhat provocative in 
terms of internal Conservative Party politics, are broadly consistent with the overall political 
agenda and ‘de-toxification’ strategy of David Cameron since he became Conservative 
Leader in December 2005. This has been further evident in speeches by the Conservative 
Leader himself where similarly-toned language has been regularly used: 
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‘The first of the policy groups I set up was Iain's, (Duncan Smith) looking at all the full 
range of social justice issues. For the Conservative Party I'm leading, social justice is a 
vital issue. The reason is simple: the degree of social injustice in our country’ 285.  
 
Such words being deliberately used by David Cameron and some of his key political allies, 
aligned with a background focus on the integral theme of ‘society’, have therefore formed 
part of a sustained attempt to ‘modernise’ and re-position the Conservative Party’s image 
on social policy matters, and in turn consolidating the notion of ‘Civic Conservatism’ from an 
early stage of his leadership. In this subsequent evolution of its policy agenda within this 
specific sphere, the party has indicated its willingness to address and embrace the social 
justice agenda, yet while also seeking to retain its own distinct interpretation of social 
justice and develop an innovative and distinct range of social policies accordingly. However, 
how such theories, rhetoric and ideas have developed and been translated into practical 
policies is another matter that continues to evolve and develop under the auspices of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government from 2010 onwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
285
 David Cameron, ‘Speech to Centre for Social Justice Kids’ symposium’, cited in The Guardian, Monday 10
th
 
July 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/jul/10/conservatives.law 
  108  
 
Modern Conservatism and Social Justice in Practice 
 
Having assessed the theoretical and philosophical origins of the concept of social justice, 
this chapter seeks to assess how the term has shaped and influenced modern Conservative 
Party social policy in practice. Within the context of re-framing the Conservative policy 
message in both image and rhetorical terms, and aligning them with appropriate theoretical 
and philosophical influences, actually putting a new and distinct 21st century interpretation 
of ‘social justice’ into practice has emerged as a key challenge for David Cameron’s 
leadership, both while in political opposition from late 2005 and in power from 2010. The 
developing narrative and analysis of Britain’s ‘broken society’ has therefore been a central 
and developing theme of the Cameron era since he became Conservative Party Leader, and 
this has been a mechanism to allow him to propose his own brand of distinct political 
solutions and instil an enhanced focus on achieving a more ‘just’ outcome to society’s broad 
and sustained socio-economic problems such as long-term poverty, poor living conditions, 
limited social mobility and high levels of crime. One academic observer has remarked that 
Cameron’s approach was fuelled by an acknowledgement that when ‘he became 
Conservative party leader in 2005 he recognized that something was badly wrong with the 
right, and a new radical conservatism was desperately needed’286, suggesting a new 
approach to society and related social policy matters, with a degree of acceptance of the 
need to re-engage with aspects of the ‘One Nation’ blueprint.  
 
Given that there is an established and historic Conservative philosophical acceptance 
of inequality as an inevitable consequence of a diverse and variable society, as well as 
considering the party’s post-1979 tendency to prioritise economic policy over social policy 
issues, Cameron’s strategy has perhaps been a bold one to adopt. It has therefore ultimately 
sought to create a consistent argument that depicts the negative legacy of a sustained 
period of Labour government as creating a fragmented society that is ‘broken’ and ill at ease 
with itself in many social aspects, exacerbated by the excessive and often counter-
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productive interventions of a costly and inefficient welfare state287. While the outgoing 
Labour administration of 2010 vehemently disputed this critical analysis of its own socio-
economic record in policy terms and indeed attacked the Thatcher legacy for similar 
reasons, Cameron has displayed a degree of audacity and tenacity in pursuing this particular 
political agenda, particularly given that he was encroaching on established Labour political 
territory and simultaneously venturing into an area of traditional Conservative weakness in 
policy terms.  In therefore seeking to move away from perceptions of Conservative 
indifference to such social policy matters and re-align both the party’s wider image and its 
overall policy direction, Cameron has also created some significant internal tensions within 
his own party, particularly among Thatcherite figures such as ex-Cabinet minister John 
Redwood, who have preferred a more ‘dry’ economic slant to the evolution and direction of 
overall government policy,288 focusing on cuts in taxation and fiscal retrenchment rather 
than the greater emphasis on society, social issues and the potential additional public 
expenditure and image of ‘big government’ that are traditionally associated with such a 
specific socio-political  perspective. 
 
The Centre for Social Justice- Addressing the ‘broken society’ and promoting social justice? 
 
Within this particular analysis of a fractured and unsettled British social model, Cameron has 
been active in calling for a fundamental re-assessment of various aspects of the welfare 
state and has advocated significant and wide-ranging  welfare reforms in order to tackle the 
deep-seated causes of poverty and dependency, arguing that New Labour ultimately  failed 
in this respect, despite making bold promises to the contrary and pledging to “think the 
unthinkable” on welfare reform when it was elected in 1997.  Such criticism of the 
established institutional structures of the British state, the need for radical welfare reform 
along with renewed social policy initiatives goes to the heart ‘of the Conservative Party’s 
                                                          
287 
David Cameron, ‘Let's mend our broken society’, 27th April 2010,  
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/04/David_Cameron_Lets_mend_our_broken_society.as
px 
288 
See Melissa Kite, ‘David Cameron's Conservatives must cut tax and spending, say policy chiefs’, The Daily 
Telegraph, 23rd August 2008,  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/2609774/David-Camerons-Conservatives-must-cut-
tax-and-spending-say-policy-chiefs.html 
John Redwood was joint chair of David Cameron’s policy commission on the economy while in opposition.  
  110  
 
relationship with the post-war welfare state’289, a relationship that has been uneasy at times 
in seeking to both preserve the provision of core public services yet reforming them 
simultaneously in order for them to ostensibly flourish in the long-term. Such reform often 
has radical and politically difficult implications, and pivotal to this approach in the early 21st 
century has been the indefatigable desire of Conservatism to limit and reduce the prevailing 
and often hegemonic ‘statist’ flavour of Labour’s management of the welfare state, and 
instead develop a political culture whereby: 
 
‘Entrepreneurial innovation is to be extended to social policy and the reform of the 
welfare state by enhancing the role of social entrepreneurs in the voluntary 
sector’.290  
 
This challenge of securing adequate public service provision but without a ‘big 
government’ model of delivery subsequently emerged as one of the fundamental challenges 
and driving factors of Cameron’s leadership from its earliest phase.  In order to provide 
substance to his developing policy rhetoric, Cameron swiftly established six groups with a 
brief to formulate new policy ideas for a future Conservative government. The groups 
convened from late 2005 onwards, and one prominent body was the Social Justice Policy 
group, led by former party leader Iain Duncan Smith, whose burgeoning interest in poverty, 
welfare policy and social reform had led to his pivotal involvement in helping to establish 
the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ)291 in 2004 to develop original policies and initiatives to 
deal with wider social policy, reform of the welfare system and identifying the root causes of 
long-term poverty. The attention to this policy area has won him praise from political 
colleagues, with David Willetts stating that ‘Iain Duncan Smith deserves a lot of credit for 
(introducing) social justice…..back into Conservative thinking’292.  Duncan Smith therefore 
                                                          
289
 Simon Lee, ‘David Cameron’s Political Challenges’, cited in Simon Lee & Matt Beech (eds.), The 
Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edn., 2009), Ch.1, 
p.13 
290
 Simon Lee, ‘Convergence, Critique and Divergence: The Development of Economic Policy under David 
Cameron’, cited in Simon Lee & Matt Beech (eds.), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last?, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edn., 2009), Ch.5, p.78 
291
 See: 
http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/ 
292
 David Willetts MP, interview with author, 10
th
 September 2012 
  111  
 
aspired to be the champion of a revived model of ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ and within 
this context: 
 
‘Reforming the public services and helping the “vulnerable” in society were to 
become his mission..... (which) stemmed in part from his Christianity and sense of 
social justice’293.  
 
Following over 3,000 hours of public consultation and after receiving submissions from over 
2,000 different organisations, Duncan Smith’s policy group published two reports in 2006 
and 2007294, reflecting a distinctive and revised emphasis to the Conservative Party’s 
welfare policy agenda, evident in the document ‘Breakthrough Britain’: 
 
‘Breakthrough Britain advocates a new approach to welfare in the 21st century. We 
believe that, in order to reverse social breakdown, we need to start reinforcing the 
Welfare Society. The Welfare Society is that which delivers welfare beyond the 
State’295. 
 
Such specific language of a ‘welfare society’, as opposed to the more bureaucratic 
perception of the ‘welfare state’ was an important differentiation of vocabulary, which 
chimed in with the similar sentiments and vocabulary of the recently–installed Conservative 
leader and his focus on addressing social injustice, tackling the ‘broken society’ and the 
evolution of his later focus on the ‘big society’.  This renewed social agenda was therefore 
an attempt to simultaneously emphasise the renewed Conservative agenda in this policy 
sphere and also revitalise the Conservative Party’s wider public image: 
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‘Under Cameron, the idea of the “broken society” was being used to help dispel the 
impression that the Conservative Party, by its own admission, was the “nasty party” 
of British politics’296.  
 
In summary, the findings of Duncan Smith’s Social Justice Group were the first clear 
indicator in a generation that the Conservatives were embarking on a renewed and 
concerted effort to develop a distinct approach to the broad area of social and welfare 
policy, and its findings could be broadly summarised as emphasising: 
 
‘the importance of marriage and strong family values and the need to reverse the 
dependency culture’297.  
 
The specific focus on the perceived stabilising influences of marriage and 
conventional family values has raised questions as to how new or original the new policy 
agenda was, namely whether it was merely a reversion to Neo-Conservative social values 
and traditionalist policies that were additionally fused with distinct moral guidelines, an 
approach that can be aligned to the influence of American-based academics such as 
Lawrence Mead298, whose work in this sphere over recent years has rejected the 
entitlement aspect within welfare benefit as a means of addressing long-term 
unemployment, i.e. questioning whether receipt of state benefit is, under specific 
conditions,  an automatic social right of citizenship in contemporary western society. This 
approach has sought to introduce conditionality into receipt of welfare support, and has 
pursued an alternative model of benefits provision where the state seeks to actively 
promote enhanced values of citizenship, responsibility and an enhanced work ethic as a 
condition of the receipt of welfare benefit. Some observers have noted that this more 
moralistic approach and its identification of an entrenched and poverty-stricken, dependent 
‘underclass’ is an interpretation that arguably has some parallels with the neo-liberal socio-
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economic analysis of American libertarian scholars such as Charles Murray299, who in using 
US society as a model example, has argued that welfare payments are ultimately harmful to 
both the individual recipients and wider society in the long-term, and that it is therefore 
desirable to remove welfare provision altogether as an incentive for people to work.  Such a 
morality-infused focus on conditionality has proved to be a controversial concept for the 
British welfare debate, and this approach involves a degree of pro-active reciprocity from 
the welfare recipient, with such a policy agenda supposedly aimed at addressing the 
inadequacies and moral failings of those who are unemployed for a long period of time by 
motivating them to find work through the fear of losing their welfare support completely. 
This influence has emerged in policy terms in the way it appears to have partially shaped 
and influenced the welfare to work and workfare agenda promoted by both Labour and 
Conservative politicians from the 1990s onwards.   
 
However while no-one in the senior Conservative hierarchy has publicly or practically 
promoted such extreme examples of welfare conditionality either in opposition or since 
returning to power in 2010, there has been evidence of a more moralistic approach and 
emphasis to welfare policy, namely from the Centre for Social Justice. Whether this attitude 
is compatible with a greater overall ‘compassion’ remains to be seen, and although the 
origins and originality of this agenda are a  source of some dispute, there has certainly been 
an enhanced focus by Cameron’s Conservatives on social policy and within that, a more 
individualistic, decentralised and less bureaucratic approach to welfare provision. Within 
this context, in July 2008 David Cameron launched the Conservative Party’s ‘broken society’ 
initiative into the practical political world at the beginning of the Glasgow East by-election 
campaign300, and this revamped socio-economic stance could ultimately said to have been 
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significantly influenced by the aims and values of Iain Duncan Smith’s Centre for Social 
Justice, established four years earlier and which had vigorously and pro-actively sought to 
initiate new policies in this sphere in the intervening period.  
 
The Conservative Party in Power: The role of the Welfare State, Social Policy and Social 
Justice from 2010 
 
Although the Conservative Party continued to struggle to achieve any sign of electoral 
progress in inner-city urban areas such as Glasgow East301 where much of this social agenda 
was targeted at, the party did return to national power in May 2010, albeit as the senior 
partners of a coalition with the Liberal Democrats.  David Cameron’s apparently blossoming 
affinity with Duncan Smith on the broad welfare and social policy agenda and the pursuit of 
a revised vision of social justice came to fruition in May 2010 when he appointed him to his 
Cabinet in the role of Secretary of State for Work and Pensions302. This was a political 
elevation that marked Duncan Smith’s return to frontline politics after his brutal ousting as 
Conservative Leader in 2003, and such a role offered him the opportunity to put his 
thorough policy findings, first-hand experiences and significant research while in opposition 
to the ultimate test while running a key government office. Some fellow Conservatives have 
subsequently praised his overall knowledge and approach in dealing with this challenging 
policy area, heralding him as ‘the champion of early intervention’303 in such sensitive aspects 
of social policy (broadly covering the welfare state and associated policy areas). Such active 
interventionism has not necessarily been a trait of the Conservatives when dealing with 
such issues in the modern political era (post-1979), yet from an early stage of his leadership 
Cameron had ‘recognise(d) the importance of softening the Party's approach towards those 
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experiencing poverty and disadvantage’304. This approach of Cameron and Duncan Smith in 
taking a reformist, less ideological and an ostensibly more ‘compassionate’ and open-
minded attitude towards the welfare state has been described by some commentators and 
academics as a typical example of the re-emergence of Conservative pragmatism towards 
this policy area (as has been the case on various issues), as well as an acknowledgement of 
the need to utilise the power of a ‘strong state’ (as alluded to by Andrew Gamble305) in 
achieving the desired long-term political goal and removing obstacles to such an outcome. 
However, while the government’s position appeared to represent a move towards a more 
One Nation approach as opposed to the neo-liberalism of the New Right, Duncan Smith’s 
infusion of a moral need to improve the welfare of the poorer members of society could 
also be said to have had distinctly Thatcherite influences: 
 
‘Margaret Thatcher was not a reductionist in that all that mattered was a free-
market economy. For her, a free market economy operated within a moral and 
cultural framework, but it was largely shaped by her devout Christianity, which is 
much under-rated’306.   
 
Although its moral and political compass could therefore be said to derive from a 
fusion of sources and influences, the post-2010 vision of Conservatism did not envisage that 
state's role would be as universal and comprehensive as was the case for the majority of the 
post-1945 era. As an alternative viewpoint, Conservative expectations demanded more 
devolved and diversified public service provision as part of a new strategy offering new 
solutions aimed at ensuring a better functioning social model and a version of civil society 
more appropriate and credible for the 21st century. This outlook has been summarised by 
Robert Page as follows: 
 
‘Under David Cameron’s “Progressive‟ form of Conservatism the Party has adopted a 
more liberal approach towards the poor and those pursuing `non-traditional‟ 
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lifestyles. Whilst recognising that the state still has a role to play in funding and ..... 
providing welfare services, greater emphasis is now being placed on the part that 
individuals and communities can play in meeting their own welfare needs. This latest 
attempt to refashion the Conservative approach towards the welfare state is yet 
another illustration of the way in which the Party continues to adapt to changing 
economic and social circumstances’307. 
 
This revised and contemporary form of Conservatism, which has been promoted by 
the Cameron leadership and his inner-circle, has been associated with the ambiguous and 
subjective term ‘progressive’308, and it has sought to more explicitly emphasize the 
Conservative interpretation of this term. As part of this approach, Cameron has also 
embraced and promoted the value of society while continuing to stress the importance of 
individuals and community in achieving desired social outcomes and improved levels of 
social justice, rather than over-reliance on the hegemonic power of the state. Indeed, 
advocates of a less centralized and more devolved approach to the organization of the state 
criticized the years between 1997 and 2010 as being a missed opportunity for more radical 
and significant changes in the fundamental approach to national governance, as ‘state 
growth without state reform has missed the opportunity to make structural changes’309. This 
revised Conservative approach appears to partly align with the views of some academic 
commentators that following thirteen years of Labour rule ‘the intervening years had seen 
the emergence of something of a new political consensus on welfare’310 which saw an 
increased degree of agreement about increased levels of state investment, fuelled by 
Labour’s significant public spending increases between 1997 and 2010, although the extent 
of such ‘consensus’ is open to debate. However by the autumn years of New Labour’s 
period in office, a new consensus was evolving among ‘modernisers’ in both major parties 
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that after a period of significant state growth, structural reform and a degree of ‘roll-back’ 
was now required. Indeed, the Conservative politicians of the 2010 administration have 
appeared to reject the approach of the majority of the New Labour era, which primarily 
focused on increased levels of micro-managed state investment from the centre, a 
viewpoint that was particularly re-formulated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the 
beginning of a deep economic recession. This has led to the emergence of more confident 
1980s-style scepticism towards the pervasive role of the centralized state, maintaining a 
view that ‘does not regard public spending per se as a necessary vehicle for the amelioration 
of social ills’311. However, such a bold vision for decentralized policy-making has again led 
critics to question how this approach equates to the practical achievement of enhanced 
levels of social justice, as despite promising greater efficiency and less bureaucracy, ‘the 
flipside of decentralization is that it means fewer guarantees….. about the scope and quality 
of provision available in each locality’312.  
 
Some of Duncan Smith’s initial experiences in devising policies for the CSJ and 
focusing on a new Conservative vision of social justice and associated policies had been 
formulated on the basis of his experiences within the inner-cities, notably in areas such as 
the deprived Easterhouse estate in Glasgow313. In taking such a path, he sought to re-ignite 
and rediscover the Conservative Party’s focus on this issue and revive the 19th century 
Disraelian ‘One Nation’ legacy of concern for poverty that had been somewhat eclipsed 
during the 1980s decade of individualistic ‘New Right’ hegemony. This approach also sought 
to challenge the perception (fuelled by various events and developments of the 1980s) that 
the Conservatives were indifferent to the plight of deprived communities, and that genuine 
attention and effort was required in order to address those members of society that were 
‘dependent on the state..... (whose dependency) becomes a stigma and allows (their) 
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demands to be disregarded (in political terms)314.  Both economic and social benefits could 
therefore be potentially produced by focusing on such a ‘stigma’ within modern society that 
had overlapped different governments as an issue needing to be addressed, namely based 
on the premise that ‘the quality of your life and your morale is affected by how you do and 
are compared with other people’315 . Initiatives to challenge such long-term social 
dislocation and political alienation had indeed emerged within the context of the Labour 
government’s struggles to reform the overall welfare system and reduce long-term 
‘dependency’ on the state, as during thirteen years in power it has been claimed that ‘they 
had done only slightly better than their Tory predecessor in liberating from welfare 
dependency the millions without good education or training’316. Indeed according to critics 
of New Labour from the ‘Big Society’ wing of the Conservative Party like Jesse Norman, the 
successive administrations of Blair and Brown arguably failed to achieve the desired 
aspiration of achieving greater social justice, as well as failing to reform the welfare system 
and associated attempts to reduce dependency on the state by excessive welfare recipients.   
 
This New Labour legacy prompted a Conservative rebuke that such statism ‘actively 
undermined social justice’317, along with academic observations that acknowledged that the 
New Labour era ‘encouraged dependence on the state, while failing to meet the aim of 
reducing social inequality’318. Within the context of such criticisms, a more efficient 
streamlining and de-centralisation of resources appeared to be the prime objectives of an 
incoming Conservative government, particularly given that the scope of the welfare system 
grew in both bureaucratic size and financial expenditure over thirteen years. Such an explicit 
failing after the party’s most sustained ever spell in office was readily admitted by new party 
leader Ed Miliband in late 2010, when he claimed that Labour “did not do enough when it 
was in power to reform the welfare system”319, despite widely acknowledged increases in 
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spending on the broader sphere of social policy. The size and scope of the inflated welfare 
structure that emerged under New Labour was exacerbated by an increasingly complex and 
bureaucratic benefits system due to the introduction of ‘statist’ and administration-heavy 
policies such as the proliferation of tax credits320 and the broad extension of means-testing 
by Chancellor Gordon Brown (1997-2007). Welfare spending was subsequently said to have 
risen 40% in real terms (including for the effects of inflation) between 2000-10, but the 
Labour government’s performance in terms of effective and financially efficient policy 
delivery has to be viewed in the context that welfare spending has arguably never really 
been kept under control by any government in the post-war years,321 so it is perhaps 
inevitable that public spending in this area would have risen anyway in line with general 
post-war expenditure trends. However, critics of this policy from the Conservative political 
ranks have highlighted what they believe to be its excessive and wasteful cost, with Iain 
Duncan Smith claiming that: 
 
"In the years between 2003 and 2010, Labour spent a staggering £171 billion on tax 
credits, contributing to a 60% rise in the welfare bill. Far too much of that money was 
wasted, with fraud and error under Labour costing over £10 billion”.322 
 
Such an apparently profligate performance by the Labour administration in this policy 
sphere since 1997 would form the framework and context for the broader socio-economic 
policy approach of the incoming coalition government from 2010 onwards, with prominent 
advocates of The Big Society arguing that many of Britain’s social and economic ‘problems 
(can be traced)….. to the long-term growth and centralization of the state’323, alongside the 
associated costs that this trend has generated.  
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The significant and concerted efforts to revise the Conservative Party’s attitudes 
within the area of social policy and its revised view of how the state effectively works and 
functions has led to political commentators observing that “Team Cameron” has ‘adopted a 
more ameliorative approach towards poverty and social injustice than their Majorite or 
Thatcherite predecessors’324, although critics would say that in the wake of the post-2010 
austerity and retrenchment measures, practical policy has failed to match such rhetoric, 
focus and attention325.  Despite this specific re-focusing however, at recent elections the 
Conservative Party has continued to struggle to win over a public that has appeared to be 
sceptical of the party’s emphasis on developing policies that focus on tackling poverty, 
maintaining good standards of social welfare delivery326, yet while also seeking to reduce 
public spending, and an image remains among some key parts of the electorate that it 
remains the party for the better off members of society327. Although the concept of social 
justice remains hazy and is still open to interpretation within the contemporary political 
scene, in 2012 the Conservative-led government sought to clarify and crystallise its 
understanding and promotion of what it means in practice by releasing the document: 
‘Social Justice: transforming lives’328, which offered an updated interpretation of this key 
concept as follows: 
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‘Social Justice is about making society function better – providing the support and 
tools to help turn lives around….. the most effective solutions will often be designed 
and delivered at a local level….. (and it) is closely related to another Government 
priority: to increase social mobility’329. 
 
Alongside such a Conservative-inspired evolution and re-emphasis of the concept of 
social justice, the development of a body such as the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) and its 
links to Duncan Smith have led to the obvious inference among many political observers 
that it is politically and ideologically aligned with the Conservative Party, and it appeared to 
play a significant role in the re-moulding of party’s attitude towards welfare policy matters, 
with many observers and party reformers acknowledging that this has been an area 
somewhat neglected during the 1980s. Bolstered by his involvement with this recently-
formed pressure group, Duncan Smith has subsequently argued in vigorous ‘One Nation’ 
language that the Conservatives have a duty to assist those in poverty and to promote their 
own specific notion of social justice in a 21st century context. However despite such 
perceptions of its political role and affiliation, the CSJ denies being explicitly connected in 
any way to the Conservative Party, stating that the organization is ‘unable to comment on 
the evolution of policy within the Conservative Party (as) an independent think tank’330. This 
is despite the high-profile connections to Iain Duncan Smith and the fact that the Head of 
the CSJ, Philippa Stroud, stood unsuccessfully for the Conservative Party at the 2010 General 
Election and was subsequently appointed as an adviser to the Department of Work and 
Pensions, headed by Duncan Smith following the 2010 election result331. Nevertheless 
despite such connections, the CSJ has confidently claimed that it is a genuinely independent 
‘think-tank’ that seeks to influence social policy of all parties ‘across the political spectrum 
and believe(s) that social justice should be a key plank of any party’s vision’332, ultimately 
developing cross-party links within the burgeoning social justice and welfare policy agendas 
in the process.  
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In therefore exploring the most efficient and optimum methods of delivering social 
policy, welfare provision and the provision of a distinct vision of the much debated concept 
of social justice in the early 21st century political environment, the CSJ has generally focused 
on addressing the role of government in the delivery of welfare provision, which in turn has 
led to demands for significant reforms of the welfare system and the encouragement and 
promotion of innovative and devolved policy practices that have primarily derived from 
community activities, voluntary groups, charities and other ‘grassroots’ social projects 
rather than the more traditional post-war funding streams from the monolithic state 
structure. In doing so, the CSJ has sought to promote the relatively novel notion, as 
endorsed by many Conservative modernisers, that the state does not necessarily have the 
answer to every socio-economic problem and that increased ‘dependency’ was ultimately 
the end result of such an exclusively ‘statist’ approach that has prevailed much of the post-
war period, a criticism particularly adhered to the Labour Party after thirteen years in office 
until 2010: 
 
“Labour's policies have left the poor even more dependent on the state for their 
incomes and the kind of public services they receive. And that, in the end, will be 
Labour's legacy to the poor. Dependence, not independence”333. 
 
Such ‘dependency’ has, according to right-of-centre political critics, been re-enforced 
by the progressively higher levels of public spending associated with various social and 
welfare policies during Labour’s thirteen year tenure in office from 1997 onwards. This 
viewpoint argues that the widely acknowledged additional public spending of this era  
created and funded additional levels of bureaucracy and complex means-tested welfare 
schemes (e.g. tax credits), that led to a further reliance on the benevolent mechanism of the 
state for many individuals in order for further financial benefits to be accessed. In the long-
term this contributed (along with the post-2008 economic slump), towards a record deficit 
which Conservatives were increasingly critical of while in opposition and which they 
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identified as a key priority to be tackled once in power after 2010, and which has 
subsequently been a pivotal and focused under-current to their social and welfare agenda 
since the advent of the financial crisis in mid-2008334.  Labour’s difficulties in addressing this 
policy area in the long-term while in office was despite the fact  that a key aim of New 
Labour was to ‘make work pay’, a sentiment that has generated broad political consensus 
and which has been heartily echoed by Cameron’s Conservatives335 in government from 
2010. On the launch of the ‘Universal Credits’ policy in late 2010, where his ideas from 
opposition could be utilised in practical terms, Iain Duncan Smith alluded to the extreme 
economic conditions of the time as a specific reason to address this specific aspect of 
welfare provision, commenting that "In prosperous times this dependency culture would be 
unsustainable but today it's a national crisis".336 On Labour’s departure from office in 2010, 
it was clearly evident that spending on public services had steadily and clearly risen while 
the party was in power, particularly in contrast with the broadly declining rate of public 
spending as percentage of GDP between 1979 and 1997 (as evident in Table 1 below). 
Conservative critics would claim that such public spending increases after 1997 had not 
always gone on frontline services and that the issue of ‘welfare dependency’ had ultimately 
not been addressed: 
 
Table 1- Public Spending in UK as a Percentage of GDP (1975-2012) 
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Year Public Spending as 
% of GDP 
1975-76 49.7 
1976-77 48.6 
1977-78 45.6 
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1978-79 45.1 
1979-80 44.6 
1980-81 47.0 
1981-82 47.7 
1982-83 48.1 
1983-84 47.8 
1984-85 47.5 
1985-86 45.0 
1986-87 43.6 
1987-88 41.6 
1988-89 38.9 
1989-90 39.2 
1990-91 39.4 
1991-92 41.9 
1992-93 43.7 
1993-94 43.0 
1994-95 42.5 
1995-96 41.8 
1996-97 39.9 
1997-98 38.2 
1998-99 37.2 
1999-2000 36.3 
2000-01 34.5 
2001-02 37.7 
2002-03 38.5 
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Sources: 
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk 
DataBlog, 2013 Budget briefing, The Guardian, Monday 18th March 2013, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/25/uk-public-spending-1963#data 
 
These accelerating fiscal figures and public expenditure trends of recent years could 
possibly justify the sentiments of contemporary frontline Conservative politicians such as 
Iain Duncan Smith, who have repeatedly and consistently lamented the progressive growth 
of ‘statism’ and its associated high levels of government spending. Such trends have been 
exacerbated by the bureaucratic implications of ‘targeted welfare’ which was a prominent 
feature of Gordon Brown’s welfare vision in particular, and which the Conservatives claimed 
provided further fuel to the overall culture of ‘dependency’ that remained in place under 
the sustained period of Labour government from 1997-2010. In adopting this approach they 
have sought to revive calls for greater ‘fiscal conservatism’ in an approach that rejects 
hegemonic state provision of core public services from the centre,  and which seeks to 
deliver a more individualistic and self-reliant range of public services within an alternative 
version of social justice in the process, and this narrative has even been adopted by some 
more moderate reformist and chastened elements within the post-Brown Labour Party in 
2003-04 39.3 
2004-04 40.5 
2005-06 41.2 
2006-07 40.9 
2007-08 41.0 
2008-09 44.5 
2009-10 47.7 
2010-11 46.8 
2011-12 45.0 
2012-13 43.1 
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political opposition337. Such an emphasis on linking fiscal conservatism with the provision of 
social justice is arguably a difficult outcome to achieve (particularly within an era of 
significant austerity), and it does raise question marks as to the true motives of the 
Conservatives’ renewed focus on welfare and social policy during the Cameron era, namely 
whether it is a genuinely new and more compassionate approach to this policy area, or is it 
merely a return of the Thatcherite policy of retrenchment and cutting back on the size and 
scope of the state’s range of provision and support, moulded by moral and financial 
pressures while being cloaked and concealed by a less threatening rhetoric and language?338 
 
In the context of Conservative attacks on the ‘dependency culture’ that was alleged 
to have been exacerbated during Labour’s thirteen year period in power, it could be equally 
argued that ‘dependency’ was a prominent legacy of the Thatcher era during the 1980s and 
its historically high levels of sustained long-term unemployment and the significant financial 
cost of subsequent benefits. Indeed, such dependency could prove to be a burden on a 
similar scale for the Cameron-led coalition if unemployment continues to increase on his 
watch, rising to a 17 year high of 2.64 million in late 2011339. In such a context, the 
comments below, while directly alluding to the 1980s, could be seen as a damning 
indictment of the cross-party administration of power that encompassed the 31 years 
between 1979 and 2010: 
 
‘’..... instead of strengthening work incentives and reducing dependency, the 
government’s policy of targeting created..... a dependency culture’340.  
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 The fact that greater ‘dependency’ could be seen as a consequence of Thatcher’s 
socio-economic approach was a somewhat ironic development given her broad hostility to 
‘Welfarism’ that clearly developed during her time in power. She and her ‘New Right allies 
had consistently argued that the post-war years of consensus ‘had spawned a dependency 
culture’341 that ‘had been allowed to take hold..... (and) become both dysfunctional and 
costly’’342 over a long-term period.  Tackling this culture was therefore a fundamental 
political and socio-economic priority after 1979, yet it was not successfully dealt with during 
her eleven and a half years in power, with unemployment levels and consequently welfare 
recipients higher when she left office than when she came to power343, although public 
spending was reduced and streamlined (see Table 1).  Thirteen years of Labour in power 
between 1997 and 2010 saw the country’s levels of public spending as a percentage of GDP 
steadily increase towards levels not witnessed since the mid-1970s (also see Table 1), a 
trend that would justify long-standing right-wing criticisms of the consistent profligate 
tendencies of Labour governments while in office.  This in turn led to significant increases in 
the levels of expenditure on some key areas of welfare provision and social policy (as 
outlined in Tables 2 and 3 below), although whether increased public spending on key public 
services addressed society’s core socio-economic problems as well as the fundamental issue 
of social justice is not clear and it remains a matter of significant political debate that strikes 
at the heart of whether the state is always the best and most efficient mechanism of 
delivering key public services.   
 
 
Table 2- Government spending by billions (2011 estimates) 
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Table 3- Government spending by key social policy areas as a percentage of GDP (2011 
estimates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Source for tables 1, 2 and 3:  
http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk 
 
 
The Influence of the Liberal Democrats on post-2010 social and welfare policies and the 
pursuit of social justice 
 
The above figures (Tables 1 and 2) indicate a considerable and ongoing financial outlay on 
key public services at a structural level, representing a massive challenge to any 
administration intent on both reforming the scope and streamlining the cost of government 
while at the same time seeking to create the necessary socio-economic conditions for 
Policy Area Billions 
% of 
GDP 
Pensions 122.6 8% 
Health  122.4 8% 
Education 83.6 5% 
Welfare Benefits 113.1 7% 
     
Overall GDP 1539   
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addressing inequality, long-term poverty and welfare dependency within a framework of a 
revised vision of social justice for the 21st century. This is the scenario facing the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition from 2010 onwards, a particularly ambitious 
agenda for a Conservative-led regime whose key political instincts and principles have 
historically (in modern times at least) been linked to retrenchment and the need to keep 
levels of public spending under control, rather than using the powers of the state to initiate 
improved public policy options as the proposed solution. It therefore remains to be seen as 
to whether this combination of factors can re-mould social justice as a concept that can be 
revised and re-moulded in line with the government’s priorities and political agenda from 
2010 onwards, and whether the political fusion of the Conservatives with a traditionally 
more interventionist political party has the potential to create new and original policy 
formulations in this sphere, with an associated morality and vigour to drive things forward.  
 
Given this political attitude alongside the uncertain outcome of the 2010 General 
Election, it is important to analyse the extent to which the Conservative Party’s coalition 
partners, the Liberal Democrats, are influencing the narrative regarding welfare reform and 
overall social policy, particularly as since the party’s official inception in 1988 they have 
been broadly viewed as being more ‘liberal’ on social issues, more ‘statist’ in their approach 
to government intervention in the economy, and ultimately more profligate in terms of 
public spending than the Conservatives in recent times. However, the two parties appear to 
have moved closer together on such policy issues in recent years due to a combination of 
the parliamentary arithmetic from 2010 and the pragmatic reaction to it, coupled with a 
revised Conservative attitude towards social policy under the Cameron leadership from 
2005, and fused with the ascendant influence of Nick Clegg’s 'Orange Book’344 (economic 
liberal) faction of Liberal Democrats from 2007 onwards. This political fusion of shared 
political priorities bolstered by a dual hostility to an unpopular outgoing Labour government 
consequently resulted in both parties reaching a broad agreement within the Coalition 
Agreement of May 2010345 that emphasized the need for the ‘greater use of private, social 
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enterprise and voluntary organizations in the provision of (public) services’346. This appeared 
to indicate a likelihood of a less ‘statist’ and more diverse approach to public service 
delivery within the context of a retrenchment agenda between 2010-15, alongside a cross-
party willingness to pursue a more ‘localist’ political approach to decision-making347.   
 
In such a context, since collaborating in office since May 2010, Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats have broadly shared a greater focus and emphasis on the importance of 
developing a healthy and more localized civil society that is allowed to flourish away from 
the tentacles of a bureaucratic central state and its capacity to grow inexorably if given the 
opportunity to do so. This pursuit of a more vigorous, de-centralized model of civil society is 
therefore said to be a more effective means of promoting social justice according to its 
advocates, who broadly espouse the vision of the ‘Big Society’ and its less bureaucratic 
structure as an inspirational socio-political model. Such an idealized political model is 
ultimately more detached and less controlled by the centralizing tendencies of politicians 
who are often inclined to seek to control and manipulate the state’s activities in their own 
partisan political interests, as well as being not over-reliant on the de-regulated markets as 
promoted by the neo-liberal outlook, a viewpoint primarily driven by arbitrary economic 
profit motives and which can be seen as undermining communitarianism and the wider 
social fabric. This burgeoning alternative approach to how government should most 
efficiently work, fused with a combination of specific political developments, philosophical 
fusion and electoral circumstances, has culminated in the Conservative Party’s ‘coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats, (and) the possibility of developing a somewhat different social 
policy agenda than the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s’348. These earlier 
administrations had governed under very different political and social conditions, had larger 
parliamentary majorities and generally pursued a more ideological and less fluid approach 
to practical governance.   
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As part of the 2010 Coalition Agreement, Liberal Democrat MPs were expected to 
broadly support Iain Duncan Smith’s first major policy initiative in the important and 
politically significant sphere of social and welfare policy, which materialised in his White 
Paper: ‘Universal Credits: welfare that works’ (November 2010)349. This policy was notably 
influenced by the Centre for Social Justice and principally aimed at cutting costs and tackling 
the bureaucratic legacy of New Labour by streamlining and fusing a multitude of welfare 
benefits into a single payment. However it remains to be seen whether this will be 
successful350 in either social, financial and indeed political terms, and critics have claimed 
that such a policy is ‘practically unachievable’ in terms of delivery351, with fears that it is 
primarily inspired as a further means of reducing government expenditure and cutting the 
deficit, the apparent raison d’être for much of the coalition government’s key activities 
during its first year in office (2010-11).  In this context, critics of the Conservative Party’s 
intentions in its post-2010 austerity measures claim that rather than offering a genuinely 
revived model for innovative social and welfare policy formulation, and by default an 
alternative vision of social justice, such cutbacks can instead appear to represent the 
Thatcherite tradition re-imposing itself on the party and re-asserting the Hayekian agenda of 
‘rolling back the state’. The dilemma for those members of the coalition government with a 
genuine and long-held interest in the policy area of welfare provision (such as Iain Duncan 
Smith), and who seek to address long-term social injustice and initiate radical and 
meaningful reforms to this policy area as opposed to adopting the blunt instrument of 
retrenchment, are potentially going to be thwarted within an atmosphere of cost-cutting 
and austerity. This also creates potentially serious and de-stabilising tensions for the 
coalition partners in power, particularly given the more interventionist and fiscally 
expansive tendencies of the 'social democrat’ wing of the Liberal Democrats. However, the 
coalition government’s dynamics on this issue have initially proved to be fairly robust, and 
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Cameron’s determined focus to both decentralise the government structure and as a 
corollary, to save money within the sphere of welfare provision, does appear to have been 
broadly accepted by the junior coalition partners.352  
 
However, the involvement and inclusion of the Liberal Democrats within the 
coalition government from 2010 onwards may restrict and curtail the more radical reformist 
tendencies of some Conservative politicians within this area of policy. Such a tense 
backdrop has the potential to seriously scupper any meaningful long-term welfare policy 
reforms, and it provides a potential breaking point in terms of both Iain Duncan Smith and 
Nick Clegg’s loyalty to Cameron’s government. Within this context of creating a balance 
between spending cutbacks and innovative policy-making in this area, it therefore remains 
to be seen whether it will be external Liberal Democrat pressures or internal Conservative 
pressures that will undermine the coalition’s broader social policy agenda. In the early 
months of government and given the Liberal Democrats’ ostensible discipline and loyalty to 
the May 2010 Agreement, it appeared that the early tensions at least were on an internal 
Conservative basis, with reported clashes over levels of spending between the incumbent at 
the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and George Osborne at the Treasury,353 an 
indicator of the long-term challenges facing the incoming government of 2010 in relation to 
its attempts to deliver improved levels of social justice via the vigorous pursuit and 
determined implementation of a revised range of social and welfare policies. Overall 
therefore, the Conservative Party has encountered a range of problems in implementing its 
own distinct social justice agenda in practical sense since returning to office in 2010, with  
prominent obstacles being the need to tackle the national deficit, internal party conflict 
about its precise policy direction, challenges in distinguishing its policies from the New 
Labour legacy, the difficulties in putting theory-based policy initiatives into practice as well 
as the compromises required for coalition government. Such issues have been evident in a 
number of practical policy areas since the Conservatives came to power in 2010, which the 
thesis will now look at in more detail.  
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The Big Society 
 
This chapter seeks to fuse theory with policy and identify and illustrate practical policy links 
that can be aligned and connected with the theoretical issues discussed within the earlier 
chapters of the thesis. It therefore seeks to explain and analyse the development and 
evolution of the concept of ‘The Big Society’ as a specific strand of David Cameron’s 
attempts to create a framework and sense of direction for a practical social policy agenda 
that stems from theories of social justice and various ideological influences, as part of the 
process of seeking to modernise and revamp the Conservative Party’s broader social agenda 
since he secured the party leadership at the end of 2005. Such an approach ultimately seeks 
to address and analyse the role of the state in providing key public services, and in turn 
assesses how realistic are the attempts by Cameron’s government since 2010 to provide a 
comprehensive and stable range of public services and social policy initiatives within a 
smaller state model and a less bureaucratic structural framework. The socio-political term of 
‘The Big Society’ has subsequently evolved into a high-profile and emblematic element of 
the wider approach of Conservative Party ‘modernisers’ to create a revised social policy 
agenda that particularly promotes a fresh vision of social justice for the right-of-centre 
tradition of British politics, which aspires to adhere to Conservative traditions yet also 
pragmatically accepts the significant socio-economic developments of the New Labour era 
from 1997 onwards.  This policy approach was a culmination of Cameron’s focus on 
regenerating interest in the broader sphere of social policy and ‘society’ since becoming 
party leader, and it came to evident fruition in the prolonged lead-up to the 2010 General 
Election, becoming a flagship Conservative policy proposal which promised to put: 
 
‘more power in people’s hands - a massive transfer of power from Whitehall to local 
communities. We want to see community empowerment, the opening up public 
services, and people encouraged and enabled to play a more active part in society.354 
 
As opinion polls suggested an appetite for change among the dissatisfied electorate 
and the likelihood of a return to power for the Conservatives after thirteen years in the 
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political wilderness355, Cameron’s specific Conservative remedy to deal with his 
identification of the country’s social and welfare-related problems (originating from various 
policy reviews), materialised in the form of a policy agenda that was clarified and condensed 
into three words- ‘The Big Society’356. This succinct and well-marketed title was part of a 
broader attempt by Cameron to instil some communitarian-inspired vision and direction 
alongside an ethos of ‘social justice’ into his distinct brand of socially-orientated 
Conservatism. Within this approach, on a practical level Cameron sought to ‘boost social 
action and community volunteering’357 as a legitimate and more flexible alternative to 
uniform state provision, while also instilling a moral streak of enhanced citizenship into 
social policy formulation in the process. However in its evolution in the period that has 
followed, the brevity of its title has created confusion and uncertainty, and for all of the 
Conservative claims that thirteen years of Labour rule resulted in ‘big government’ that 
failed to deliver a more ‘socially just society’, this social and moral vision has been 
somewhat blurred and misunderstood as both a concept and practical entity by significant 
sections of the media, the political classes and the wider general public.  
 
The origins of The Big Society 
 
This specific political term had been developing and germinating from an early phase of 
David Cameron’s leadership, with one prominent advocate of the Big Society stating in 2012 
that ‘David Cameron has been speaking about “Compassionate Conservatism”, which is the 
governing philosophy behind the ‘Big Society’, for at least seven years’358. However it was 
firmed up towards the end of 2009 at the Hugo Young Memorial Lecture, when the 
Conservative Leader sought to explicitly create a distinct and alternative model for a better 
functioning and more efficient civil society to replace the stuttering and ‘broken one’ his 
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policy reviews had identified. In doing so he emphasised the need for a bottom-up approach 
to social policy, involving ‘greater citizen involvement and empowerment, and a bigger role 
for cooperatives, private service providers and voluntary groups’359, all of which were key 
components of his vision of public policy provision that rejected the hegemonic and 
prominent role of the centralised and bureaucratic state that had been the dominant model 
and means of providing core public services for most of the post-war era. In arguing for a 
radical review of how poverty and inequality were to be tackled in the name of social 
justice, Cameron argued that: 
 
‘..... the recent growth of the state has promoted not social solidarity but selfishness 
and individualism’360.  
 
  In essence, Cameron was arguing for a revised ‘rolling back’ of the state from a 21st 
century perspective, which would in turn create localised communities with greater 
autonomy and the power to initiate, influence and organise public activity including the 
provision of social and welfare policies. However he identified that the state was not to be 
eliminated entirely, but instead ‘re-imagined’ and given a revised role in re-making society. 
Vocal supporters of the Big Society agenda argued that this policy sought to re-energise a 
‘strand of Conservatism that has existed for over 200 years’361 and which dated back to the 
18th century Whig tradition of Edmund Burke with its focus on individual civil liberties, a 
vibrant civil society and effective civic institutions, a strong sense of community and a 
limited state.  Some modern Conservatives have lamented the loss of influence of Burke’s 
Whig tradition within the modern Conservative Party dating back to the early 19th century, 
as such an outlook was essentially:  
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‘optimistic about the ability of parties to make things better and this is something we lost 
when the Whig strand or the Liberal strand diverged from the Conservative strand’362.  
 
This burgeoning concept of an enhanced and more constructive role for political 
institutions released from the ostensible shackles of an overbearing centralised state, which 
in turn would create the appropriate conditions for a vibrant civil society and instilling a 
creative and moralistic individuality into local communities was the fundamental basis of 
this new Conservative agenda for social policy. In subsequent months following the initial 
public declaration of this agenda in late 2009, Cameron progressively formulated it as a 
dynamic and indeed ‘vigorous’ doctrine, which in its practical application would promote 
voluntarism and generate a wider collective social conscience as a means of rebuilding 
Britain’s wider cultural and social fabric: 
 
‘David Cameron’s pitch is that British society is broken, not just parts of it; and the 
underlying causes are cultural not economic. Taking his cue from the Social Justice 
Policy Group, the Conservative leader argues that British society is broken because of 
what he terms the decline in “responsibility” and “social virtue”. Civil society has 
become a lot less civil. By extending the powers and reach of the state, and taking 
responsibility away from individuals and communities, the Labour government has 
added to this social fracture’363.  
 
This emphasis on ‘social virtue’ and on the reinvigoration of a ‘civil society’ within 
the renewed and re-modelled socio-political structures of the 21st century has therefore 
been at the heart of the Conservative Party’s social agenda in the Cameron era.  Such a 
revised Conservative social and welfare policy outlook was initially encouraged by the party 
hierarchy on an internal party basis while in opposition, evident in the ‘self-help’ social 
action projects that many Conservative politicians and parliamentary candidates were 
encouraged to develop in the build-up to the 2010 General Election (and to continue 
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beyond in some cases)364, although which were dismissed by political opponents as 
gimmicks. Such schemes were deliberately targeted at a grassroots level in order to provide 
model examples of how to respond to some genuine needs in terms of welfare provision 
from a more communitarian angle, while being notionally free from as much ‘statist’ 
bureaucratic control and regulation as is possible. In political opposition they were used by 
the Conservatives to illustrate the effective role of voluntarist, non-state bodies in delivering 
vital areas of public policy, and indeed in early 2007, Cameron was keen to ‘indicate just 
how important the third sector and its workforce would be for a future Conservative 
government’.365 Such an approach also sought to instigate new social media and technology, 
an apparent influence of Cameron’s Director of Strategy Steve Hilton, who enthused other 
modernising Conservatives with ‘the creation of new forms of social action via advances in 
technology’366 (as evident in the clean-up operation after the 2011 summer riots when 
positive social action was instigated via Facebook in particular). The involvement of the 
voluntarist ‘Third Sector’367 was also identified from an early stage of this socio-political 
approach as a key component to be encouraged in such schemes and initiatives, again as a 
means of finding more efficient alternatives to uniform and monolithic state provision, and 
which in the process rejected the notion that the state has the answer to all of society’s 
major socio-economic problems. While attacking the ‘statist’ agenda of Labour in office and 
also implicitly accepting an apparent neglect by his own party of social policy innovation in 
the past, the policy’s overall ethos can therefore be concisely summarised  as seeking to 
‘empower civil society using the failed approaches of left and right (as) they’ve clearly failed 
to broker a new solution’368.  
 
There does however remain a consistent public under-current of doubt and 
scepticism as to the viability of such an approach, with most contemporary opinion surveys 
indicating that the public ultimately retain greater faith in the power of the state to most 
effectively administer and deliver social and welfare policy. This has resulted in a somewhat 
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quixotic public mood, given that for all the inflated levels of public spending yet 
questionable service delivery under thirteen years of New Labour in power, there remains 
‘little public appetite for an expansion of private sector provision..... (and) deep divisions over 
the delivery of services by other organisations in the voluntary and third sector’369. 
Nonetheless and despite such wider public doubts, the ‘Big Society’ social policy ethos has 
appeared on the political horizon to argue that by promoting and developing public service 
delivery schemes that fuse a reduced role for the state along with voluntary activity and 
greater community-level involvement, this in turn leads to a sense of greater social 
responsibility and civic virtue being instilled back into those who participate, along with 
better value for money for both the taxpayer and the government.  With the overall ethos 
of this concept focusing on a reduced role for the state and an enhanced civic and even 
moral benefit for those involved in such community activities, Cameron’s re-focused brand 
of Conservatism has therefore sought to offer a robust critique and coherent solution for 
Britain’s ‘broken society’, with the promise of providing specific alternative policy 
approaches in the process. This is particularly in relation to the funding and overall strategic 
approach in delivering welfare provision in the UK, broadly recognised as a rising source of 
expense for all governments both now and in the future, and particularly so during a period 
of recession and austerity370. Alongside a greater emphasis on civic and community-based 
activity as a means of delivering a more distinct Conservative vision of social justice, such an 
approach is however not supposed to mark a return to the ‘rugged individualism’ promoted 
during the Thatcher era, but instead provide a more diverse, responsive, compassionate and 
flexible range of decentralised community-focused services and support structures for the 
vulnerable members of society to utilise for their benefit.   
 
The Big Society during and after the 2010 General Election 
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During the 2010 General Election campaign there was much dispute and political debate as 
to what the somewhat ambivalent term ‘The Big Society’ actually meant,371, with one 
political commentator describing the term as having the power ‘to send voters into a state 
of catatonic indifference’372 with some Conservative candidates citing confusion about its 
meaning as an issue on the doorstep when canvassing for votes373. Critical voices cited it as 
a factor why Cameron failed to achieve an overall parliamentary majority despite Labour’s 
failings in office374, accusing him of being unable to fundamentally connect with both his 
party and the wider public about the fundamental problems facing Britain, with the coalition 
with the Liberal Democrats as an eventual compromise settlement as a means of the 
Conservatives being restored to national power375. However, Cameron appeared 
undeterred and continued to promote the specific values and agenda of ‘The Big Society’ 
once he had been elevated to the position of Prime Minister, albeit within a coalition 
framework tinged with political expediency. Following the coalition’s formation in May 
2010, in one of his first high-profile press conferences with his Liberal Democrat Deputy 
Prime Minister Nick Clegg, Cameron indicated how the concept was central to the party’s 
coalition agreement and aims for coalition government376, with Clegg ostensibly endorsing 
this position in the process.  The official Cabinet Office document that supported the policy 
affirmed the essence of this specific policy agenda as follows: 
 
‘Our Conservative - Liberal Democrat Government has come together with a driving 
ambition: to put more power and opportunity into people’s hands. We want to give 
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citizens, communities and local government the power and information they need to 
come together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain they want. We 
want society – the families, networks, neighbourhoods and communities that form 
the fabric of so much of our everyday lives – to be bigger and stronger than ever 
before. Only when people and communities are given more power and take more 
responsibility can we achieve fairness and opportunity for all’ 377.  
 
Despite such cross-party support for this localist and decentralised political agenda 
being proposed to run through the heart of the coalition government’s decision-making and 
policy process, debate over the precise meaning of the term has continued in the post-
election aftermath.  Some political observers subsequently claimed that despite Cameron’s 
buoyant rhetoric, during the first six months of his premiership from May 2010 onwards, 
this high-profile policy stuttered along and hovered on the brink of collapse378.  In response, 
David Cameron has consistently and vigilantly argued that this policy agenda represented a 
re-moulding of a more compassionate form of Conservatism for the post-bureaucratic 
political era, essentially replacing Labour’s ‘big government’ model with the Conservatives’ 
‘big society’379 alternative. Within such a framework, Cameron has sought to utilise figures 
such as the social entrepreneur Baron Wei380 and his focus on enhanced ‘social capital’ and 
innovative de-centralised social activity, alongside the academic Phillip Blond as prominent 
supporters of this socio-political agenda. They in turn have been dubbed Cameron’s ‘Big 
Society gurus’, broadly endorsing the coalition government’s critique of Labour’s state-
heavy approach during its thirteen years in power from 1997, and bolstered by the 
emergence of bodies such as ‘The Big Society Network’381, have instead sought to generate 
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greater social energy and community activity from a bottom-up rather than a top-down 
model of political action.  
 
Blond has particularly been a key influence behind the ideas that have shaped the 
’Big Society’ blueprint, and as the founder of the tank-tank ‘Respublica’382 (from 2009), he 
has emerged as the architect of the ’Red Tory’383 vision that espouses a more 
compassionate and less individualistic form of Conservatism, yet which rejects a powerful 
state within such a desired formula. It has been succinctly summarised as follows: 
 
‘A commitment to the progressive merits of tradition and social conservatism and the 
need to build ethos-driven institutions, and a new Tory economics that distributed 
property, market access and educational excellence to all’.384. 
 
An original Conservative-minded thinker, Blond has echoed the sentiments of David Willetts 
in arguing ‘that the fundamental objective of Conservative politics should be a healthy civil 
society’385 with a more explicit emphasis on the importance of community and 
‘mutualism’386, yet featuring activities and services that are not the sole preserve of an all-
powerful bureaucratic state. Blond’s argument is ultimately both anti-statist yet focused on 
community cohesion, rejecting the bureaucracy of New Labour and the post-war model of 
welfare delivery, while also desiring ‘"red Tory" communitarianism, socially conservative but 
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sceptical of neoliberal economics’387. Such a viewpoint rejects both the dominance of the 
state as an agent of delivering standardisation, which Blond describes as the ‘the great 
destroyer of wealth and opportunity’388, while also dismissing the New Right’s ideological 
prescription of an inflated status and supremacy for the prevailing role of the markets in 
influencing policy-making. Blond has repeatedly offered a scathing critique of the modern 
New Right agenda as having produced ‘an argument for free markets but a failure to deliver 
them’389, or provide a fairer distribution of wealth and resources. He instead prescribes a 
paternalistic and community-led approach to shaping social policy, and he ultimately views 
the emergence of this policy approach as: 
 
‘A response to what I think is an historically unprecedented situation, which is the 
destruction of both the standard left and standard right positions. We’re now in a 
situation where both are busted flushes’390.  
 
 This vision is ultimately aligned with enhanced levels of government efficiency alongside a 
more streamlined state, which combined with a more diverse and innovative range of 
service providers aims to deliver wider social policy improvements and stake-holding 
opportunities for ordinary citizens: 
 
‘we have followed the standard model for, goodness knows, some sixty years that the 
state can deliver all, and the state has failed.  During the time under New Labour we 
pumped more money into the state than ever before and actually all the indices fell – 
social mobility fell, the ability of people to transform their lives dropped, poverty 
increased.  What the Big Society is saying is that the state hasn’t been working, how 
can we make it work?   It is a pro-poor, pro-society agenda’391. 
 
                                                          
387 Phillip Blond, ‘Rise of the red Tories’, Prospect magazine, 28th February 2009, 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/02/riseoftheredtories/ 
388
 Phillip Blond, Respublica think-tank, interview with author in Liverpool, 19th February 2013 
389
 Ibid. 
390
 Ibid. 
391 Dermot Murnaghan debates the Big Society with Phillip Blond (former Cameron advisor), Rev Peter Smith 
Archbishop of Southwark and Sir Stephen Bubb, ACEVO, Sky News, 13th February 2011, 
http://skynewstranscripts.co.uk/transcript.asp?id=946 
  143  
 
 In further developing this argument, Cameron has proclaimed that this new political 
approach would represent a "big advance for people power", and that “my great passion is 
building the big society..... (to) turn government completely on its head"392, due to the 
creation of a less ‘statist’ model of government as a consequence. This line of argument has 
been described as another leading proponent of the Big Society as a rejection of ‘a diet of 
top-down prescription and centralised government’393. Blond has gone on to argue under 
the cloak of his think-tank that the role of collective and ‘community’ action should indeed 
be an important feature of modern and re-branded Conservatism, and this focus has 
appeared to represent an apparent rejection of the Thatcherite ‘New Right’ individualist 
analysis of society. In claiming that the policy is ‘pro-poor’, this appears to contradict broad 
perceptions of post-1979 Conservative policies that ostensibly seemed to promote a free-
market model of government featuring  a ‘rolled-back’ state and low taxation that created a 
socio-political scenario which broadly appeared to favour the better off members of 
society394. This 21st century approach on the back of three successive general election 
defeats seeks to broaden the party’s electoral appeal while maintaining a general 
Conservative suspicion as to whether the state has the definitive answer to all of society’s 
socio-political problems, broadly adhering to the right-of-centre viewpoint which maintains 
an ‘embedded scepticism about the benefits of public expenditure’395. Nevertheless, the 
viewpoint of Blond explicitly argues that both the neo-liberal ‘market-state’ of the ‘New 
Right’ under Thatcher’s guidance and the more socially liberal and interventionist 
tendencies of ‘New Labour’ under the Blair-Brown axis, have ultimately failed in addressing 
the inherent socio-economic needs and demands of the wider population:  
 
‘Under the auspices of both the state and the market, a vast body of disenfranchised 
and disengaged citizens has been constituted..... stripped of their culture by the Left 
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and their capital by the Right, and in such nakedness they enter the trading floor of 
life with only their labour to sell. Proletarianised and segregated, the individuals 
created by the market-state settlement can never really form a genuine society: 
lack(ing) the social capital to create such an association and the economic basis to 
sustain it.”396 
 
 From an academic perspective therefore, Blond has sought to consolidate and 
bolster Cameron’s attempts to shape and influence a Conservative political agenda with an 
ideological anchor and an enhanced social policy focus and emphasis, promoting a socio-
political model that values the importance of society and community, yet one which is not 
exclusively dominated by the power of the state, and which actively seeks its withdrawal 
from some aspects of everyday life:  
 
‘The Big Society, let me put it at its most simple, is helping people to help each other 
so we can help our neighbours, our communities and renew the places where we live 
and rebuild our society..... the point is the Big Society is saying something is wrong 
with the traditional approaches, we pump millions into the state and we still have 
situations like Baby P who met some 50-60 state officials, who die..... what’s 
happened is we’ve taken away power and opportunity from more and more people 
and put it in the centre, it is about putting ordinary people in the driving seat’397. 
 
Public Response to the Big Society and an Austerity Agenda 
 
In terms of the Conservative Party at its grassroots level, one activist has appeared to 
acknowledge the appeal of this concept in re-branding and re-marketing some core 
Conservative values, arguing that this policy agenda is ‘extremely complementary to 
Conservative Party traditions of the “small state”, “localism” and the “empowerment of the 
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individual”’398. However, despite claims of the ‘Big Society’ having an ideological coherence 
and consistency with the Conservative Party’s overall ‘localism’ agenda399 of recent years, 
parts of the media, the political commentariat and indeed the wider general public have 
continued to be increasingly frustrated and confused at the perceived ‘fuzziness’ of what it 
actually means in practice, requiring further detail in the process. In this context, 
approximately a year after Cameron became Prime Minister, two opinion polls suggested 
that ‘the public are increasingly confused by the concept’400. One recurring public concern 
has been the broad belief, as expressed in opinion polls and British Social Attitudes surveys, 
that despite a steady short-term growth in public concern about the levels of government 
spending as the New Labour era progressed, long-term opinion trends suggest that certain 
key social and welfare policies continue to be viewed as the fundamental responsibility of 
the state: 
 
‘..... it is apparent that a large proportion of the public nevertheless feel that welfare 
provision is mainly the responsibility of the government. This may call into question 
the level of likely support for the Conservative idea of the “Big Society”. 401 
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Along with a sceptical public, even ‘Big Society’ prophets and ideologues such as 
David Willetts have appeared to acknowledge that this overall policy approach faces 
practical problems in terms of implementation, and risks for the Conservative Party’s overall 
image. This viewpoint argues that the emphasis of The Big Society on community-led 
voluntarism lacks some practical realities in terms of policy delivery and implementation, 
and in the process generates a negative reaction towards the Conservatives in the context 
of allowing people to ‘think that Conservatives hate the state’402, and one commentator has 
subsequently observed that there doesn’t appear to be ‘any coherent means by which 
efforts to mend the broken society can be co-ordinated’403. A key cross-party report 
published exactly one year after the launch of ‘The Big Society’404 subsequently claimed that 
the government ‘has failed to properly explain it..... amid fears it will be concentrated in 
wealthy suburbs and leave the poorest parts of the country behind’405. Such apparent failings 
of communication and delivery have exposed the Cameron-led government’s inability to 
effectively transmit the primary focus of the government’s message in relation to this high-
profile policy, a particularly notable failure in this instance given that it was the poorer parts 
of society that ‘The Big Society’ was primarily supposed to focus on, and also that Cameron 
highlighted it as one of his government’s most potentially enduring legacies. Amidst such 
ongoing wider public confusion, Cameron was forced to promote what was claimed to be 
the fourth relaunch of this flagship policy in May 2011406, again emphasising the need for 
greater voluntarism and charitable activity stemming from community-based activity rather 
than the unerring control of the hegemonic state, and in doing so offering a revised version 
of modern Conservatism that represented a fresh image and a break from the past in 
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rhetorical emphasis at least, being somewhat detached from both the New Right’s 
individualist neo-liberal focus but also resistant to the perceived ‘statist’ and bureaucratic 
tendencies of New Labour in government. In re-affirming his support for this policy, 
Cameron referred to his ongoing faith in this policy and described it as his ‘passion’ and 
‘mission’407 in politics.  
 
However, further criticism of ‘The Big Society’ policy emerged in autumn 2011, when 
the House of Commons Public Administration Committee re-affirmed such practical 
concerns, declaring that the proposed devolution and decentralisation of power would not 
work without radical and significant structural reforms to the civil service in order to meet 
the demands of the new policy.408 Further critical comments came from the same 
committee at the end of 2011, when it declared that the public and voluntary sectors 
remain confused about the Big Society’s implications, with the Chair of the Committee 
Bernard Jenkin adding that the government’s ongoing focus on greater localism and 
devolution within political decision-making would take a period of time to impact on 
broader public perceptions of this policy: 
 
‘This was never going to happen overnight. To make a change of this magnitude 
successfully will take a generation. It represents a whole new way of government. 
However, so far, the government has not been clear enough about what the Big 
Society means in practical terms”’409.  
 
Such concerns followed claims from both political opponents and erstwhile allies that 
government spending cuts were further hampering the implementation of this policy ethos, 
and that indeed the whole political approach was in fact a smokescreen to mask the 
significant public spending cuts being pursued from May 2010 onwards. This was partially 
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acknowledged by a key instigator of the policy, Philip Blond, who in early 2011 stated that 
‘the cuts as administered I think risk damaging the infrastructure of the Big Society’410, and 
who later in the year claimed that the policy was ‘failing’ and being undermined by the 
depth and scale of the government’s retrenchment agenda, amidst rumours of a cooling of 
his level of influence over the Prime Minister411.  Similar critical conclusions were reached by 
an independent analysis of the policy a year later (mid-2012), with the tank-tank Civil 
Exchange concluding that the flagship policy had been ‘undermined by cuts and distrust’412 
in the eyes of the wider public.  Cameron’s response to such claims that public spending 
cuts are undermining the Big Society ethos was to launch the Big Society bank413 in the 
spring of 2012 as a public-private source of funding that will  seek to provide ‘start-up 
capital for social enterprises’414. Such a pro-active move, which appears to re-affirm a key 
role for the state in this revised model of society, has formed part of a vigilant response by 
the Prime Minister in response to the clamouring viewpoint that retrenchment has allegedly 
undermined the whole concept of the Big Society as the government’s spending cuts have 
impacted from 2010-11 onwards in particular.  
 
This outlook has been particularly voiced by a prominent figure from the charity 
sector, Dame Elisabeth Hoodless, who claimed that the coalition government’s slashing of 
public expenditure in the ostensible name of deficit-reduction and to re-invigorate 
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voluntarism and reduced reliance on the state would in fact paradoxically erode the very 
principles of voluntarism that the new devolved, communitarian political agenda sought to 
encourage, claiming that “there are other ways of saving money without destroying the 
volunteer army."415 This allegation followed reports that the charitable sector, the ‘supposed 
vanguard of the Big Society’416, and central to the delivery of its agenda, was facing massive 
cuts in government funding and subsidies as part of the coalition government’s determined 
attempts to drive down the national deficit from mid-2010 onwards417, with an estimated 
7,000 such bodies having to close during 2011-12418.  It has also been argued that many 
people are too busy either maintaining or seeking employment during a difficult economic 
period to have the time or commitment to engage in the sort of community-based 
voluntarism envisaged by the Big Society approach to public policy419, as well as having less 
of their own money to donate to charity due to the more severe economic climate.  Some 
critics and bodies such as Volunteering England have even claimed that charities are being 
exploited and the unemployed are being targeted in the name of work experience within a  
Big Society narrative, both being expected to provide their services free of charge as a 
means of reducing the costs of private work programme providers420. Such developments 
strike at the heart of the argument inherent to the Big Society agenda that a smaller state 
encourages greater levels of citizen engagement and charitable activity. Optimists however 
have continued to argue that there are innovative means of getting round such challenging 
socio-economic realities, as outlined below:  
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‘When times are tough hardly anything is protected, and amongst the victims of any 
recession includes voluntary giving and voluntary activity and we have to be realistic 
about that. However where the likes of Steve Hilton has brought David Cameron’s 
Conservatism is ….. using social media for new forms of community action and 
volunteering’421. 
 
Whether such utilisation of new technology fills the emerging charitable void 
remains to be seen, given such an unconvinced wider reaction towards the policy amidst an 
atmosphere of public spending cuts. The government has been regularly forced on the 
offensive in promoting this overarching policy direction, with further attempts to clarify the 
precise sentiments of the ‘Big Society’ made by Cabinet members on a regular basis. For 
example Baroness Warsi, then Chairman of the Conservative Party, sought to affirm its 
meaning in a fairly concise manner in the House of Lords in February 2011: 
 
"The big society is defined by many in this House as being what most of them have 
done for most of their lives. It is a volunteering, social action, philanthropic approach 
to life, but it is also about the opening up of public services to local control and 
devolution of power."422 
 
However, the policy’s apparent inability to capture the wider public and indeed 
Conservative imagination could perhaps be seen in that it failed to make the formal agenda 
of the 2011 Conservative Party Conference423, while there was only one fairly limited 
mention of it during David Cameron’s conference speech in 2012, when he aligned it with 
the voluntarist spirit of the 2012 London Olympics workforce:  
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“And those Games-Makers. You know, I've spent three years trying to explain the Big 
Society......they did it beautifully in just three weeks”.424  
 
David Cameron did however seek to further re-ignite its relevance by linking the ‘Big 
Society’ as a key driver and narrative behind the New Year’s honours list of 2011/12,425 
suggesting that he was not willing to totally abandon the concept despite the various 
setbacks affecting its overall evolution and progress. He was simultaneously supported in 
retaining some faith in this policy agenda by a prominent commentator who has argued that 
the policy, despite being unfavourably likened to Tony Blair’s vague and uninspiring ‘Third 
Way’, still had the potential to act as the ‘pro-active’ driving force, the moral compass and 
the sense of political coherence for a coherent domestic policy agenda that Cameron has so 
far struggled to articulate426.  
 
Reaction to the ‘Big Society’ from left and right 
 
There are various left-of-centre figures who have been critical of this new Conservative-led 
agenda and who have been sceptical of claims that the policy does not have right-wing or 
‘neo-liberal’ implications. This viewpoint is also fearful of how the Big Society’s emphasis 
and reliance on voluntarism and localised schemes could potentially affect the overall 
provision of key public services. In its rejection of the hegemony of the state as a public 
service provider, this has raised fears that the policy could initiate a return to the mentality 
of the Victorian era when state welfare provision, the effective regulation of standards and 
the assurance of ‘safety nets’ for recipients of key social policies were limited, and both 
public and charitable welfare provision was far more arbitrary and less uniform and 
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universal in nature427. In practice, this perspective fears that such an approach would mark a 
dismantling rather than a restructuring of the post -war welfare state. Such a voluntarist 
emphasis has therefore been lambasted by many political and academic figures on the 
centre-left who have claimed that the term ‘Big Society’ is merely a vague euphemism for 
the justification of savage public spending cuts and a massive shrinking of the state’s size 
and its egalitarian scope and remit, regardless of David Cameron’s soothing vocabulary and 
renewed focus on the concept of ‘society’428. Indeed, other leftist commentators have 
further warned of the dangers of this approach, arguing that the Cameron regime is 
threatening to bypass the goals of the Thatcher era, claiming that ‘Where she privatized 
state-run industries, the Cameron government would dismantle the state itself’ and that 
Cameron ‘retains the misleading aura of a pragmatist, disguising the fervour of his anti-state 
dogma’429.  
 
However despite such media, academic and broader public scepticism about the 
nature of the concept, in the wake of the 2010 General Election result Labour politicians 
have been forced to adapt and respond to the ‘Big Society’ political agenda and its 
associated vocabulary as outlined by Cameron430, with concerted efforts being made to 
mould rival and distinct political messages in order to both contribute to and challenge the 
narrative in relation to social justice and the welfare state, but framed with a left-of-centre 
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political hue431. This has been evident in the appearance of alternative yet similar concepts 
based on localised and co-operative activity, namely ‘Blue Labour’, ‘The Purple Book’432 and 
the ‘good society’,433 the latter phrase which was also utilised by Labour’s arch-revisionist 
Anthony Crosland in the 1950s434 as a reaction to the perceived growth of an overbearing 
state. All such developments reflect the traditional teleocratic emphasis of Labour policy 
and its focus on aiming for devised or utopian ends based on a form of planning for a future 
socio-political settlement. However the Big Society approach does not offer such an explicit 
plan or outcome to its agenda, yet it does align itself with some elements of New Labour’s 
repeated focus on ‘rights and responsibilities’ within society. Such reactive developments 
from the Labour Party have been evident under Ed Miliband’s leadership from September 
2010 onwards, promoting a vision of government (particularly influenced by Lord Glasman) 
that also offers a reduced reliance on the role of the state, an embracing of more 
responsible capitalism and a return to the pre-1945 focus of Labour governments with a 
greater emphasis on utilising voluntarist and co-operative activity to deliver public services 
where appropriate435. Although the Labour left can cite the various failings of pre-1945 
Labour governments as a reason not to hark back to their distinct ethos, this reciprocal 
development on the political left-of-centre could be used as evidence for a degree of 
success in Cameron’s promotion of a new and innovative social agenda for the Conservative 
Party and the need for political opponents to adapt accordingly, appearing to embrace a less 
‘statist’ agenda in the process.  It also indicated that Labour was perhaps re-thinking its 
approach to public service delivery along more pragmatic, flexible and creative lines within 
the context of an economic slump and an austerity agenda. 
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Other serious thinkers from the modernising wing of the Conservative Party have 
also attempted to define its apparent vague meaning into a more concrete political entity 
that will work in the party’s favour in terms of its enhanced clarity to the wider electorate, 
although they have also implied that it does not have to be an explicitly partisan or ‘party 
political’ entity in the process: 
 
‘The big society, which is ultimately about creating and releasing latent sources of 
social energy, is an extraordinarily ambitious conception of how this 
underperformance occurred, and how to address it.....The big society is not itself 
either a left- or right-wing idea’436.  
 
Such sentiments clearly imply that in an ostensible era of less adversarial and less explicitly 
ideological politics, the ‘Big Society’ project could be comfortably pursued by either a 
Conservative or Labour administration in a re-aligned political paradigm, and in the autumn 
of both 2011 and 2012 the Respublica think-tank was lobbying the Labour Party Conference 
amid claims that some senior Labour figures wanted to ‘save the Big Society agenda’437. As a 
corollary to this, in late 2012 influential Labour MP Jon Cruddas claimed that Labour had 
“missed a trick”438 in failing to embrace its own version of The Big Society, and in his role as 
Labour’s policy review co-coordinator he stated that “We want to build our own version of 
the big society. That’s going to be a big part of our policy review over the next 12 
months”439.  This approach would endorse the view that the ‘Big Society’ transcends 
                                                          
436
 Jesse Norman, Conservative MP for Hereford & South Herefordshire,  ‘Stealing the Big Society’, Comment is 
Free, The Guardian, 8
th
 February 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/08/stealing-big-society-ed-miliband 
437
 Respublica sources speaking to author at Labour Party Conference, Liverpool, September 2011.  
See also: 
Oliver Wright, ‘Labour to embrace David Cameron's 'big society', The Independent, 1
st
 October 2012, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-to-embrace-david-camerons-big-society-
8192956.html 
See also, Phillip Blond, Respublica think-tank, interview with author, 19th February 2013, who claimed that it 
is: 
‘perfectly possible for the Labour Party to go back to genuine formative first principles and have a different 
relationship to The Big Society’. 
438
 Jon Cruddas, IPPR fringe event, Labour Party Conference (October 2012), Manchester, cited in Kayte Rath, 
‘Jon Cruddas backs Labour version of Big Society’, BBC News website, 1
st
 October 2012,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-19779457 
439
 Oliver Wright, ‘Labour to embrace David Cameron's 'big society', The Independent, 1
st
 October 2012, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-to-embrace-david-camerons-big-society-
8192956.html 
  155  
 
traditional left-right politics, but many reformers and advocates of this agenda within the 
Conservative Party do remain wary of Labour embracing and adopting this policy approach, 
primarily due to the belief that it is essentially opposed to and in conflict with the ‘Fabianist’ 
and centralising instincts of Labour governments. As one of its leading advocates on the 
Conservative parliamentary benches has argued, the ‘Big Society’ idea fundamentally 
rejects: 
 
‘the state-first Fabian dogma that is the specific political target of the big society ..... 
(but rather) emphasises the renewal of social capital, localism and greater personal 
empowerment. However, the big society also contains a robust critique of 
neoliberalism..... critical of the fundamentalism of free market uber-libertarians, who 
see no role for the state at all…..(and) is ultimately derived from the ideas of Edmund 
Burke and Adam Smith, who emphasized not rampant but limited markets; not the 
over-mighty state but free and independent institutions; not personal greed but trust 
and sympathy.440 
 
This viewpoint therefore argues that the Big Society’s essential localism and personal 
empowerment rejects both the ‘statism’ of the left and the ‘neo-liberalism’ associated with 
the free-market Thatcherism of the 1980s, and is essentially a modern, original and 
mainstream idea in tune with traditional conservative philosophical instincts (as well as the 
‘localist’ agenda of the Liberal Democrats), and aligned with the natural and instinctive 
communitarian tendencies evident across broader society. One active advocate of the ‘Big 
Society’ agenda has subsequently described it as representing an original fusion of political 
concepts and structures, reflecting ‘not the two-way opposition of state vs. individual, but 
the three-way relation of enabling state, active individual and linking institution’441. Other 
Conservatives with interests in the Big Society agenda do however acknowledge some 
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potential for Labour to exploit its key themes, principally due to the ‘communitarian strand 
in Labour….. going back to the Methodist tradition of dissent’442. 
 
From another ideological angle however, there has been some right-wing criticism of 
David Cameron’s ostensible abandonment of the economics-driven, individualist, neo-liberal 
focus of the Thatcherite era, which has consolidated the mainstream criticism that the 
policy is vague and unclear443. Within this context one backbencher has appeared to reflect 
the sentiments of many more ‘traditionalist’ Conservative MPs, in describing it as 
“intangible and incomprehensible... odd and unpersuasive”444, while a prominent Internet-
based Conservative figure has labelled the policy:  
 
‘as intellectually interesting as it is useless on the doorstep. It's so far removed from 
working families' current concerns that polls find, over time, that it is understood less 
rather than more’445. 
 
Such internal party criticism has generated concerns that the post-2005 Conservative 
agenda of David Cameron has abandoned traditional and hard-won political territory that 
the party seized after 1979, as well as becoming detached from the clear and coherent 
identity associated with it. This has been due to the emphasis placed by Cameron on an 
enhanced and revitalised social policy agenda that stresses the importance of co-operation 
and the benevolent ‘mutualism’ of relationships within ‘society’, and the nature of this 
revised agenda has raised suspicions from the right that the ‘dead hand’ of the state will 
continue to be unerringly and prominently present within such an approach. Such suspicion 
has perhaps been justified in policy terms in the form of Cameron’s reluctance to cut taxes 
or make savings in key public services such as the NHS, which the Conservatives pledged 
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during the 2010 General Election would be ring-fenced from any future spending cuts446, 
despite a common right-wing complaint that it is an inefficient and excessively bureaucratic 
organisation447. Although there is fierce political debate about the true nature of Cameron’s 
controversial NHS reforms (see chapter 7), Cameron’s counter-argument to internal party 
critics from the right is that his own specific vision of an increasingly voluntarist, ‘rolled-
back’ yet benevolent state model is actually consistent with one of Thatcher’s greatest 
political and philosophical inspirations: 
 
‘The virtues these people possessed (British)..... were independence and self-reliance, 
individual initiative and local responsibility, the successful reliance on voluntary 
activity..... and a healthy suspicion of power and authority’448.  
 
The above language of Hayek is notable for its explicit rejection of the ‘collectivist’ state 
whose growth was said to unerringly accelerate under left of-centre governments, and 
which established what has been described by one Conservative moderniser as ‘the rotten 
postwar settlement of British politics’449. Hayek’s sentiments can therefore be said to be 
wholly consistent with the support for such a voluntarist approach and the vision for 
reduced statist welfare provisions as espoused by both Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ gurus and 
bodies such as the Centre for Social Justice. Cameron’s revised welfare and social agenda 
has therefore sought to maintain a delicate balance of preserving some inherent 
Conservative traditions while simultaneously developing a new and more refined social 
dimension to the party’s contemporary image, calling for ‘greater citizen involvement and 
empowerment..... (resulting in) the amplification and development of earlier ideas of 
compassionate Conservatism and post-bureaucratic politics’450. Such desire for a more 
compassionate Conservative image has been reflected in Cameron’s rhetorical focus on 
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society, and which appears to be an implicit rejection of the tough yet somewhat uncaring 
reputation the party had been associated with in relation to its social policy attitudes during 
its sustained period in power between 1979 and 1997, and this formed part of Cameron’s 
wider strategy to ‘detoxify’ the brand451. His renewed focus on a refreshed and revised 
approach to social policy and its associated issues can be linked back to the period when he 
was striving to establish himself as an effective Leader of the Opposition, when he promised 
to adopt a distinct policy focus and stated that: “I’m going to be as radical a social reformer 
as Margaret Thatcher was an economic reformer”452.  
 
However, despite some on the right of politics speaking about a ‘post-bureaucratic 
state’453 and pushing for a perceived logical conclusion that entails a radically reduced level 
of reliance on state-provided welfare and the need for greater ‘marketisation’ of its core 
services, there has been a broad acceptance among the modernising ‘Cameroons’ that the 
state is required to retain a co-ordinating, if less cumbersome role in the delivery of social 
policy provision. So whereas the Thatcherites of the 1980s desired a ‘strong state’ yet 
limited government intervention as a means of delivering the necessary conditions for the 
‘maintenance of a free economy’454 with a reduced emphasis on social and welfare policy, 
the 21st century Conservatives acknowledge that the markets alone are not sufficient to 
tackle the country’s 'broken society’ and wider welfare needs. Their ‘Big Society’ analysis 
therefore argues that the state’s framework can be effectively used in instigating and 
formulating generic social policy goals and then devolving the process to allow innovative 
and ‘localised’ policies to flourish that are most appropriate to tackling specifically 
challenging social conditions and associated problems, with the state ultimately stepping 
back from such policies’ direct implementation.  By supporting and promoting the different 
and variable dimensions of government-initiated activity, a more detached state role can 
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therefore be fused with ‘third sector’ charities and localised bodies within a proposed model 
of ‘creative’ policy delivery that divides and fragments the role of providing core public 
services while also consolidating individual ‘social ambition’, ostensibly saving money and 
liberating individuals from excessive and centralised ‘statism’ in the process.  In this respect 
the politics of Cameron’s modern-day Conservatives ultimately appear to be distinct from 
the libertarian, free market and more ideological agenda of the neo-liberal Thatcherites, 
arguing that: 
 
‘Whatever talk there is of a post-bureaucratic state..... State action, not limited 
government, is necessary because there is recognition that however important 
market-led growth is to fixing the broken society, it is not enough. There are real 
problems of poverty and social breakdown that a political economy based on the 
incentives of market forces cannot fix’455.  
 
Given the focus on austerity and  financial savings as the driving force behind many 
key government decisions from May 2010 onwards, some critics from the Labour Party and 
the centre-left of the political spectrum have questioned whether Cameron’s vision of a 
more devolved and ‘enabling’ welfare state, with an increased focus on self-help and the 
support of variable ‘voluntarist’ providers as opposed to direct state provision, is actually a 
genuine and original post-Thatcherite policy development or merely an extension of the 
economic and social priorities of the 1980s and the mood of economic austerity often 
associated with aspects of this historical period. Replacing direct state provision with 
greater voluntarist and charitable involvement is by no means guaranteed to provide a 
more solid basis for innovative and sustainable social policy development, and indeed, in 
the worst case scenario it could create serious risks to both the sustainability and the 
comprehensive and regulatory aspects of the British welfare state and its historic focus on 
protecting society’s most vulnerable citizens. Therefore by reducing the hegemonic 
influence and role of the state as part of the ‘Big Society’ agenda, yet at the same time 
pursuing a programme of fiscal retrenchment and eroding some of the support for 
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charitable institutions that often bolster state provision and which are expected to have an 
enhanced role under the original Big Society model, this potentially increases the prospect 
of vulnerable individuals being excluded from its ‘non-universal’ and fragmented welfare 
provision. This has led to high-profile interventions from prominent religious figures also, 
with the retiring Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams condemning the policy in the 
summer of 2012 as “aspirational waffle designed to conceal a deeply damaging withdrawal 
of the state from its responsibilities to the most vulnerable”.456  In this context, some critics 
have claimed that such policies represent an attempt to revert back to the pre-1945 era 
when the role of the state was much smaller and its modern range of welfare services 
fragmented between a range of different providers including charities, local agencies and 
voluntary groups. Such a scenario directly conflicts with the more generous and statist 
‘social democratic’ welfare model that has been dominant for most of the post-war period 
in Britain, and it is in this respect that the ‘Big Society’ proponents have struggled to 
convince the sceptical public.    
 
The Big Society’s role and influence within Conservative Social Policy 
 
In the context of developing a critique and a background narrative to the evolution of the 
party’s new social policy agenda and its overall approach to administering a streamlined and 
genuinely reformed welfare state provision, David Cameron has specifically sought to re-
frame the relationship of the contemporary Conservative Party with its neo-liberal socio-
economic agenda of the past, revising and modifying its relationship with the party’s 
Thatcherite legacy in the process457, in public terms at least.  This has subsequently led to a 
more ‘compassionate’ Conservative analysis of a ‘broken’ or ‘atomised’ society that needs 
to be genuinely healed in the long-term, and such ‘compassionate conservatism’ appears to 
be a distinct contrast to the short-term punitive outlook and broad lack of sympathy aimed 
in the direction of long-term recipients of the welfare system, as was the tendency of some 
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right-wing Conservative politicians during the 1980s458.  Yet Cameron’s distinct approach to 
dealing with such a fractured society is not to call for more state intervention, but instead 
argue that the state needs to do less and that other agencies should absorb some of the 
strain in order for the emergence of ‘the active citizen as philanthropist and volunteer’459 to 
also take some burden off the state, but which at the same time potentially marginalises 
some of the more vulnerable members of society.   In adopting this stance, Cameron has 
explicitly rejected the state’s ‘accompanying ideology of centralisation, managerialism and 
intervention’460 that has prevailed for most of the post-war period.   
 
However, Cameron has faced significant difficulties in ‘selling’ his specific analysis of 
society to both his political party and the wider public, along with struggling to overcome 
some scepticism about how his less ‘statist’ solutions can be practically implemented. He 
has been further hampered by the fact that many politicians, notably some Conservative 
ones, have rejected the blanket and perhaps simplistic Big Society analysis implying that all 
aspects of British society were ‘broken’ and required such a radical overhaul when the 
Conservative-led coalition came to national power in 2010. For example London Mayor 
Boris Johnson has openly questioned the mantra461, rejecting its arguably simplistic 
conclusions as “piffle”. In his affirmation and determined emphasis as to just how ‘broken’ 
Britain was when the Conservatives have found themselves back in national office in 2010, it 
could be legitimately claimed that ‘the Conservative leader is in danger of exaggerating the 
social problems facing Britain today’462. Certainly there are significant enclaves of poverty 
and deprivation throughout British society, (exacerbated by rising levels of unemployment 
amidst the prolonged economic recession), many of which are long-established and which 
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have been sustained under different governments of different political affiliations who have 
administered the nation’s welfare provision during different periods of modern history.  
However those that are hostile to Cameron’s critique of ‘broken Britain’, situated on both 
the left and right of British politics, argue that its analysis is too primitive and its message 
too gimmicky, and that it needs to be grounded in greater practical realism, without 
distorting or exaggerating the state of contemporary society in order to generate party 
political benefit. Political opponents have also questioned whether such 'compassion' and 
focus on greater efficiency is in fact a mere rhetorical smoke-screen to justify significant 
public spending cutbacks and an ideology-driven reduction in the size of the state.  
 
Ultimately, if such an analysis is to be constructive, effective and be able to carry the 
necessary weight and subsequent public support, it requires appropriate intellectual rigour 
and practical reality behind it.  Iain Duncan Smith’s experiences with the Centre for Social 
Justice and his subsequent thorough analysis of proposed socio-political remedies appears 
to have the potential to instil a greater degree of realism and credibility into this overall 
hypothesis of British society, although the nature and effectiveness of his detailed proposals 
in this key area of public policy remain to be seen.  Thus, in the context of the search for a 
post-Thatcherite identity, the Conservative Party leadership under David Cameron has 
aligned itself with the desire for a speculative post-bureaucratic model of governance as 
identified and alluded to by contemporary academics and political thinkers. There has 
subsequently developed some significant further analysis of the key socio-economic issues 
and problems that exist within modern society and how best to address them, with The Big 
Society a prominent example of an innovative critique of how a revised vision of social 
justice can best be achieved within a reconstructed state, coupled with a revised social and 
welfare policy agenda. In promising to deliver a renewed and changed approach to the 
social policy sphere, David Cameron has been a central figure in this high-profile socio-
political debate since his accession to senior political office from late 2005, but his 
arguments for a genuinely ’changed’ post-bureaucratic vision of government for the future, 
as well as its capacity to effectively and practically deliver key and innovative social policies, 
have yet to convince much of the political community along with the wider British public. 
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Social Policy Case Studies- Addressing the ‘broken society’ and promoting greater social 
justice? 
 
(1) The ‘Free Schools’ Policy 
 
Within the overall thesis, this chapter seeks to focus on a prominent social policy of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government that has been implemented since May 
2010, the ‘free schools’ education agenda. As a high-prolife component of the 2010 
Conservative Party manifesto463, the proposal then came to practical policy fruition within 
the coalition arrangement with the Liberal Democrats in seeking to ‘promote the reform of 
schools in order to ensure that new providers can enter the state school system in response 
to parental demand (and) that all schools have greater freedom over the curriculum’464, this 
educational initiative provides a pertinent and contemporary indicator of how Conservative 
Party social policy has evolved and developed since the party lost national power in 1997. It 
also illustrates how the Conservatives have sought to utilise the educational sphere as a 
means of addressing their specific perceptions and interpretation of social injustice within 
contemporary society, and the overall development of this agenda, along with the evolution 
of its associated principal aims and specific socio-political principles, is a useful means of 
assessing how the modern Conservative Party has sought to adapt and infuse its own 
ideological heritage and distinct political traditions into contemporary social policy 
formulation. In taking this approach, the policy that has emerged has in many ways also 
represented a pragmatic reaction to the realities of a political landscape moulded by 
thirteen years of a Labour administration, and it is therefore a pertinent policy to analyse 
and evaluate to assess as to how much it appears to be similar or distinct from the dominant 
political traditions that have preceded it, namely the New Labour period of government 
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(1997-2010), or the Thatcherite and Major era of Conservative rule and its eighteen-year 
duration from 1979 onwards.  
 
Such a distinct and innovative policy therefore offers the potential to assess the 
influences that have shaped it, as well as comparing and contrasting the extent of both 
continuity and change between the outlook and attitudes of the contemporary Conservative 
Party leadership towards this key element of social policy, and then offer a valid comparison 
to the approach of previous governments of the modern political era in relation to this 
policy sphere. It is also a means of illustrating the nature of mainstream British 
Conservatism’s re-formulated and more ‘modern’ and much-heralded compassionate 
attitude towards social justice and associated policy-making in the 21st century, particularly 
from a perspective held by the Cameron Conservatives that the left’s conventional vision of 
social justice has fundamentally failed to deliver in its desired aims over recent periods of 
Labour government, and indeed for most of the post-war ‘consensus’ era between 1945 and 
1979. Within this context, according to one contemporary Conservative moderniser there 
has been an ‘internal difficulty on the left in that many of the things that were designed to 
support social justice….. actually ended up hurting it’465. This rejection of such conventional 
left-of-centre statist and bureaucratic solutions to issues connected to social justice have 
ultimately been evident and observed in the post-1979 Conservative focus on education as a 
key policy area that can actively improve social mobility and generally enhance the quality 
of life for British citizens, but with a greater focus on individualism as an alternative 
framework in which to operate.  
 
 Modern Conservatism’s approach to educational policy has been fuelled by a 
prevailing and influential political ethos of the post-1979 period, namely the ‘belief in 
markets and a minimal state..... (and the) view that the route to tackling poverty and 
educational underachievement lies in greater responsibility’466, rejecting the state-knows-
best ethos in the process. This acceptance of a greater degree of autonomy in education has 
been broadly accepted to differing degrees by all governments since 1979, fuelled by 
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external bodies such as the OECD that have claimed that ‘countries that delegate 
managerial discretion to headteachers and school governing bodies often have higher 
educational attainment’467.  Indeed, it is a valid and important area of discussion to assess 
whether this particular socio-political viewpoint, that was instilled into the public policy 
agenda after the Conservatives came to power in 1979, has been altered by a long period of 
exile from national office during a sustained spell of centre-left government that moulded 
its own distinct political agenda and culture, and whether a genuine and original brand of 
‘New Conservatism’ has emerged as a result. From another angle of the same scenario, this 
policy also provides a means of indicating how the party’s broader political aspirations in 
this policy sphere have been affected and influenced by forming a coalition government in 
an alliance with a junior partner (the Liberal Democrats), who have a broadly different 
ideological outlook on such matters, and whose traditional position on such education and 
social policy matters has appeared more willing to rely on the dominance of the state, based 
on the premise that ‘liberalism could only be delivered by “big government solutions”’468.  
However, as the coalition has been formed and evolved since May 2010, there have 
emerged some key areas of common ground in educational policy, namely the shared focus 
of a more localist broad outlook, as well as specific policies such as the ‘pupil premium’ in 
particular, an ostensibly Liberal Democrat policy which the Conservatives have also 
enthusiastically supported, and which has been claimed to represent the ‘freeing up and 
empowerment of disadvantaged individuals…..  as much a Conservative as a Liberal 
Democrat policy’469.   
 
The Origins of the Free Schools Policy 
 
Following the Conservative Party’s resounding ejection from national office in 1997, the 
subsequent years of political opposition led to a period of sustained introspection and 
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review of the party’s broader political identity and purpose. Within this context, one of the 
many policy areas that the party sought to address in terms of re-formulating a revised and 
refreshed agenda was in the specific realm of educational provision within the wider sphere 
of social policy. This was a policy area that had the potential to impact on significant 
swathes of the electorate, and its identification as a key issue to address was part of a 
specific strategy of the Cameron leadership within this recent historical period to 
'decontaminate’ the party’s brand by primarily focusing on issues that had a more 
‘communitarian’ emphasis, with the party keen to embrace a more 'compassionate’ image 
overall. In doing so, Cameron sought to attach to such policy areas a distinct Conservative 
perspective, and the contemporary Conservative Party has therefore sought to develop a 
modernised social policy agenda that has aspired towards the achievement of enhanced 
social justice coupled with greater social mobility, with the implication of a reduced role for 
the state as part of the process. This has represented a challenging target for any political 
party, and the fusion of such core motives at the heart of educational policy-making have 
been at the crux of the party’s recent attempts to devise an alternative and viable counter-
narrative to the approach of New Labour in office from 1997 onwards.   
 
In the context of succeeding thirteen years of Labour government, the Conservatives 
inherited a state of affairs that had seen New Labour under both Blair and Brown, despite 
some initial caution, progressively invest significant amounts of public spending in core 
educational provisions.  Investment in education averaged 3.9% a year during Labour’s 
period in office470, with funds steadily pumped into the service’s core buildings and 
infrastructure from a largely centralised and interventionist ‘command and control’ style of 
government. However the New Labour approach to key social policy areas like education 
also retained some aspects of local autonomy in pragmatic recognition of the significant 
educational reforms of the Conservative administrations between 1979 and 1997471, and in 
the words of one academic commentator ‘New Labour took the Conservative infrastructure 
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(on education policy) and gave it meat and teeth’472. There was ultimately a gradual build-up 
and enhanced focus by the post-1997 Labour administrations on programmes and 
educational initiatives which entailed major capital investment from the centre of 
government, a prime example being such as the ‘Building Schools for the Future’473 (BSF) 
policy, which emerged during Labour’s third term in office from 2005 onwards and which 
had the lofty initial ambition of rebuilding or refurbishing all of England’s 3,500 secondary 
schools, at an estimated cost of £55 billion.  This policy clearly adhered to the party’s 1997 
high-profile focus on “education, education, education”, and this was a clear example of the 
trend towards increased bureaucratization and levels of educational documentation that 
had appeared in the modern political era from 1979 onwards, with ‘the pace of reform being 
especially frenetic after the victory of New Labour in 1997’474. However, in an 
acknowledgement to the neo-liberal trends of the 1980s, while a significant degree of 
centralised funding was a consequence of this policy, the use of PFI475 to deliver many of 
these educational projects appeared to represent a more modern ‘neo-liberal’ market-
driven influence on the traditional model of state intervention and investment in public 
services. Such a significant degree of centralised planning and bureaucracy that 
accompanied this policy initiative appeared to downgrade the focus and emphasis on 
schools autonomously and responsibly managing their own organisational affairs alongside 
enhanced educational choice for the individual that had been established by the modern 
(post-1979) Conservative Party in this sphere476. It was this extent of central government 
expenditure and additional bureaucracy that generated criticism from the then Conservative 
opposition, who claimed that a future Conservative government would be committed to 
tackling such statist tendencies that stemmed from ‘New Labour (being) excessively 
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managerial in its conception of both the private and public sector’477.  As a consequence, the 
axing of BSF was one of the first major decisions taken by Michael Gove after becoming 
Secretary of State for Education in May 2010, with the excessive costs and bureaucracy 
cited as the key reason why the programme could no longer be justified in an era of 
significant economic austerity.  
 
As innovative and original policy-making in all spheres became more in demand as 
the economic downturn erupted from 2008 onwards, the revived emphasis on fiscal 
conservatism led to a desire within the Conservative Party for the development of social 
policies that would provide enhanced value for money for the taxpayer, yet which would 
also offer the prospect of strengthening the traditional Conservative ethos of individualism 
alongside the more modern emphasis on compassion and social justice within social policy 
provision. One commentator has observed that the economic crisis was a key turning point 
and arguably a major disruption to the Conservative modernisation project, when ‘an era of 
austerity and serious economics had dawned’478. This development would initiate the need 
for a more frugal approach to government and involve greater flexibility, enterprise and a 
more fragmented model of government on the whole. Within the generally expensive 
sphere of social policy matters, educational policy has traditionally been a significant area of 
public spending over the course of the post-war era of the comprehensive welfare state, 
and in practical terms this subsequently led to a significant surge of Conservative interest in 
an educational policy with a more efficient and cost-effective aura that originated on the 
European continent, namely the ‘free schools’ initiative. This policy particularly derived from 
the socio-political experiences of Sweden from the early 1990s onwards, which in this 
period elected a non-socialist government for the first time since the 1930s, and as a result 
of such a radical political swing the country’s long-established and centralised welfare 
model and bureaucratic educational system came under scrutiny by the incoming political 
regime. One academic observer has described such a development as a reflection and 
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acknowledgement that the global influences of ‘Neo-liberal politics (had) come to 
Sweden’479, somewhat belatedly in relation to the New Right hegemony that had infiltrated 
Britain and the USA during the 1980s.   
 
The innovation of ‘free schools’ was devised as a decentralised alternative to 
universal policy delivery by the centralised and bureaucratic state, and as a model of 
educational provision it has been described as offering ‘state-independent schools’ whose 
functions would be delivered by ‘independent providers of different sorts’480. The localised 
role and focus of such bodies would, according to the policy’s advocates, remove the cost 
and inefficiency of centralised bureaucracy, respond to local needs and ultimately provide 
better value for money for the hard-pressed taxpayer in the long-term. This model of 
education has experienced significant growth since its inception in Sweden, as ‘the number 
of pupils in free schools has increased from 20,247 pupils in 1995/96 to 95,948 pupils in 
2009/10’481. The rapid expansion of such a system based on the premise of an enhanced 
degree of freedom and autonomy from state control at a central level was viewed by those 
on the political right as an attractive, effective and efficient mechanism for increasing 
overall educational standards, social mobility and individual choice. One academic observer 
has described such policy trends emerging in Britain as marking a departure from ‘a more 
managed Labour response’ in relation to educational policy-making from 1997 onwards, and 
instead moving towards ‘a more libertarian Conservative one’482.  Such schools could 
therefore utilise a more diverse and wider range of tools and mechanisms to raise standards 
while creating a greater sense of efficiency and dynamic detachment from the state in the 
process, with private and community sector interests having greater opportunity and 
potential to access and influence the delivery of state educational services and provision, 
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and in the process undermining what has traditionally been a hegemonic role for the state 
in this respect.   
 
Arguments for the Free Schools Policy 
 
The free schools policy therefore came to hold attractions for Cameron from an early phase 
of his leadership from late 2005 onwards, as the Conservative Party sought to re-invent its 
social policy agenda in the wake of a demoralising third successive electoral defeat. From 
the outset, his primary aim as leader was to develop original and innovative policies that 
would generate wider public and electoral support in order to avoid a potentially fatal 
fourth general election defeat in a row. As the policy’s formulation developed while in 
opposition, Cameron’s Shadow Education Secretary Michael Gove emerged as a key figure 
within its evolution, and in pushing the free schools agenda, he justified his support for this 
re-modelled concept of public service provision by attacking Labour’s record in this policy 
area after over a decade in power. Apparently damning statistics that ‘almost half of 
children from deprived backgrounds leave school without a single good GCSE’483, provided 
some core evidence that broader social and specific educational inequality had been 
maintained and even exacerbated under New Labour’s ‘statist’ public service agenda that 
was a prominent feature of its prolonged period in office. This bolstered Gove’s faith in the 
decentralised and devolved free schools as a solution to the problem, and he therefore 
envisaged such institutions as a means of delivering the vital socio-political assets of greater 
social mobility and enhanced social justice within traditionally disadvantaged parts of 
society, with such specific terms forming key elements of the vocabulary of ‘modern’ 
Conservatism in this social policy sphere: 
 
‘Schools should be engines of social mobility.….. the education system isn't delivering 
social mobility at the moment..... we wanted to overturn that injustice (and) we 
looked to social democratic Sweden for reform. Fifteen years ago the Swedes decided 
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to challenge declining standards by breaking the bureaucratic stranglehold over 
educational provision and welcome private providers into the state system. Since 
they introduced their reforms, 900 new schools have been established in Sweden, a 
country with a population one-sixth the size of England. Those new providers have 
not only created schools with higher standards than before, the virtuous dynamic 
created by the need to respond to competition from new providers has forced 
existing schools to raise their game. There is a direct correlation between more 
choice and higher standards; with the biggest improvements in educational 
outcomes being generated in those areas with the most new schools’484. 
 
Michael Gove’s confident assertion that greater competition and choice instilled by 
an influx of enterprising private involvement would raise standards was a controversial one 
in terms of how it challenged some fundamental conventions of the post-1945 welfare 
state, namely due to its absolute belief in enhanced localism and decentralisation as 
opposed to the relatively entrenched ‘state knows best’ ethos.  However Gove could cite 
some evidence from Sweden to support his claims that such schools improved overall 
standards by instilling enhanced levels of competition into the system485, and in adopting 
this stance he appeared to be seeking a return to an era when the state was less 
comprehensive and controlling in its remit, and where a greater diversity of public service 
provision existed and offered enhanced choice for the citizen. In doing so, Gove seemed to 
embrace the influence of the writings of the 20th century Conservative scholar Michael 
Oakeshott486, who was critical of the left’s utopian vision and state-centred approach to 
shaping and moulding civil society into a more engineered and manipulated direction, which 
he referred to as an ‘enterprise society’. Oakeshott ultimately rejected such an artificial and 
state-induced enterprise society as he saw it, and instead envisaged the alternative 
development and distinct evolution of a more natural and traditional ‘civil association’ that 
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is ‘organised as a communal enterprise or undertaking in its own right’ 487, which focuses on 
greater individual choice at a grassroots level and the primacy of citizens obeying the rule of 
law rather than a desired socio-economic outcome being imposed from the centre of 
government.   Such a model of society would entail citizens having roles, values and 
autonomous social goals within their communities which they are fully conscious of and 
which are detached from the state’s explicit control, direction and instructions.  This 
approach can be aligned with this educational policy’s fundamental emphasis on creating 
greater autonomy for key public bodies such as schools, although to what extent this could 
occur due to natural local enterprise and autonomy and without the state’s guiding hand is 
one of the major practical challenges facing this social policy.   
 
The fundamental driving-force behind the free schools policy is the notion that that 
providing more varied choice of schools and instilling a more enterprising emphasis will 
create improved standards in this sphere of public policy and address areas of genuine 
educational need. This policy agenda has subsequently been a dynamic area of modern 
political debate and dispute between the two major parties within British politics, and it 
would continue to attach itself to this policy as it evolved in government after 2010. 
Cameron’s strategy appeared to want to utilise this and other social policy initiatives as a 
means of depicting the Conservatives as a forward-looking and modern political party, 
equating such policies with the seemingly dynamic political values of ‘progressivism….. 
modernism and the future as opposed to (Labour’s) statism and egalitarianism, (and) to 
portray New Labour as the party wedded to a backward looking repressive centralism’488. 
Gove visited Sweden in early 2010 to see how such schools worked in practice, and fuelled 
by supporting academic research489, developed an enthusiasm for a more diverse selection 
of educational provision with an enhanced role for the private sector and a subsequent 
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greater range of choice for parents and pupils, culminating in the policy’s inclusion as a 
prominent and distinctive aspect of the 2010 Conservative Party manifesto. Its enhanced 
and explicit focus on promoting individual choice and wider social responsibility certainly 
appeared to have the desired effect and created a distinct area of ‘clear blue water’490 
between the Conservatives and the outgoing Labour government in this policy sphere in 
particular. In pursuing such a policy the Conservatives were seeking to form a clear and 
sharp ‘political contrast between the centralisation of the Brown era and the 
decentralisation that is characteristic of the philosophy of the (alternative) Cameron 
government’491. The policy was accordingly initiated following the party’s return to national 
office, and after a period of planning and preparation that entailed 323 bids for free school 
status, the first wave of 24 free schools opened in September 2011.  One of the most 
prominent of these new educational institutions was the West London Free School492, 
whose high-profile creation was instigated by the author and journalist Toby Young493 and 
other local parents.  
 
The policy has been rolled-out at a fairly rapid rate, and in November 2011, ‘the 
government announced it had ear-marked an extra £600m on building 100 new free schools 
in England over the next three years’494. A further fifty-five free schools were confirmed as 
opening in the autumn of 2012495, tripling the number in England alone496, and reaching 79 
in total. This further expansion was part of a rolling process of applications for this status, 
with a further wave of applications for free school status having been established by the 
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government from February 2012 (for opening in the autumn term of 2013). Those opening 
in subsequent phases of the policy’s roll-out during 2012-13 have featured a diverse array of 
groups including Christian charities, former soldiers, football clubs497 and existing private 
schools among those applying for the status.498  Within this rolling programme of free 
schools being established, of the provisional proposals for 102 new free schools approved in 
the summer of 2012499, a third had a religious ethos500, and following on from his initial 
foray into secondary education, Toby Young applied to open a further primary institution 
attached to his original West London Free School within the next phase of proposed free 
schools announced in mid-2012501, primarily due to the apparent popularity of his initial 
educational venture: 
 
‘Over 1,000 children applied for our second batch of 120 places this year (2012), 
making us the most over-subscribed secondary in the London Borough of 
Hammersmith and Fulham….. The teaching unions warned us that free schools would 
increase social segregation, but ours hasn’t. On the contrary, it’s a genuine 
comprehensive’502. 
 
Such popularity as evident in the number of applicants forms the basis of Toby Young’s 
determined viewpoint that such schools generate social and community integration rather 
than segregation, and that such a diverse range of grassroots bodies expressing a 
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committed interest in this policy area offers major advantages to the country’s education 
system, for in bringing a variety of experiences they offer the prospect that ‘the groups 
responsible for free schools are likely to be better at setting up and running schools than 
politicians and bureaucrats, with a firmer grasp of what a good education looks like’.503 This 
argument is therefore aligned with the devolved and localist sentiments and theories at the 
heart of the policy’s formulation and direction.  
 
The challenges for free schools 
 
The initial wave of such schools were established amidst a degree of hostility and opposition 
from some local authorities and politicians on the left504, largely fuelled by fears from this 
political perspective (supported by the teaching unions), that in adopting a more 
fragmented and diverse approach to educational policy delivery, they were undermining the 
broadly egalitarian principles of education that provides and protects minimum and uniform 
standards, and which are administered and regulated by the centralised state and its 
devolved local education authorities. The Free Schools advocate Toby Young has described 
such hostility from left-wing politicians, commentators and teaching unions as akin to ‘rabid 
opposition’505. The left of the political spectrum have been critical of the free schools 
‘revolution’ as it is often termed by both proponents and opponents, particularly in relation 
to its de-regulated nature that ostensibly by-passes aspects of the state’s bureaucratic 
structure and its accompanying mechanisms and prescribed procedures. A potential 
negative consequence of this policy as highlighted by this viewpoint could be seen in the 
chaotic closure of one proposed free school in Yorkshire just days before it was due to open 
in the autumn of 2012506. A further example of such de-regulation and potentially harmful 
avoidance of government bureaucracy emerged in early 2015 when the LGA voiced critical 
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comments that free schools do not have to adhere to national food standards when 
providing school meals507.  
 
 The most fundamental form of criticism is that far from raising standards and 
improving quality and social justice within the education system, the policy will in fact 
create greater inequality and social divisions in its more arbitrary methods of educational 
provision, primarily due to its essentially neo-liberal, free market approach to meeting 
educational demand, with fears being raised that such schools ‘are being funded by money 
taken from other schools ….. (with) no account of how the schools will be joined up with 
other local schools and services ….. (with the possibility of a) free-for-all undermining other 
schools’508. Indeed one critical commentator has gone as far to say that the approach of the 
Conservative Party to this area of policy-making after 2010 is to ‘break up and privatise 
English education’509 within a wider de-regulation of welfare and social policy delivery, while 
other critical comments have warned that by replacing uniform central state-driven 
provision ‘with local voluntary providers the claim of rights is reduced to an act of charity’510, 
and such a policy stance therefore appears to undermine people’s rights to the full range of 
welfare state support.   Convincing the broader political spectrum of their value is therefore 
a significant challenge, however, in a similar vein to other spheres of social policy since 
2010, the left-of-centre have reacted in varying ways to free schools, with prominent Labour 
peer Lord Adonis a particularly strong advocate who has argued that his party should fully 
support their development511.  
 
                                                          
507
 Local Government Association (LGA), ‘Schools duck “moral duty” to dish up healthy meals’, 13
th
 January 
2013,  
http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/media-releases/-/journal_content/56/10171/3839479/NEWS-TEMPLATE 
508
 Stephen Twigg MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Education, E-mail questionnaire response, 24
th
 January 
2012. 
509
 Seamus Milne, ‘Crony capitalism feeds the corporate plan for schools’, The Guardian, Tuesday 14
th
 February 
2012,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/feb/14/crony-capitalism-corporate-schools?newsfeed=true 
510
 Roy Hattersley and Kevin Hickson, ‘In Praise of Social Democracy’, The Political Quarterly, Vol.83, Issue 1, 
(January-March 2012), p.7 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2011.02259.x/pdf 
511
 Andrew Adonis, ‘Labour should support free schools — it invented them’, The New Statesman, 15
th
 March 
2012,  
http://www.newstatesman.com/education/2012/03/free-schools-labour-academies 
See also Andrew Adonis, Education, Education, Education: Reforming England’s Schools, (Biteback, London, 
2012) 
  177  
 
The Swedish experience of free schools has also raised further potentially negative 
implications of this social policy, namely in that according to some academic analysis it has 
caused falling educational standards and enhanced levels of social division, with similar 
negative social patterns said to have emerged in another Scandinavian country, Denmark, 
since it also rolled-out a programme of devolved yet state-subsidised free schools over 
recent years512. While figures such as Toby Young dispute this argument  and highlight 
conflicting data513, this debate goes to the heart of the Cameron government’s educational 
agenda, with a critical attack on the policy arguing that free schools and their neo-liberal 
focus on market-driven individual choice will actually create greater social injustice, 
segregation and ultimately discriminate against poorer members of the community who will 
be less likely to utilise the opportunities offered by their establishment than the middle 
classes and their enhanced levels of ‘social capital’. This would appear to be the exact 
opposite of the desired outcomes of the policy as outlined by Michael Gove, and would 
indeed suggest the replication of social policy failures that Gove sought to attach to many of 
the educational policies of the Labour government between 1997 and 2010. A key challenge 
for advocates of the free school agenda is therefore to achieve genuinely enhanced 
educational choice for citizens, while negating and preventing the potential for creating 
greater social and educational segregation in the process, which should in turn nullify 
criticisms of the policy. 
 
Re-invigorated Conservative education policy 
 
Despite such vehement and concerted criticisms, the confident and re-invigorated 
Conservative educational agenda argues that as well as raising educational standards, the 
additional benefit of free schools is said to be evident in their initial popularity in meeting 
the needs of parents and the communities in which they are located, as according to one 
government minister, ‘Parents are voting with their feet. Around two-thirds of Free Schools 
were oversubscribed for their first year. The West London Free School has just reported more 
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than 1,000 applications for 120 places in September 2012’.514 Such figures would appear to 
vindicate the Conservative Party’s faith in this policy as an alternative and populist approach 
to the universal and ‘statist’ approach favoured for much of the post-war era, and schools 
ultimately seek to adhere to the following core principles, as in essence they are: 
 
‘all-ability state-funded schools set up in response to what local people say they want 
and need in order to improve education for children in their community’515. 
 
At a basic level such free schools are therefore still under the ultimate control of the state, 
albeit within a more arms-length relationship. This policy for more ‘innovative’ and flexible 
educational provision therefore aims to provide a more localised service and autonomous 
curriculum which is in theory accessible to the whole community and which offers a service 
model that utilises and devolves centralised state funds to allow such free schools greater 
independence and ‘freedom’ in terms of prioritising core functions and key decision-making 
on a day-to-day operational basis, particularly in relation to staffing, facilities management, 
curricular options and specific local requirements. The policy also seeks to offer enhanced 
levels of individual choice to parents in a consumerist style, and in this respect the approach 
has some parallels with the prevailing Conservative neo-liberal attitudes of the 1980s and 
the broad focus on improving parental options, reducing government intervention and 
bureaucracy (both central and local), enhancing the role for the private sector, instilling 
greater levels of competition within mainstream education and the broad de-centralisation 
of the state’s educational scope and provision. This ethos was previously evident in the 
period between 1979 and 1997 in flagship policies such as grant-maintained schools, school 
league tables and city technology colleges, and which established elements of a more 
‘individualist’ culture with educational policy that was maintained to a degree within 
aspects of New Labour policy from 1997 onwards, notably within the academy 
programme516. In many ways, the policy ultimately aims to strike a revised balance between 
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uniformity and diversity within the provision of state education in Britain, within an 
underlying inference that there has not been sufficient diversity over recent years.   
 
However, David Cameron and Michael Gove have emphasised what they believe is a 
radical and innovative edge to such a policy that transcends previous administrations and 
which genuinely reflects a form of ‘New Conservatism’, specifically in the way that groups of 
parents, community activists and local charities can operate as the ultimate instigators of 
such schools to meet specifically local educational needs and demands, an option that has 
not previously been available and which appears to instil an even more competitive and 
dynamic aspect to the delivery of such a vital social policy in the process. Conservative 
politicians who have actively promoted and supported this policy have also explicitly sought 
to integrate the ethos of ‘free schools’ within the core message and ongoing narrative of the 
broader ‘Big Society’ agenda and the ‘localism’ policy narrative since returning to power in 
2010. This overall political agenda focuses on de-centralised, community-led activity across 
a range of social policies, promoting greater individual responsibility detached from the 
spectre of bureaucratic state control517, which in the view of this new brand of Conservatism 
seeks to instil ‘variety, experimentation and local innovation’518 and ‘innovation within the 
taxpayer-funded education sector’519 in a more diversified public service delivery overall. As 
a consequence, advocates of the policy dismiss fears from those on the political left that the 
enhanced competition caused by these new schools will cause greater segregation among 
and between neighbouring schools, but will instead act as a catalyst to generate enhanced 
choice and to raise ‘standards all round..... (with such) new schools (acting) as a spur to their 
neighbouring maintained schools’ 520, and on a wider social scale instilling an ethos that will 
‘make sure middle income and low income families benefit as much from those choices as 
high income families’521.  
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In this approach of seeking to raise standards by offering educational provision that 
in theory benefits all social classes and which derives from genuine grassroots demands 
where no previous institution was in existence, this policy is therefore distinct from what 
has gone before, and in turn it appears to offer a radical glimpse of the concept of post-
bureaucratic politics in action, adhering to the basic premise that ‘there is a difference 
between public services and state provision’522 in the sense that neither is mutually exclusive 
to the other, and that effectively functioning public services can be delivered away from the 
monopolistic control of the state. On a negative level however, there is anecdotal evidence 
from those involved in the application process to establish a free school, that the application 
process if so challenging and complex that ‘there is a real danger that free schools become 
the sole preserve of those with the resources and capacity to take on such a huge 
undertaking, such as faith groups or independent schools’523. This would suggest that the 
notion that everyone has equal potential to establish such a school is questionable, and that 
middle-class communities capable of ‘exploiting (their) social capital’524 are at a major 
advantage over poorer and more deprived groups who seek to establish a similar 
educational institution.  
 
This approach to educational provision following the Conservative Party’s return to 
government in 2010 can however also be said to be broadly consistent and coherently 
aligned with the Conservative vision for education that has been established since 1979 in 
particular, whereby ‘individuals, families, school staff and communities will be given 
“freedom” to “take responsibility” for the education system’525 within a less regulated and 
de-centralised model of policy delivery that allows schools to have greater choice and 
flexibility in the type of educational provision on offer.  The enhanced ability of free schools 
to emerge and develop without a prior organisation being in place is viewed as one of its 
most radical aspects that ultimately transcends the Conservative policy agenda of the 1980s, 
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as does its more explicit use of commercial and non-public bodies as alternative sources of 
funding and service delivery.  Many right-wing think-tanks such as the IEA have explicitly 
argued that the eventual outcome of this policy will be linked to an inherent profit motive 
that will be influential in the delivery of state education, and which will ultimately raise 
overall educational standards526, particularly for the lower social classes who have been 
guaranteed a proportion of places in such institutions due to the proposed non-selective 
nature of such bodies527, in social terms at least. Indeed within this context, free schools 
pioneer Toby Young has offered the powerful example that at ‘the West London Free 
School…..  25% of our first cohort are on free school meals’,528 as a clear indicator of the 
diverse and varied social composition of their initial pupil intake.  However this socially 
inclusive aspect of free schools has been challenged by figures that suggest that the first 
phase of free schools have on average taken a lower than average number of pupils who 
qualify for free dinners529 than other schools in the same area or borough, which would 
appear to undermine their status as being vehicles for greater social mobility and raising 
questions as to whether they are fully representative of the wider community they wish to 
serve.  
 
Other notable right-of centre think–tanks and policy lobbyists such as Policy 
Exchange have also been active in lobbying for similar reform of key social policy spheres, 
and Michael Gove was significantly one of this body’s key founders in 2002530, representing 
an obvious and practical link between the origins of social policies such as free schools and 
contemporary political developments.  Prominent educational charities such as The Sutton 
Trust531 have consistently argued for enhanced opportunities being provided for bright 
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students from disadvantaged backgrounds532, and free schools have subsequently been 
identified as a vehicle for providing such provision.  Within this context, bodies such as the 
Sutton Trust want to ensure greater social mobility and opportunity for those from deprived 
backgrounds, with a priority of such schools being able to ‘serve disadvantaged pupils to 
give preference to pupils from low income homes in their admissions criteria’ and that '”free 
schools” are established primarily in disadvantaged localities’ 533. The role of such charities 
alongside various right-of-centre pressure groups and think-tanks such as the IEA, Policy 
Exchange, Civitas534 and the New Schools Network535 in broadly supporting Free Schools and 
in seeking to influence distinct initiatives and innovative policies in the educational sphere 
has been viewed by some as evidence of a thriving civil society existing within a separate 
sphere between the individual citizen and the state, offering specific evidence of the ‘Big 
Society’ in action.  
 
Within such a model of government and society, these advisory groups are viewed in 
a positive manner as prominent and pro-active civic stakeholders, who are 'authoritative 
voices..... undertaking further commissions to deliver initiatives’536. Indeed, the educational 
charity that is the New Schools Network (established in 2009), is run by Rachel Wolf, a 
former adviser to Michael Gove and which is viewed as a particularly significant organisation 
in having an initiating, enabling and co-ordinating role in the process of establishing free 
schools537. Such apparently pluralistic influence in policy formulation and implementation is 
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therefore viewed by those who share this new Conservative outlook as a positive aspect 
within the contemporary educational and wider social policy sector, and a further 
advantageous asset to be attached to the free schools policy. Such independent bodies, 
along with the establishment of the devolved free schools, are viewed by advocates of a de-
centralised and post-bureaucratic state structure as symbolising ‘the heart of the Big 
Society’538 in practice, promoting an ethos that seeks to revive a genuine civil society and a 
rejection of the post-1945 ‘big state’ era when autonomous and localised bodies were 
‘largely pushed to the margins’539 when it came to the practical implementation of such core 
government policies. 
 
Does the ‘Free Schools’ policy represent a new type of Conservatism? 
 
It has already been alluded to that the ‘free schools’ policy in many ways reflects a 
consistent strand of Conservative thinking on educational provision that dates back to the 
advent of the New Right in the mid-1970s and the evolution of the Thatcher administration 
from 1979 onwards, namely in relation to the emphasis on devolving power away from the 
centralised, bureaucratic control of the state in order to meet local demand in a broadly 
neo-liberal model of governance. Conservative Party interest in educational policy was an 
evolving one during this period, as from the outset the government had a more economic 
agenda, and ‘education was not a priority of the Government in 1979’540. However, even the 
Thatcher administration had its own internal tensions in terms of moulding the country’s 
educational policy during the 1980s, with internal conflict evident within the New Right 
political faction itself, between the radical neo-liberals who favoured even greater de-
regulation of the economy, and the distinct brand of Neo-Conservatives who were 
‘interested primarily in upholding 19th century notions of tradition, hierarchy and social 
order’541, and who sought to retain a significant degree of centralised control of policy from 
the centre. It can be ultimately argued that despite Thatcher’s own neo-liberal economic 
instincts and broad aversion to state intervention, it was Conservative politicians such as 
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Education Secretary Kenneth Baker who favoured maintaining a ‘strong state’542 as 
acknowledged by Gamble as a key tenet of the overall political doctrine of Thatcherism, and 
which sought to retain significant social controls from the centre of government along more 
authoritarian lines.  
 
It was this more centralising and ‘strong state’ variant of modern Conservative 
thought that sought to instil and impose greater moral standards from a strong and co-
ordinated centre which appears to have ultimately won the day, as domestic-orientated 
‘neo-Conservatism’ appeared to have triumphed over more ‘neo-liberal’ influences in this 
policy sphere during this period of government. Such tendencies became evident in the 
emergence of key ‘centralising’ educational policies such as the National Curriculum in 
1988543, which has remained in place to the present day, and which to the dismay of 
contemporary neo-liberals represented an avowedly bureaucratic element of government 
educational policy-making, taking up ‘nearly 370 hours of parliamentary time and (giving) 
the Secretary of State 451 new powers’544. Over twenty years later its centralised and co-
ordinating role and content has come under the scrutiny of Michael Gove, whose 
decentralising policy agenda it appears to conflict with. With free schools only adhering to 
the core elements of this centralised curriculum and with greater flexibility in terms of the 
range and diversity of their subject provision as a result, Gove launched a formal review into 
the purpose and functions of the National Curriculum in early 2011545, with significant and 
potentially more flexible developments expected on this front in 2013-14 according to the 
government timetable on this subject. 
 
In returning the party’s attention to this key area of social policy while back in 
national office after 2010, the Conservatives sought to revive the debate of the 1980s, yet 
with a greater degree of de-centralisation, alongside an enhanced philanthropic emphasis, a 
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greater degree of paternalistic compassion and a sense of communitarian zeal. Within this 
context, one of the Conservative ministers in charge of the implementation of the free 
schools policy from 2010 onwards has described the policy in radical terms as ‘a grass-roots 
revolution’546, and some of the policy’s most enthusiastic supporters have argued that it has 
transcended the 1980s policy agenda in that it has more genuinely radical connotations, 
with the nature of its ‘grassroots’, bottom-up approach its key innovative aspect, with 
anywhere or anyone in theory being able to instigate such a school if the appropriate 
localised organisation and funding can be put in place. Prominent media commentators 
from the libertarian right of the political spectrum such as Fraser Nelson have subsequently 
proclaimed the establishment of free schools as a 'triumph’, particularly in the rapid pace of 
their introduction and the fact that they may even struggle to keep up with demand fuelled 
by population growth and increased pupil numbers in some parts of the country. This radical 
vision of educational provision therefore seeks to promote an ethos of genuine post-
bureaucratic individualism, meeting localised needs while also diluting, yet not eliminating 
in influence entirely, the previously dominant influence of the centralised state547 in the 
delivery of this key social policy within the public sector. Key regulatory bodies such as 
OFSTED maintain a monitoring role of such bodies, while the Secretary of State ultimately 
retains the power to suspend any school that appears to be in breach of the terms of its 
‘Articles of Association’548.   
 
Yet from another less supportive angle, it has also been suggested by sceptical 
political commentators that far from freeing schools from the tentacles of centralised state 
control, such regulatory controls of a financial and bureaucratic nature will continue to be 
an inevitable aspect of government intervention within the British education system, 
despite such an essentially decentralised approach to educational policy549.  This it is 
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claimed, has been the fate of all such attempts to devolve educational provision in the 
modern political era, as it is argued that pure and genuine ‘devolution’ of this social policy is 
extremely difficult to achieve in practical reality due to the need for the existence of some 
basic minimum standards and regulations to be adhered to, e.g. the continued application 
of the centralised national school curriculum (created in 1988), or the regulatory monitoring 
of standards by OFSTED550 (formed in 1992), as obvious examples.  This has led to criticism 
that in practical terms the free schools policy is unrealistic in its deregulatory aspirations, as 
a genuine and credible educational policy simply cannot be as radically de-centralised as has 
been claimed by its advocates, and is therefore something of a paradox in practical terms: 
 
‘Tory ministers claim to be decentralising power in our education system (yet) they 
are doing the complete opposite..... they have been quietly accumulating power in 
the centre. All new schools established by this government (academies and free 
schools) are reliant on central government funding, are accountable to ministers and 
civil servants, and are monitored through seven-year finance agreements decided in 
Whitehall’551. 
 
This particular line of criticism therefore suggests that despite the radical rhetoric 
associated with the free schools policy and its links with the broader vision of ‘The Big 
Society’, the practical reality is somewhat different in terms of disentangling such localised 
institutions from the centralised state and its bureaucratic labyrinths of Whitehall. One 
commentator has gone as far as commenting that such is the extent of government central 
control that ‘Michael Gove's centralism is not so much socialist as Soviet’552. It is indeed the 
central Whitehall machine that controls the funding for such educational bodies, in many 
ways simply bypassing and transcending the role previously held by local authorities in the 
traditional educational funding process, and this would appear to contradict the localist 
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aims for the policy. The post-2010 government has been accused by the Labour opposition 
of subsequently prioritising financial investment in the educational arena to the free schools 
as opposed to centralised and more comprehensive and ‘catch-all’ policies such as the 
abandoned ‘Building Schools for the Future’ programme. This has allegedly led to poor value 
for money and low student numbers in some such bodies, within one commentator 
describing them as part of a ‘"free" (meaning expensive) state school movement’553, which 
lack genuine experiment and liberation, and which have created a two-tier and 
segregationist structure where free schools will find it difficult to integrate with existing 
local authority bodies.  
 
The impact of coalition government on the free schools policy 
 
However the internal political pressures of coalition government can be said to have blurred 
the policy’s focus and more radical edge, with the Liberal Democrats, who did not principally 
advocate this policy and have been more hostile and sceptical to its agenda on the whole554, 
appearing to restrain its more radical neo-liberal elements.  As a consequence it would 
appear that a significant degree of state bureaucracy and restrictions will continue to exist 
and serve to limit the scope of commercial freedom and be imposed from the centre of 
government, with significant limitations and conditions demanded by Nick Clegg in relation 
to whether such schools can make a profit, although existing fee-paying private schools can 
apply for free school status and continue to charge for admission. Such limits and restraints 
being applied to the wholly radical, neo-liberal model of free schools delivery are likely to be 
retained in this policy sphere in the contemporary political period of 2010-15 at least, 
although the future vision of establishing free schools for profit is clearly a desired policy for 
some advocates of this policy who would like a scenario to emerge whereby ‘after the first 
batch of free schools have been judged a success, the government will allow for-profit 
Education Management Organisations to set up, own and operate free schools, as they can 
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in Sweden and some American states’555.  Such a scenario will almost certainly depend on 
the outcome of the General Election in 2015.  
 
The coalition government’s divisions in relation to the competitive, commercial and 
selective implications of the nature of educational provision and financial arrangements 
attached to the free schools policy ultimately chimes at the heart of a long-standing political 
debate within British politics and wider society, namely as to how to improve and reform 
educational provision in the UK. This centres on whether delivering core public services on a 
comprehensive, uniform basis is preferable to the alternative of allowing greater diversity 
within public service provision in order to meet specialist individual and finance-driven 
requirements, which supporters of free schools claim are the decisive dynamics behind 
government policy-making in this social policy sphere. The greater devolved status of such 
schools has the potential to create long-term prospects for the business and community 
groups behind such newly-established bodies to have commercial interests and profit 
incentives as a core factor in their involvement in such educational initiatives556, and this has 
been specifically evident in Michael Gove’s decision to approve the opening in autumn 2012 
for a wholly ‘for-profit’ free school, IES Breckland in Suffolk, by a Swedish private company, 
heralding a significant breakthrough for private involvement in the state education system, 
although such a model appears to be limited in its scope in the short-term at least. 
However, it is by no means certain that a desire for profit automatically equates to either 
improved public services or aligns with the communitarian emphasis of the broader Big 
Society agenda. However the most enthusiastic advocates of ‘The Big Society’ view the 
educational policy sphere as key testing ground to implement the various socio-political 
freedoms that the Big Society’s framework as ‘a governing idea’557 seeks to steadily instil 
across all of society, and such reforms as free schools will ultimately alter the way that the 
public views the provision of public services. This in turn has the potential to enable ‘a 
drastic scaling back of the national curriculum….. (and) the creation of new schools, be they 
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publicly or privately funded, and in corporate, trust or co-operative form’558, which will 
create an educational model featuring a diffusion and diversity of different types of state 
school, which is an explicit aspiration of the transformative nature of the ‘free schools’ 
education agenda and its prominent role in asserting a new brand of social conservatism.  
 
The future direction of the free schools policy 
 
There are those of less ideological and visionary tendencies, and who instead adopt a more 
pragmatic socio-political outlook who would claim that such state bureaucracy and private 
commercial restrictions are inevitable when dealing with public administration and the need 
to guarantee a minimum of national standards. This latter point is consolidated by a 
sociological theory promoted by the prominent social scientist Max Weber in the early 20th 
century559 who observed and argued that a more ‘bureaucratized society’ steadily develops 
due to the growth in size and complexity of states and communities, which therefore 
suggests that the contemporary aspiration of creating a wave of post-bureaucratic free 
schools is not based in practical reality given the significant demands and varied 
complexities of 21st century British society.  In the sphere of education, this is a particularly 
pertinent argument given that during ‘the 20-year period from 1979 to 2000….. (there were) 
over 30 separate Education Acts, together with large numbers of accompanying circulars, 
regulations and statutory instruments’560. Such bureaucratic and socially complex trends, 
alongside critical theories and arguments appear to further question and undermine the 
‘radical’ post-bureaucratic tenets of this policy as espoused by its principal advocates like 
Michael Gove, and which in the process appear to erode and suppress the radicalism of the 
apparent ‘freedoms’ that it creates, although it remains to be seen as to whether the ability 
of free schools to hire teachers without teaching qualifications561, the lack of need for 
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conventional educational buildings, the progressive appearance of a more flexible 
curriculum and the emergence in future of greater commercial freedoms will improve such 
schools and make them more genuinely ‘free’ overall. 
 
In its focus on de-centralised and more localised policy making, reduced bureaucracy 
and a greater emphasis on individual choice and needs, the Free Schools education agenda 
appears to chime in consistently with the wider Big Society narrative of the Cameron 
leadership, but its steady evolution as a policy has gone to the heart of the Conservative 
Party’s delicate identity issues on its return to national office from 2010 onwards. The policy 
does appear to embrace some traditional Conservative political priorities that could be said 
to hark back to a pre-1945 model of society where mutualism, localism and enhanced local 
autonomy thrived before the comprehensive and universal welfare state was constructed. 
From a later political era, such ‘neo-liberal’, New Right principles that then demanded a 
reduced role for the centralised state also suggest that such a policy would not have looked 
out of place if it had been initiated during the heyday of Thatcherism in the 1980s. Indeed, 
there has been some arguments made that this educational flagship policy has maintained 
the neo-liberal outlook of the 1980s, but has been fused and instilled with a sharper focus 
on ‘society’ and ‘incorporated elements of communitarianism’ within a ‘re-imagined 
state’562, an overall approach that fundamentally affects the structures of both central and 
local government. Within this analysis of the policy agenda, and despite its tendencies 
towards an enhanced focus on ‘society’, there are some that argue that the Free Schools 
policy is part of a wider, more radical political strategy from the right of the political 
spectrum that seeks to steadily erode the structural basis of the post-1945 model of the 
British state and its inexorable tendency to grow and expand, and in the process 
fundamentally challenge what this perspective views as a fundamental error at the heart of 
the post-war political consensus that ‘a large state was a guarantor of good public services 
and social well-being’563. The critical counter-argument to the viewpoint of those such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Does this mean that Free Schools can employ unqualified staff? - Free Schools do not have to employ 
teachers with Qualified Teacher Status (although certain specialist posts will still require QTS)’.  
562
 Sonia Exley and Stephen J. Ball, ‘Something old, something new: understanding Conservative education 
policy’, cited in Hugh Bochel (ed.), The Conservative Party and Social Policy, (The Policy Press, University of 
Bristol, 2011), Ch.6, p.101 
563
 Jesse Norman, The Big Society: The Anatomy of the New Politics, (University of Buckingham Press, 
Buckingham, 2010), Ch.2, p.26 
  191  
 
Jesse Norman would appear to argue that such policies of New Conservatism are potentially 
‘dangerous….. In its genuine belief that charities and volunteers, rather than the state, can 
and should provide numerous, core public services’564.  
 
However, there is an alternative interpretation that the ‘collectivist’ and ‘mutualist’ 
influences within the Big Society and its associated goals and key policies such as ‘Free 
Schools’, have in fact represented a dilution of the 1980s Conservative ‘free-market’ agenda 
and this has subsequently distinguished it from the more individualist emphasis and 
arbitrary outcomes of pure neo-liberal policies. Within this viewpoint, the policy appears to 
acknowledge some aspects of the more paternalistic 'One Nation’ Conservative tradition, 
particularly in response to criticism from the left that free schools are elitist and designed to 
cater for a largely affluent and middle-class market565, with the government insisting that all 
such bodies are not for profit and must guarantee that a significant proportion or quota of 
their intake come from poorer sections of society and not just a selective enclave of 
wealthier, middle-class families with enhanced levels of ‘social capital’566. This again 
indicates an interventionist, bureaucratic element of this policy, and would appear to 
suggest that completely decentralised, de-regulated and devolved decision-making is not 
feasible or desirable in terms of meeting wider social and inter-connected community 
needs. Herein is the paradoxical element that lies at the heart of the free schools initiative, 
that such a localist policy requires the state to initiate the decentralisation and devolution of 
power and to maintain an influence, albeit a streamlined one, in the effective functioning of 
the policy going forward.  The policy does however consistently correlate with the focus of 
past Conservative governments in at least minimising and reducing the state’s centralised 
control and extending opportunity in a meritocratic manner to all pupils regardless of social 
backgrounds, as evident in previous Conservative policies such as the assisted places 
scheme and the party’s ongoing affinity with grammar schools567. 
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This much-heralded emphasis on ensuring quotas of specific socio-economic groups 
within such free schools in order to tackle the ongoing cycle of social inequality and injustice 
in parts of the country would appear to reflect an approach to education policy that 
indicates a clear goal-based vision behind such an agenda, with an enhanced level of 
compassion instilled within a quasi-regulatory structure at the very least. This ‘determinist’ 
aspect of the policy goes to the heart of why initiatives such as ‘Free Schools’ illuminate a 
key debate at the heart of the whole Big Society agenda, notably in relation to the 
Oakeshottian approach of a 'natural’ or instinctive sense of community activity and 
responsibility among ordinary citizens568, which rejects the rationalism of ‘ideology….. and 
(moves) towards pragmatic principle’569. This is in contrast to the ‘rational’ and planned 
approach to governance as espoused by various (and often left-wing) ideologies that place a 
greater emphasis on theory and which alternatively seek to instil such values and activities 
into citizens via the state’s influence and intervention.  Such a traditionalist Conservative 
rejection of utopian ends can be aligned to the philosophical debate regarding the 
fundamental nature of government, namely whether “nomocratic” (rule-based) governance 
featuring a neutral end or aspiration, is preferable to a “teleocratic” model of government, 
which instead focuses on a governmental approach that is designed to achieve specific ends 
or which has a desired outcome.   
 
In applying such approaches to a specific policy such as the free schools programme, 
a key practical question that arises and which equally applies to the overall Big Society 
agenda and the evolution of a ‘New Conservatism’, is whether such a political narrative has 
specific ends or is it neutral and merely legalistic in its aspirations in line with the traditional 
and ‘natural’ Conservatism of Oakeshott? While the Big Society’s cloak around the free 
schools policy does seek to distance it from the explicit ideological positions of both the 
traditional left and right, this stance has been rejected by many teaching unions in particular 
who argue that ‘although the Government may indicate that they are introducing this 
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programme to reduce disadvantage, the reality is that it is wholly an ideological move’570 
with its focus on a more diverse utilization of private educational provision. The policy does 
however appear to have a clear focus on addressing fundamental socio-economic problems 
with a degree of state interventionism, and although it is unclear how success and progress 
will be measured within this policy, advocates of the policy claim that as an eventual 
outcome ‘this agenda may do more to improve equality than straight tax and spend’571, and 
its centralising tendencies.  This would suggest an emphasis on social outcomes that are 
linked to key political goals and values, and however vague such socio-political targets may 
be, this approach veers towards the teleocratic model where government via the various 
powers of the state seeks to guide public policy towards a broad and imprecise goal of some 
sort, although its utopian nature is likely to be limited.  
 
Given such a quixotic fusion of variable Conservative traditions and ideological 
influences within this social policy’s overall formulation, it remains a matter of conjecture as 
to which specific aspect or nuance of influence has been the dominant one in driving the 
Free Schools agenda forward and shaping its distinctive evolution in the years ahead. There 
appears to be some tensions between pragmatism and ideology within this policy sphere, 
with Michael Gove’s more dynamic ideological emphasis being moderated by the caution of 
the Liberal Democrats alongside some more pragmatic Conservative figures, adjoined to the 
practical necessity of retaining state control of such educational bodies, and such factors 
have collectively instilled a steadier rate to the policy’s reforming zeal. It remains to be seen 
as to which dimension or influence will take the more prominent role in shaping and 
moulding the policy in the long-term and as a result whether a genuinely new version of 
Conservatism emerges at the forefront of a credible and popular new educational agenda. 
Such a range of influences ultimately suggest a somewhat quixotic and ambiguous 
undertone to the policy’s overall image and identity, and within such a context a 
compromise position would be that reforms such as the free schools policy can arguably be 
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said to represent, in the short-term at least, a degree of ‘common sense and a new 
perspective (as opposed to)….. more ideological commitments’572.  
 
However as a rebuke to the various critics of the policy who would prefer the policy 
to fade away and fizzle out, it has been claimed that the innovations attached to this policy 
appear to have created a ‘competitive education quasi-market’573, which has already made 
some fundamental and irrevocable changes to this sphere of British social policy that cannot 
be altered. Such developments suggest that a distinct and new political consensus will 
subsequently emerge on this issue, with ‘free schools continu(ing) to be set up regardless of 
who wins the next election (as) the policy is irreversible, as the Swedes discovered in 
1992’574. This will entail yet another distinct feature or type of unit within the country’s 
educational structure, nestled alongside comprehensives, grammar schools and academies 
in providing an increased diversity of schools via a broader range of providers as opposed to 
a hegemonic state monopoly, and creating something of a ‘patchwork quilt’ appearance for 
the country’s system of state educational provision in the process. Although the number of 
such schools remains relatively small in number, whether their creation proves to be 
beneficial for wider society is not clear, as it has been claimed that policies that are fuelled 
by a wide number of devolved, quasi-private bodies do not always automatically equate to 
benefits for all of society, as in practice ‘parental preferences over education are not fully 
aligned with the public interest’575, indicating likely tensions between the communitarian 
instincts of civic engagement and the desire to ultimately instil commercial profit and 
viability within such institutions.  The likely benefits or failings of the policy will only be 
confirmed or disproved over a significant period of time, and while it has certainly delivered 
change, it ultimately remains a matter of conjecture as to whether such contemporary 
socio-political developments are part of a long-term, broader shift towards the emergence 
of a genuine brand of ‘New Conservatism’ for the 21st century. Alternative propositions are 
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that the free schools policy is merely a re-marketed reversion to the individualist market-led 
agenda of the 1980s, or that the pragmatic nature of Conservative ‘statecraft’, its associated 
populist tendencies and the desire to meet local needs and demands for primarily electoral 
purposes has been revived in all of its flexibility to be adaptable in the formulation of key 
public policies within national governance. 
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Social Policy Case Studies- Addressing the ‘broken society’ and promoting greater social 
justice? 
 
(2) Reform of the NHS 
 
This chapter of the thesis seeks to focus on a further area of contemporary and topical 
social policy that, similarly to free schools, has also aspired to address the ‘broken society’ 
and to maintain social mobility across the wider population, which in this instance features 
significant attempts by the Conservative-led coalition government to both effectively 
manage and simultaneously reform the key institution of the National Health Service since 
taking office in May 2010. Like educational policy, this pivotal area of welfare provision is an 
important aspect of modern British governance in the 21st century, and as a integral and 
high-profile component of the British welfare state it has been said to have ‘no parallel in 
terms of its resilience, its longevity and its abiding appeal to the citizens of the United 
Kingdom’576. The sheer size and complexity of the NHS as an organisation577 particularly 
provides a significant political challenge to any administration in terms of making it function 
and operate in an efficient and effective way along the specific organisational or functional 
lines that it desires.  As such a pivotal feature of British welfare policy provision, it therefore 
provides a clear opportunity for the modern Conservative Party to identify and illustrate just 
how original and innovative its approach is in dealing with another significant and 
increasingly expensive area of social policy since it returned to power following a thirteen 
year exile. Parallels can therefore be drawn with education policy, as both are high-profile 
aspects of governance with a ‘compassionate’ policy edge that equally affect large numbers 
of the population and both are therefore extremely potent as electoral issues. It is also a 
means of indicating whether the party’s proposals in this particular area of social policy 
represent any specific evidence of a revised attitude since its last period in government 
during the 1980s and 90s.   
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Historical Conservative attitudes to the NHS 
 
On the surface at least, the refreshed and re-branded approach of British Conservatism 
towards the NHS in the early years of the 21st century puts to the test the dynamic principles 
of the decentralised and localised aspects of the party’s broader social policy agenda, the 
‘Big Society’, which has been at the forefront of much of the party’s recent rhetoric in 
relation to social and welfare issues. This subsequently raises the key question as to 
whether this social agenda’s focus on ‘self help, entrepreneurship and community energy’578 
can be transferred into the monolithic and bureaucratic structure of the National Health 
Service, and even those who believe in the values of this decentralised socio-political 
approach have acknowledged the difficulties of this challenge, describing it in analogous 
terms of ‘taking five or ten years of reversing the supertanker to try to get it heading in the 
other direction’579.  Such comments imply the need for a long-term strategy in the pursuit of 
such a socio-political agenda, and the Conservative Party’s overall approach to this policy 
sphere ultimately raises important questions regarding the extent of the party’s revised 
identity and broader modernisation of recent years. As a consequence, the question arises 
as to whether the party’s emerging attitudes and policies in relation to the NHS represent a 
distinct alternative and a more compassionate approach in comparison with the ideological 
mood and neo-liberal political agenda attached to such social policies during the last 
sustained period of Conservative rule (1979-97), and therefore whether the party is offering 
continuity or change in its health policy.  
 
The core emphasis of the National Health Service since its inception in the aftermath 
of World War Two was to provide a quality service based on need, and not ability to pay, 
and its central ethos was to provide quality health care “from the cradle to the grave”. It has 
always been a particularly challenging area of policy to address for the Conservative Party, 
for the principal reason that the party originally opposed its creation when it was 
established by the reforming post-war Labour government in 1948, primarily due to its 
expensive burden on the taxpayer and its symbolic appearance as a vestige of bureaucratic, 
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socialist government. This opposition produced particular scorn from Labour’s Health 
Minster at the time, Aneurin Bevan, who denounced  the Conservatives as “being lower 
than vermin”580 for adopting such a position, and this  hostile and somewhat ‘toxic’ analysis 
has adhered itself to the Conservative Party on this issue to a variable extent since. The NHS 
has subsequently remained broadly popular with the British public since its creation in the 
collectivist aftermath of World War Two, with British citizens placing great emphasis on the 
value of the service and the need for investment in it in both social and political terms, and 
this has made it a political challenge for politicians of all parties aspiring to be in 
government. Over the years different governments of all parties have therefore been faced 
with a ‘never-ending public clamour for improved state health services’581, and this historic 
legacy has meant that consequently the NHS has been significantly intertwined with politics 
and public opinion, principally due to the fact that it is ultimately a public body, directly 
funded by the taxpayer, and this has resulted in an ongoing political battle between rival 
parties to provide an appropriate selection of specific social and welfare rights to a 
demanding public.  
 
The fundamental problem with seeking to address such elements of demand and 
supply within the NHS is that demand has appeared to be infinite and has experienced 
inexorable growth from an early stage of the service’s existence and in the ensuing years. 
However in practical terms the supply of the service has clear practical and financial limits, 
and at times since 1948 this has led to a rationing and streamlining of resources in general, 
with some aspects of service having to be prioritised over others. In the post-1948 era of the 
NHS there have therefore developed significant political implications for politicians and their 
electoral fortunes in relation to NHS policy and their ability to manage the service 
effectively. In the context of significant public interest in the service and the general 
perception of the NHS as a pivotal aspect of welfare provision, it has become a key 
responsibility of government to determine ‘how best to manage the gap between health 
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care demand and supply’582, and it is within this context that if a scenario exists whereby the 
wider population believe that politicians are not managing this key area of social policy 
effectively: 
 
‘they will legitimately demand that their elected representatives press for changes to 
be made. Thus politics and the NHS are rightly inseparable’583.   
 
As a corollary of such specific historical developments relating to the introduction of the 
NHS, as a policy area it ‘has long been regarded as a core Labour issue….. especially so since 
the 1980s,’584 when it came under pressure from the Thatcher government’s focus on 
retrenchment, reform and neo-liberal marketisation. During this period the Labour Party 
campaigned to preserve and defend the organisation’s original aims and structure amidst 
claims that its core basis was being eroded. This resulted in a political battle that was 
infused with ideological momentum, and this created both a social and political scenario 
where ‘a strong body of public and official opinion….. saw the NHS as underfunded and ill-
equipped to meet the legitimate expectations of its consumers’585, a factor that further 
eroded the Conservative Party’s image in relation to this sphere of the welfare state, with 
many critics questioning the party’s levels of ‘compassion’ and commitment in its 
governance of this public service.  In subsequent years, this specific aspect of social policy 
has become of even greater significance for the wider electorate, and can indeed be 
attributed as one of the key issues that influenced the electoral mood from the mid-1990s 
onwards, as ‘between 1995-2007 opinion polls identified health care as one of the top issues 
for voters’586. Such a socio-political development in turn provides a key reason in explaining 
the Conservatives’ political unpopularity during the approximate decade after 1997, with 
many key voters viewing the party’s initial unwillingness and reluctance to match the 
increased investment in the service during the first two terms of New Labour government in 
particular (until 2005), with suspicion.  
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Following a third successive general election defeat in 2005, the Conservative Party 
under David Cameron did explicitly acknowledge the need to maintain and consolidate 
Labour’s public expenditure in this policy area, and this represented a ‘fundamental rethink 
of strategy and policy’587 with regard to the NHS. However the party faced a difficult 
scenario whereby despite concerted attempts to improve the party’s image on this issue 
during the early years of the 21st century in particular, the party faced a harsh reality that 
‘most people never trusted them (the Conservatives) on it (the NHS) in the first place’588, and 
this has ultimately hampered the party’s political progress in relation to this policy area 
since it left national office in the late 1990s. This explains why there have subsequently been 
concerted attempts to de-toxify the party’s brand, which have been influenced by and 
linked to this lingering suspicion and hostility from the wider public towards the party’s 
motives in this particular policy sphere589. Such attempts at creating a more compassionate 
image in relation to health policy have also been undermined by a perception that many 
Conservative politicians remain critical of the NHS and its essentially statist principles and 
bureaucratic implications, with occasional outbursts on the issue from figures such as Daniel 
Hannan MEP, who in 2009 described the NHS to an American TV audience as a “sixty year 
mistake”590. Such views do not appear to correlate with the broadly favourable view of the 
NHS held by much of the wider British public, nor indeed the more moderate public ‘line’ of 
the modern Conservative Party leadership. The party’s contemporary attitude towards the 
NHS has subsequently become a vital barometer of wider public perceptions of the modern 
Conservative Party, striking at the heart of its perceived intentions for such an integral 
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aspect of British social policy that impacts on all of the population at some point of their 
lives.  
 
David Cameron’s focus on the NHS as an important socio-political issue 
 
During the sustained exile from national governance for the Conservatives between 1997 
and 2010, the thirteen years in question saw the NHS gain further significance as a high-
profile area of public policy during the longest period of Labour government in history. Its 
role towards the top of the political agenda was instigated by Tony Blair as part of Labour’s 
electoral strategy from the mid-1990s onwards, with the NHS prioritised as an election issue 
during the 1997 general election campaign, and the New Labour leadership declaring 
emotively that there were only 24 hours to ‘save it’ on the eve of the party sweeping to 
power. This approach and policy agenda subsequently resulted in a significant wave of 
financial investment in the country’s health service after 1997, with the rate of NHS 
spending steadily accelerating the longer that Labour was in power (see Table 1). The 
Labour government therefore appeared to adopt a clear political and electoral strategy of 
progressively investing in this key public service while markedly pointing the blame for 
failings in the service’s administration and the associated apparent under-investment 
directly at the previous Conservative government. This approach created a political 
narrative that attracted and engaged many significant and important socio-economic groups 
within the electorate, and it sought to contrast the perceived under-spending of the 
Conservative years in office with ‘a relatively long period of sustained real terms growth in 
public spending’591 on key public services such as health over the course of the Blair/Brown 
administrations after 1997, with significant public funds made available for this prominent 
area of social policy. Within the broader brush of this focus on enhanced investment were 
specific fiscal trends and intricacies, an example being ‘particularly large average annual 
increases in spending on the NHS (5.7% a year)’592, a factor that exposed Conservative 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities in its NHS policy approach while also chiming in with a 
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broadly supportive public mood towards such explicitly inflationary trends in government 
expenditure on public health (see table below).  
 
Table 1593: 
 
Year 
Public spending on  
health as a percentage of GDP  
in England (1993-2009) 
 
  
1993-94 5.5 
1994-95 5.6 
1995-96 5.6 
1996-97 5.4 
1997-98 5.3 
1998-99 5.3 
1999-2000 5.2 
2000-01 5.5 
2001-02 5.8 
2002-03 6.1 
2003-04 6.5 
2004-05 6.8 
2005-06 7.1 
2006-07 7.0 
2007-08 7.2 
2008-09 7.7 
 
 
NHS policy was therefore an important component of New Labour’s three successive 
general election victories over the demoralised and disjointed Conservatives (1997-2005), 
although the Blair/Brown approach to health policy after 1997 was somewhat ambiguous in 
its overall tone and direction, as alongside this significant additional spending the incoming 
government did not abandon the Thatcherite ‘internal market’ in its entirety, and indeed 
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maintained many of the market-driven, ‘consumer’ focused NHS reforms of the ‘choice 
agenda’ of the 1980s and 90s. This acceptance of a degree of private influence within the 
NHS was evident in the further use of private funding of NHS facilities in the form of PFI, the 
extension of the autonomy of hospital trusts into foundation hospitals, enhanced 
managerial responsibilities for doctors, as well as private non-state providers delivering 
aspects of NHS provision. This degree of bipartisan continuation of policy direction 
appeared to reflect a broad consensus that there would be a likelihood of variable levels of 
service and performance within an essentially state-run institution traditionally based on 
‘universal’ principles, and this represented a pragmatic ‘Blairite’ acknowledgment of the 
realities of the existing system and its focus on patients as ‘consumers’ that was a legacy of 
the eighteen years of Conservative rule. As well as an awareness of the difficulties caused by 
massive organisational upheaval if such structures were totally abandoned, this more 
blended policy direction was consistent with New Labour’s potent tactic of ‘triangulation’ 
and desire to outflank its political opposition by adopting some of its policies, and in 
embracing aspects of choice and marketisation within the NHS, as a consequence this 
appeared to enigmatically blur the focus of New Labour’s NHS agenda and tilt it slightly 
‘towards the policies pursued by the Thatcher and Major governments’594 in the process. 
Despite aspects of the party’s NHS legacy therefore being embraced by the incoming Labour 
government, a weak and untrustworthy Conservative image in relation to the NHS 
continued to persist in the wider public psyche, and this presented the party ‘with a 
significant problem, creating pressures for policy change’595, a scenario that could be seen as 
an opportunity from the perspective of party modernisers, particularly so after the 
modernisers’ candidate, David Cameron, seized the party leadership in 2005.  
 
Changes in relation to Conservative Party NHS policy and rhetoric began to evolve 
more substantially from an early stage of the Cameron leadership as the significance of a 
third successive general election defeat struck home. The newly-installed party hierarchy 
acknowledged the unpopularity of its apparent market-friendly ‘pro-private’ tendencies on 
this issue, with the key 2005 election policy ‘The Patient’s Passport’, which advocated state 
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subsidies for private healthcare, rapidly discarded within the first month of Cameron’s 
leadership596. Policy reform accelerated further as the Conservatives began to steadily 
regroup and threaten a return to national office from 2008 onwards in the wake of the 
onset of financial recession. Cameron’s deliberate attention to this policy area from the 
outset of his leadership was an explicit aspect of his attempts as a party leader from a new 
generation who sought to achieve de-toxification in regard to the negative memories of past 
Conservative governments and their record on such social policy matters. It quickly 
appeared to be an area in which Cameron and his political allies were considered to be 
more liberal-minded and reformist, and this was initially evident in public comments from 
an early stage of his leadership, notably when he stated in his first party conference speech 
as leader that "Tony Blair explained his priorities in three words: education, education, 
education, I can do it in three letters: NHS”597. Cameron’s personal connection to the issue 
was bolstered by to the NHS’s treatment of his son’s serious illness598, and this factor re-
enforced NHS policy as his “number one priority”599 should he be elected to lead a future 
government, further consolidated by his significant declaration that the creation of the 
service was ‘one of the greatest achievements of the 20th century’600.  
 
This bold approach of promoting a modern brand of Conservatism that was steadily 
re-assuring in relation to the NHS appeared to directly confront a sceptical wider public and 
attempted to suppress the suspicions of the wider electorate towards Conservative 
intentions in relation to the long-term future of the largely popular public service, as well as 
addressing internal Conservative policy tensions relating to a policy area with a high level of 
public interest and electoral potency. In doing so Cameron was therefore determined to 
depict the party with a more caring and compassionate image within the wider socio-
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political framework, and this policy approach formed part of his broader political strategy of 
seeking to promote an enhanced and distinct Conservative-orientated version of social 
justice within society, albeit one with a less interventionist role for the state in practical 
political terms.  Therefore in pursuing such a ‘socially just’ agenda, Cameron sought to 
emphasise that a specific undertone to such social policy formulation would aim to avoid 
the dominance of the centralised and bureaucratic state, and which would instead seek to 
provide opportunities for devolved levels of service provision and delivery via a more 
diverse range of non-state providers and various devolved structural elements within the 
NHS. 
 
In taking such an ambitious route in what was effectively a dynamic re-formulation 
of his party’s image regarding the NHS, Cameron swiftly acknowledged the need to be 
pragmatic in seeking the middle ground on such social policy issues, adopting an almost 
Blairite degree of pragmatism that ‘brought the party much closer to Labour’s position’601 in 
the build up to the 2010 General Election, primarily in terms of matching spending 
commitments and investment in the health service. This revision and prioritisation of health 
policy took on a more significant level as the general election approached with Cameron 
explicitly promising to ‘back the NHS….. (and) increase health spending every year’602,  a 
manifesto promise subsequently re-enforced in the 2010 Coalition agreement with the 
Liberal Democrats, which pledged that ‘funding for the NHS should increase in real terms in 
each year of the Parliament’603. This was a somewhat conspicuously inconsistent position 
given that it appeared in the wake of a Conservative manifesto programme that was 
determinedly focused on securing significant public spending cuts in order to tackle the 
national deficit604. Cameron’s brand of New Conservatism however felt that such required 
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investment could be achieved by ensuring funds more efficiently arrive at frontline services 
within a distinctly less bureaucratic infrastructure, although there was a cautious condition 
to this otherwise ambitious fiscal pledge, with promises to increase annual spending on 
health underscored by the crucial addition that ‘the rate of increase under Labour would not 
be continued’605.  This was perhaps an acknowledgment that the rate of spending on the 
NHS had been on a dramatically upward curve and required more cautious and prudent 
rates of growth in future years, with Cameron acknowledging that “In the past two decades, 
NHS spending has more than doubled in real terms from £38bn to £103bn”606. 
 
The political priorities of the NHS under Conservative governance since 2010 
 
On re-entering national office in 2010 as part of a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats, Conservative ministers were keen to emphasise the party’s much-heralded pre-
election pledge of increased financial investment in this key public service, a stance that 
would fulfil a significant manifesto commitment and which broadly aligned itself with the 
more expansive health policy of the junior coalition partners.  This prominent commitment 
to substantial NHS investment represented a relatively consistent policy stance throughout 
the Cameron leadership era and also aligned itself with attempts by party modernisers to 
mould a more compassionate public image as part of the broader strategy of embracing the 
ethos of vigorous, dynamic and innovative public service provision in the 21st century. 
Cameron himself made such sentiments as clear as was possible after a year of his 
premiership, re-affirming his commitment that “We will not cut spending on the NHS, we 
will increase it”607. Within this context, this modern expression of social Conservatism and 
its focus on maintaining constructive government investment into a core public service has 
appeared somewhat inconsistent and incoherent in the light of the party’s high-profile focus 
and rhetoric on deficit reduction, and this has left the policy’s intellectual and philosophical 
basis open to criticism. In practical terms, such ambitious spending pledges have 
subsequently become vulnerable to significant scrutiny, particularly given media claims that 
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NHS spending was actually cut in real terms by £25 million in the financial year 2011-12 
when inflation is taken into account608, leading to one academic observation that ‘the NHS is 
not immune’609 from the era of austerity that has prevailed since the Conservatives returned 
to national office in 2010.  
 
Despite this pro-investment rhetoric being such a prominent feature of NHS policy-
making under the Cameron leadership since 2005, some on the right of the Conservative 
Party have lamented the party’s perceived capitulation to the New Labour agenda and have 
challenged the apparent consensus that relatively high levels of public spending 
automatically equates to an improved level of service. This this was evident in the broad 
thrust of the televised comments made by the MEP Daniel Hannan in 2009, and such 
sentiments were at least acknowledged at a senior level in comments made by Health 
Secretary Andrew Lansley, who in 2010 remarked in a high-profile TV interview that “Britain 
now spends European quantities of money (on the NHS) without achieving European 
standards of treatment”610, which was a strong re-emphasis of a recurring Conservative 
criticism that Labour’s NHS investment after 1997 had failed to reach frontline services due 
to alleged bureaucratic obstructions.  This viewpoint has arguably shaped the Conservative 
critical narrative of the centralised and statist approach of Labour over thirteen years in 
power, and which influenced Cameron’s emphasis that the party’s post-2010 NHS 
programme had to be accompanied by a long-term outlook entailing a programme of 
proposed reforms which he argued seek to “modernize the NHS - because changing the NHS 
today is the only way to protect the NHS for tomorrow”611. Such comments emphasise that 
Cameron’s brand of social Conservatism aspires to create a more streamlined, diverse and 
efficient state structure that can deliver a modernised health service while always being 
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aware of the rising and arguably unsustainable financial costs612, which appears to indicate 
that enhanced financial investment alone is not the Conservative Party’s answer to ensuring 
a viable and effective NHS in the long-term.  
 
This emphasis on greater economic and organisational efficiency can be aligned to 
the fact that since 2010 the government has been operating under the cloak of a severe 
austerity agenda that has sought to unerringly drive down the national deficit and to 
achieve better value for money in the process, and this has been a central dimension of 
post-2010 government’s raison d’être, which was identified by the Conservatives in 
particular as a fundamental issue during the 2010 General Election campaign and in 
subsequent coalition negotiations613. As an integral and high-profile theme that appeared to 
derive from the heart of government and which sought to control and direct the coalition 
government’s overall policy agenda, the focus on deficit reduction was consistent with the 
Big Society’s alternative model of a more streamlined and less bureaucratic structure of 
public service delivery, and which aspired towards ‘a significant reshaping of public 
services….. empowering front-line staff and allowing them to get on with the job’614 in an 
ostensibly more creative, cost-effective and autonomous manner and with a clear reduction 
in centralised state control, perhaps symbolised by the scheduled abolition of primary care 
trusts (PCTs) by 2013. Within such a socio-economic context, the incoming government’s 
approach to NHS policy could be summarised in practical terms as seeking to make a 
significant commitment to sustained financial investment alongside a long-term 
organisational reform that was focused on managing and controlling the overall 
bureaucratic costs and structural size of this expensive public service. However a key 
challenge that would be created by this approach would be to keep a potentially sceptical 
and suspicious public opinion on board, alongside the large ‘client state’ attached to the 
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service, namely the trade unions and the almost two million NHS employees, all of whom 
are voters at election time.   
 
In its role as the senior partners of the coalition, the Conservative Party leadership 
has approached NHS policy since 2010 with an acute awareness of its responsibility for the 
management of the service in the short-term, along with the associated sensitivities of re-
assuring the public in relation to the service’s future viability given the party’s somewhat 
negative image of the past in relation to this public service. Within this context, Cameron’s 
Conservatives have also had to acknowledge the growing socio-economic pressures on the 
service, and as a result have ambitiously sought to steer NHS policy direction towards 
targeting the public organisation’s considerable and escalating long-term structural costs as 
part of the overall focus on deficit reduction, with such costs particularly fuelled in the long-
term by the demographic trends of a growing and ageing population. Figures in support of 
this analysis include a 61% projected increased in those aged over 65 in the UK by 2032, as 
well as the increased average life expectancy in the UK being a substantial thirty years over 
the course of the 20th century615. In many ways such demographic variants have been a clear 
indicator of the NHS’s post-war success in how it has considerably prolonged average life 
expectancy via the promotion of ‘improvements in health, diet and preventative care’616, but 
with this have come significant financial costs relating to NHS infrastructure and service 
viability in the long-term. This trend in the UK’s demographics has been particularly 
identified as a specific cause of ‘the inexorable growth of welfare spending’617 and the 
ongoing extension of social rights in the post-war era, and such trends have provided an 
escalating and evolving challenge to most governments of this historical period. While the 
incoming government from 2010 ultimately appears to have been focused on achieving 
improved levels of service and performance within the NHS, it remains a valid issue to 
consider as to whether NHS policy is ultimately both shaped and hampered by the 
considerable structural and economic constraints unerringly linked to the UK’s long-term 
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and significant demographic changes, and this can subsequently erode and undermine 
government policy intentions from the outset.  
 
Such a scenario strikes at potentially conflicting Conservative motives for NHS policy-
making, and in tackling this demographic reality the party’s primary focus is on enhancing 
the provision and quality of service within the NHS by a combination of financial investment 
alongside a simultaneous programme of organisational reforms in order to ensure improved 
value for money for the taxpayers and the guarantee of a quality public service in the long-
term. The Conservative Party’s contemporary focus on providing enhanced levels of choice 
within the service are ostensibly fuelled by the post-2010 government’s desire to utilise a 
greater range and diversity of proposed healthcare providers, and alongside this 
development is a programme of structural reform as a further means of achieving an 
improved service in practical terms. These rival demands of simultaneous investment, 
reform, retrenchment and eventual service delivery have subsequently created a somewhat 
inconsistent momentum at the heart of this specific aspect of the social policy agenda of 
modern Conservatism, featuring a fusion of conflicting pressures and tensions which make a 
clear and coherent policy direction a major challenge and difficult to predict in terms of 
planning, implementation and eventual outcome. This somewhat multi-faceted approach 
could possibly be viewed as an effective political strategy that would re-enforce a key aspect 
of the party’s traditional political identity and play to some traditional strengths, primarily in 
terms of the Conservatives being perceived as being flexible and pragmatic, financially 
prudent, in control of public spending and social policy innovators all at the same time.  
 
However on a more radical and innovative level, the party’s contemporary NHS 
agenda has aimed to instil a modern and contemporary variant of Conservatism into the 
policy mix, namely by promoting it as a core emphasis of the government’s ‘Big Society’ 
narrative, focusing on overseeing the creation of a dynamic type of social policy within a de-
centralised and more localised policy-making model. In adopting this approach, the new 
government has particularly sought to distinguish itself in a positive manner from the 
allegedly profligate fiscal tendencies and bureaucratic, centralising instincts in relation to 
public policy-making that were increasingly associated with the previous Labour regime. The 
ultimate outcome has seen the emergence of a scenario where the coalition government’s 
  211  
 
commitment to maintain healthy levels of investment in such a key public service on the 
one hand, while simultaneously attempting to radically restructure and re-shape it has 
appeared on the political horizon as an extremely challenging balancing act to fulfil.  
Attempts to significantly reform the NHS was a major challenge faced by the Thatcher 
government in the 1980s, and even during the New Labour period there were difficulties in 
re-organising the service while also investing in it, particularly due to Labour’s close links to 
the public sector trade unions and the resistance this movement generally expressed 
towards public service reform. Such historic parallels suggest that similar proposed reforms 
from 2010 onwards were always likely to be laden with a series of significant political and 
economic difficulties.  
 
Within this increasingly expensive broader policy arena of wider welfare provision 
and within it the specific aspect of health policy, the fundamental focus on streamlining 
costs and bureaucracy have encapsulated many Conservative criticisms of the previous 
Labour government in relation to this issue618. However whether such a reduction in 
bureaucracy and overall cost is practically possible within a credible social policy agenda 
that seeks to guarantee the maintenance of established levels of service within an ageing 
society is open to question, particularly within the added aspiration of a more devolved 
organisational structure and localised service delivery. This complex challenge of 
governance has been particularly evident in the context of developments such as the global 
economic crisis since 2008 and the subsequent additions to social and welfare policy 
expenditure caused by rising levels of unemployment, and such socio-economic crises have 
historically required the need for a strong centralised state to co-ordinate an appropriate 
response, a factor which subsequently appears to undermine the coalition government’s 
localist agenda.  It is therefore a fundamental question as to whether Cameron’s 
administration has both the political desire and practical ability to be ‘radical’ enough to 
achieve its explicit aims in this area of social policy, namely to achieve significant 
retrenchment in expenditure while at the same time seeking to create a more decentralised 
health service structure in line with traditional Conservative principles of freedom and 
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marketisation, without damaging the broader fabric of British society and de-stabilising this 
key public policy in the process.   
 
Linked to such socio-economic influences and structural organisational pressures, 
there have also been moral imperatives behind this policy approach and its ultimate focus 
on creating a more efficient public service while simultaneously reducing bureaucracy and 
the national debt. The Cameron-led administration has therefore sought to infuse a greater 
sense of Conservative–orientated social justice into British politics and society in the 
process, whereby a less centralised state structure exists to provide a regulatory framework 
for public service delivery, but which in practical terms entails that the state is ultimately 
less active and interventionist in such policy provision and the individual has greater 
personal responsibility and is therefore less directly reliant on the state for support. Under 
this idealised vision of modern Conservatism, citizens are therefore encouraged to utilise a 
model of public service provision that delivers enhanced levels of choice, personal 
responsibility and opportunities within a more independent and autonomous framework, 
operating within a broader political structure that features a more diverse range of service 
providers and which should ideally feature a slimmer state that is more appropriate for such 
desired levels of personal autonomy to flourish. Within this context, choice is to be viewed 
as a positive means of enhancing the service, not eroding it, with the Prime Minister 
affirming that “We will ensure competition benefits patients”619. Some Conservatives and 
right-of-centre commentators have embraced this perspective of enhanced choice and 
individuality within the service and developed it to a further dimension, making it the basis 
for arguing, in a somewhat neo-Conservative and morally-infused position, that a logical 
conclusion of this approach is to question the universal ethos of NHS provision and to favour 
the utilisation of specific NHS services only for those that ‘deserve’ them, and that a form of 
rationing should entail as a result. Such an argument that seeks to instil a morality-based 
conditionality has concluded that aspects of NHS provision should be withdrawn for people 
who don’t take care or personal responsibility of their own health due to smoking or poor 
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diet620, but the party leadership have not offered public support or been willing to formally 
embrace this position.   
 
Cameron’s approach to the formulation of NHS policy has also come under pressure 
from a variety of right-of-centre think tanks such as the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), the 
Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the Social Market Foundation (SMF)621, who in a similar 
vein to the educational sphere, have sought to influence and shape government health 
policy within a pluralistic ‘Big Society’ framework. While such groups have broadly sought to 
steer this area of policy towards a broadly more individualised, marketised and streamlined 
organisational direction, the CSJ in particular, with its particular emphasis on social justice, 
has also re-enforced a sense of moral pressure in stressing the importance of enhanced self-
help and autonomy within public healthcare as a means of improving an individual's self-
worth and value within society. Cameron therefore has had to balance the somewhat 
incongruous pre-election promises of enhanced levels of investment in the health service 
alongside the achievement of national deficit reduction, as well as reacting to the realities of 
coalition politics and external think-tank and pressure group activity in framing NHS policy 
after 2010. The challenging issue of re-shaping and restructuring the pivotal public service of 
the NHS therefore provided a number of variables to the largest party within the coalition 
government, ultimately offering the potential for the Conservatives to fulfil their expressed 
commitment to the devolution and de-bureaucratization of public policy-making. However 
even the trailblazing and more ideologically assertive Conservative administration of 
Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s struggled to deal with the fundamental issues relating to 
the management of the costs and overall size of the wider and extensive welfare state, for 
the principal reason that ‘it affects the lives of so many people’622.  
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The NHS and The Big Society 
 
This key social policy area was therefore identified as a principal dimension of governance 
that would allow both traditional Conservative principles and innovative new ideas to be 
dually imposed as part of the party’s new social agenda from 2010 onwards, while in the 
process promoting more efficient use of taxpayers’ money and offering further 
enlightenment as to how such policies correlated and aligned themselves with the overall 
socio-political architecture of The Big Society with its focus on greater ‘localism’, enhanced 
social responsibility and a re-modelled state.  Advocates of the Big Society agenda have 
subsequently proclaimed that when its principles are attached to specific areas of social 
policy such as the NHS, its approach to governance is ‘pragmatic and non-ideological in 
character….. (providing) more freedom to innovate….. and more freedom to act in 
accordance with simple common sense’623. Such an apparently practical political approach to 
the delivery of key public services would therefore suggest that pragmatism and ‘statecraft’ 
has been prevalent over ideological dogma in such contemporary social policy-making, and 
such a practical political nature is consistent with a label that has been attached to Cameron 
by observers and biographers624. However as a counter to this viewpoint, critics from both 
the political and medical world have claimed that the proposed NHS reforms of the 
Cameron government are tainted by explicit ideological tendencies that clearly and 
deliberately advocate a smaller state which seeks to make greater use of what Conservative 
supporters perceive to be a more efficient private sector625 to offer a better balance to the 
state’s previously hegemonic influence in public service delivery, and it is such an 
organisational model that has been broadly espoused by supporters of the contemporary 
post-2010 NHS reforms. 
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The government’s overall focus on deficit reduction, eliminating excess bureaucracy 
and streamlining the functionality of key public services since 2010 has subsequently 
generated controversial policies and proposed reforms to the existing health service 
structure626, with a particular emphasis on seeking to liberate the service from what is 
perceived to be an overbearing and bureaucratic central state. Advocates of the Big Society 
agenda have therefore argued that a standardised national health service, rigidly controlled 
from the centre of government, as has been the prevailing tendency since its creation in 
1948, does not necessarily provide a better quality or more efficient service: 
 
‘Nobody wants a patchy health service, but the point is that we already have a 
patchy health service, we already have a health service that is delivering massive 
inequality, we already have a world where some people live thirty years longer than 
someone else’.627  
 
In the sphere of health policy (as in other policy areas since 2010), the principles of 
The Big Society have therefore been fused with the austerity agenda, and this combined 
pressure has led to an enhanced focus of the market ethos and the generation of ‘greater 
competition into the NHS628, which in many ways has echoed the debate of the 1980s in 
relation to this policy issue. In this sense there has appeared to be some degree of history 
repeating itself in relation to the policy trends of the 1980s, with Labour leading the 
objections to such policy reforms from opposition, and many health professions joining the 
chorus of disapproval, with key groups such as the BMA excluded from government-
organised summits to discuss the proposed NHS policy changes after 2010629. The pursuit of 
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such policies has suggested that the Conservatives possibly have some unfinished business 
in this socio-political sphere from their last sustained spell in government between 1979 and 
1997, despite the fact that New Labour embraced private involvement and funding within 
the NHS while in office between 1997 and 2010. However New Labour’s utilisation of 
private sector involvement was not to such a radical or extensive extent as the coalition 
government proposes, with the potential limit on private patients in the NHS rising from a 
2% maximum imposed by Labour in 2003, up to a 49% maximum to be obtained by private 
funds as outlined in the 2012 Health and Social Care Bill630.  This scenario has therefore seen 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition encouraging and indeed legislating for non-
state providers and private companies to have access to a bigger share of the NHS and 
provide specific health and broader welfare services that have traditionally been under the 
remit of the state. In adopting this approach the Conservative-led government has sought to 
expand the opportunities for the private sector in order to diversify provision in the name of 
enhanced value, reduced administrative bureaucracy, greater choice and a more diverse 
public service, as has also been the case with education policy.  
 
This variable fusion of pressures and influences of an economic, social, moral and 
political nature has meant that such proposed NHS reform, featuring an organisation that is 
complex, extensive and entrenched, has been an integral aspect of the revamped 
Conservative social policy focus since the party regained national office in 2010, and it has 
absorbed significant amounts of government time in the process.  The Conservative-led 
government’s ‘Big Society’ approach to the health service has subsequently witnessed some 
core principles of the post-1948 NHS and its ‘universal’ provision coming under significant 
scrutiny and revision from private, non-state elements, and this outlook has been fuelled by 
economics,  demographics and communitarianism in particular. In pursuing a policy 
approach that promises investment alongside organisational reforms and restructuring, the 
Cameron government has adopted what can be argued is a flexible and pragmatic premise 
which embraces the mantra that it is ‘a perfectly reasonable question to ask whether you 
would get better public services by employing other organisations than merely the 
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instruments of the state’631. This in itself has proved to be a major gamble for Cameron’s 
government, and given that such reforms have associations with neo-liberalism and 
privatisation, he has duly re-kindled connotations of the Thatcherite ideology and its impact 
on the NHS during the 1980s, which significant swathes of voters have viewed as being 
negative.  This has risked ‘retoxifying’632 the party’s precious brand and image in this 
‘compassionate’ sphere of policy-making, in spite of Cameron’s extensive efforts to achieve 
the opposite outcome.   
 
The influences, aims and intellectual basis of Conservative NHS Policy since 2010 
 
As Michael Gove has been the prominent figurehead for Conservative educational reforms 
after 2010, Andrew Lansley took on a parallel role in relation to health policy until he left 
the post following a Cabinet reshuffle in September 2012, to be replaced by Jeremy Hunt. 
Lansley had been one of the longest-established Conservative politicians in their particular 
policy role, having held the Shadow Health position since 2004, and therefore preceding 
Cameron’s accession to the party leadership in late 2005. During this time he subsequently 
built up a considerable depth of knowledge in relation to this policy portfolio, and Cameron 
appears to have deferred to such policy experience by keeping him in the same position for 
such a sustained period of time. Given such a substantial degree of pedigree in this 
particular sphere of social policy, Lansley will have been influential in shaping the 
commitment made by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition in May 2010 that as far 
as NHS policy was concerned, the new government would seek to ‘free NHS staff from 
political micromanagement….. (and) stop the top-down reorganisations of the NHS’633. This 
pledge was a high-profile one and sought to epitomise the apparently distinctive approach 
of the new government from 2010, with its emphasis on patient empowerment and the 
liberation of the broader NHS as an organisational structure with reduced levels of 
bureaucracy. However in relation to the aims and influences of NHS policy-making since 
2010, it has been the source of much political debate in the months and years that have 
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followed as to whether the Conservatives have adhered to this specific aspect of the 
coalition agreement and its emphasis on greater devolution and autonomy within the 
service, as opposed to significant organisational restructuring imposed from above. 
 
Such top-down re-organisations were identified as negatively prominent features of 
NHS policy-making that were associated with the previous Labour administration, and they 
were deemed as being undesirable from a Conservative perspective for the principal reason 
that they were highlighted as an apparent cause of generating increased levels of 
organisational bureaucracy. Within this context, from an early stage of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government’s existence, reducing the levels of bureaucracy was 
identified as a key priority in terms of addressing a structural aspect of the NHS monolith 
that Labour’s thirteen years in office had failed to address, despite rhetoric to the contrary.  
An early specific target that was identified for bureaucratic cutbacks was the need to 
achieve a minimum of £20 billion in spending cuts over 3-4 years, as highlighted by the NHS 
Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson in 2009 during the final phase of Labour’s period in 
government634. Achieving 4% spending cuts within the NHS for four successive years 
alongside the development of greater levels of integrated health care were therefore seen 
to be specific and essential elements of this cost-cutting and more prudent agenda, and this 
approach has been broadly endorsed by the Commons Health Select Committee from 2010 
onwards, chaired by former Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell (1995-97). This financial target 
was subsequently dubbed the ‘Nicholson challenge’, but in the short-term at least the 
government has initially failed to meet such a challenging target aimed at reducing the 
bureaucratic costs in the health service according to National Audit Office estimates in 
2011-12635, and such an upward public expenditure trend appears to have undermined its 
overall health policy agenda from an early stage of its time in national office.  
 
Within this broader context of seeking to control the long-term upward spiral of cost 
and bureaucracy within the NHS during the post-war era, spending on the service has 
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increased by ten times its original level in real terms since 1948636, although this has been 
generally in line with most other developed nations also.  However since 2010, specific and 
clear attempts have been made to steer policy formulation in a more explicitly 
Conservative-orientated direction, with a greater focus on traditional principles such as 
improved patient choice, enhanced levels of devolution of responsibilities to GPs and 
medical professionals (more clinical leadership), alongside greater accountability and the 
attempted elimination of superfluous organisational structures. This has been bolstered by a 
background political narrative of de-bureaucratization and tougher fiscal guidelines for 
government expenditure on the service, and despite Cameron’s post-2010 claims to have 
ring-fenced NHS spending637, some critical voices have declared that the practical 
implications of this approach amidst cuts in overall government expenditure are that NHS 
spending levels (in real terms) could steadily slip below the Thatcher period of the 1980s. 
This is due to the developing scenario that despite the NHS facing less savage cutbacks than 
other departments in the post-2010 austerity drive, the health department’s budget is set to 
rise by just 0.1% annually until 2014, compared to a 4.5% annual average for most of the 
service’s lifetime since 1948638. Such challenging spending levels have been put into a stark 
historical context by NHS Chief Executive Sir David Nicholson, who has stated that proposed 
spending levels on the service after 2010 are "generous when you look across the rest of the 
public service. [But] there has never been a time where we have had four years of flat real 
growth. It is unprecedented”639.  
 
Such an ‘unprecedented’ background context within this new NHS agenda has 
generated renewed fears of ‘rationing’ within the service among political opponents, raising 
question marks against the Conservative Party’s pre-election commitment to the NHS, but 
such fears will be able to be more accurately assessed by the end of the 2010-15 Parliament. 
                                                          
636
 BBC News website, ‘The Riddle of the NHS Budget’, 8
th
 November 2010,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-11686396 
637
 
Jonathan Moore and Alex Stevenson, ‘Emergency Budget: Only NHS and international aid ringfenced’,   
Politicos.co.uk, 22nd June 2010,  
http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2010/6/22/emergency-budget-only-nhs-and-international-a 
638
 Nick Triggle, Health Reporter, BBC News, ‘Why the NHS must face up to the new world’, BBC News website, 
25
th
 February 2011,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-12566719 
639
 Sir David Nicholson, NHS Chief Executive, 25
th
 February 2011, cited in BBC News, ‘Why the NHS must face 
up to the new world’, BBC News website, 25
th
 February 2011,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-12566719 
  220  
 
The culmination of NHS policy in the early years of the coalition government was the high-
profile Health and Social Care Act (2012),640 which the then Secretary of State for Health, 
Andrew Lansley, praised as being: 
 
‘part of a broader vision of health and health services in this country being among 
the best in the world…..  a service where national standards and funding secure a 
high-quality, comprehensive service available to all, based on need and not the ability 
to pay; and where the power to deliver is in the hands of local doctors, nurses, health 
professionals and local communities’641.  
 
In its fundamental shake-up and restructuring of the NHS,  this Act has been widely criticised 
by many on the left-of-centre of British politics, primarily due to its apparent contradiction 
of repeated coalition pledges not to engage in a top-down reorganisation of the health 
service and many of its long-standing institutional elements. Its implications have indeed 
entailed some significant restructuring of this core public service with an enhanced focus on 
instilling greater competition via a wider range of NHS service providers642, and as junior 
coalition partners the Liberal Democrats have been sceptical but have been gradually 
persuaded to support the general thrust of such reforms. However there have been internal 
tensions and divisions within the party amid claims that the NHS was being privatised in all 
but name by such policy measures, with Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg offering re-
assurances that "If I felt it was privatising the NHS or tearing it limb from limb, it would 
never have seen the light of day."643  
 
This policy proposal endured a prolonged and controversial passage through 
Parliament in 2011-12, with significant amendments and concessions secured by Liberal 
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Democrat peers in the House of Lords in particular, primarily in relation to the nature of the 
proposed devolution of powers and financial decision-making to GPs, alongside the scale 
and range of external private healthcare providers that suggested the resurrection of a 
more full-blown ‘choice’ agenda644. In this sense it can perhaps be argued that as in 
educational policy, the Liberal Democrats have acted as some form of braking mechanism 
on the more ideological tendencies within the Conservative Party, although Andrew Lansley 
has been keen to further underplay the ideological implications of the policy and that 
‘choice, competition and the involvement of the private sector should only ever be a means 
to improve services for patients, not ends in themselves’645. The Prime Minister and Deputy 
Prime Minister have also sought to align such health reforms with their broader attitude to 
public service provision, namely that: 
 
“a new approach to delivering public services is urgently needed. The principles that 
inform our approach, and the policies we will enact to give it force, signal a decisive 
end to the old-fashioned, top-down, take-what-you-are-given model of public 
services. We are opening public services because we believe that giving people more 
control over the public services they receive, and opening up the delivery of those 
services to new providers, will lead to better public services for all”646. 
 
However one high-profile media critic has still claimed that the thrust of the reforms are 
aligned not with practical necessity or the mood of ‘The Big Society’ as the above quote 
suggests, but instead with an inherent market ideology with links to the neo-liberal agenda 
of the 1980s, and which therefore have the negative potential to ‘finish the Health Service- 
and David Cameron’647. This implies a potentially adverse political consequence for the 
Prime Minister in his pursuit of such NHS reforms, which was perhaps an explanatory factor 
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in Andrew Lansley’s sideways move from the Department of Health in autumn 2012, amid 
media suggestions that he was bearing the brunt of criticism of the post-2010 NHS 
reforms648.  Such a negative fall-out from the policy has resurrected images of re-toxifcation 
of the Conservative image in the process, a bleak prospect for a Prime Minister who in 
restructuring this core public service has sought to re-define his party’s reputation in 
relation to it. 
 
A central influence behind Cameron’s NHS policy has therefore been the concerted 
efforts to drive down and eradicate the extent of government bureaucracy, a fundamental 
theme of the post-2010 Big Society agenda. Within such a context, there has been a 
particularly ironic aspect of the government’s specific programme for NHS reform, and this 
has been fuelled by the Labour opposition’s claims in 2012 that despite this much-publicised 
focus on reducing the hegemonic role of the state in NHS provision, the practical 
implications of post-2010 NHS policy are that there has actually been more structural 
bureaucracy created within this area of social policy649, not less as the Conservatives had 
aspired to achieve (see diagrams one and two). David Cameron has made this aspiration for 
NHS governance very clear with recurring comments such as “We're wasting too much 
money on empty bureaucracy when it could be spent on the frontline”650, yet despite such 
rhetoric, the warnings of bureaucratic growth have been re-emphasised from more unlikely 
quarters, with the right-of-centre and libertarian think-tank Civitas expressing similar 
comments in 2010 of the potential creation of additional organisational bureaucracy caused 
by government proposals to transfer NHS purchasing power to GPs, supposedly to save 
costs. Civitas argued that the outcome of this proposal could be counter-productive, 
primarily due to the NHS ‘facing the most difficult financial times in its history (and) now is 
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not the time for ripping up internal structures yet again on scant evidence base”651, with the 
contradictory consequence that such organisational reform has created another structural 
layer in the process, as instigated by the 2012 Health and Social Care Act.  
 
Such arguments appear to fundamentally undermine one of the prime influences 
behind the flagship Health and Social Care Bill’s introduction, and this specific criticism 
ultimately suggests that the new NHS policy approach since 2010 has indeed instigated a 
top-down organisational re-structure despite coalition government promises to the 
contrary, and this has unerringly brought its own distinct layer of associated bureaucracy 
and ‘red-tape’ that will potentially be difficult to eliminate in the long-term. This is further 
evidence to vindicate the Max Weber analysis652 from the early 20th century, a viewpoint 
that argues that society becomes more bureaucratized the more complex and advanced 
that it becomes, regardless of government attempts to stem the bureaucratic tide. This view 
has been concisely summed up, bolstered by the identification of some specific 
contemporary problems, by one political commentator as follows: 
 
‘Taking the development of local empowerment seriously could involve massive 
expenditure to set up the necessary infrastructures, and that may not be possible in 
the aftermath of the world financial crisis’653.  
 
A similar charge has been laid against the free schools agenda within the educational 
sphere, namely that any significant structural re-organization within such a key public 
service always carries with it its own bureaucratic and financial baggage in addition to 
existing structures, with entrenched and existing organisational layers difficult to eliminate 
entirely and new ones often more complex than initially envisaged. Within this context 
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therefore, and despite Conservative pledges to the contrary prior to 2010, it can be argued 
that top-down bureaucracy is very difficult to control and eliminate within a vast and 
complex public service such as the NHS, for the principal reason that the practical running of 
the organisation is heavily influenced by political pressures to ensure adequate service 
delivery, as well as being ‘a taxation-based economic system (which)….. will always to an 
extent have to be managed in a top-down manner’654, and this in turn creates further 
bureaucracy. As the above quote suggests, such pressures on the NHS have been 
exacerbated by the global financial crisis from 2008 onwards, which appears to have put 
further strains on the funding and management of this key public service. 
 
Such explicit aims and influences that focus on the need for greater organisational 
efficiency and improved levels of performance have brought difficult practical implications 
with them, as recent figures have indicated the lowest recorded health satisfaction surveys 
for thirty years655, with a 12% drop in public support between 2010 and 2011. This has 
prompted critics to make a link between the contemporary direction and focus of the NHS 
policy agenda since 2010 and a steadily worsening service that is likely to come under 
further strain due to the impact of the government’s reforms and ongoing austerity agenda. 
Prime Minister Cameron has expressed his awareness of the rising levels of political and 
public opposition and criticism to his NHS reforms and has declared a willingness to “take a 
hit” (at least in the short-term) from the wider public over the issue, adding that the reforms 
were those of a “brave government” and offering reassurance that the NHS was "in the 
party's DNA and that's not going to change"656. Those of a supportive outlook to the 
reforms have argued that after the Health and Social Care Bill formally became law in Spring 
2012, the new policy needs to be given appropriate time to prove its worth and fulfil the 
government’s claims that the reforms will improve the service, particularly in the light of 
significant amendments in the House of Lords to ostensibly enhance the policy proposals 
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and to reflect concerns from the medical profession657. Former Health Secretary and Chair 
of the Health Select Committee Stephen Dorrell subsequently commented on the passing of 
the bill that the government should now be given “opportunity to apply it (the new policy) 
and to demonstrate the value it can create"658. 
 
A further negative dimension relating to the apparent influences behind the 
formulation and implementation of NHS policy since 2010 has been fuelled by claims that 
the Conservative Party is too close to lobbyists and business interests who stand to directly 
benefit in financial terms from the enhanced competition and private investment created by 
such NHS reforms, with media coverage in early 2010 suggesting that ‘Tory MPs in charge of 
health policy had accepted donations from private health-care companies’659. While 
lobbyists seeking to influence public policy is a regular and somewhat inevitable aspect of 
any political system, this particular example has raised critical concerns in relation to a more 
fundamental commercial motive at the heart of Conservative NHS policy formulation, and 
this would appear to undermine the party leadership’s morally-fused compassionate 
rhetoric and its agenda for legitimate structural reform of this important public service 
based on the definitive motive of ensuring its long-term survival as a thriving public service. 
Such developments about policy motives strike at the heart of the Conservative Party’s aims 
for NHS policy since returning to national office in 2010, and whether intellectual or 
philosophical factors are ascendant over more purely political and even commercial policy 
influences.  
 
One further intellectual factor worth considering when assessing the Conservative 
Party’s motives and influences within this area of policy is the relevance of the ‘nudge 
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theory’660, which argues that governments have the ability to influence and shape wider 
social behaviours in a more positive and beneficial direction to suit their overall socio-
political agenda, particularly in seeking to align and mould the long-term mentality of the 
wider population towards its specific policies over a sustained period of time. This theory 
focuses on behavioural traits and social influences across society, and its core emphasis is 
that a government’s consistent and pro-active overall direction, alongside a recurring 
message about acceptable or desirable ‘social norms’661 can produce ‘positive economic and 
social outcomes without resorting to bans or increased regulation’662. This approach has 
been dubbed ‘libertarian paternalism’663, and it is within this context that the government 
has utilised a “Behaviourial Insights Team”664 as part of the 2010 Coalition Agreement to try 
to facilitate such outcomes aligned with its own political agenda, yet without seeking an 
excessively active role for the central state, which is consistent with the broad thrust of the 
Big Society agenda. This team has therefore initially identified certain aspects of public 
health policy in particular that can be influenced and shaped in such a way, notably by 
providing an enhanced and somewhat manipulated ‘choice architecture’ to the wider 
general public in a bid to influence its behaviour and specific lifestyle choices.  
 
Examples of this approach to public policy-making can be seen in initiatives such as 
anti-smoking and healthy eating strategies, principally aimed at altering and moulding the 
public mood and attitudes in line with a central government public health agenda, yet 
without the government appearing too authoritarian or interventionist in the process. 
Within this context, in the sphere of the Cameron-led government’s post-2010 health 
reforms, it is therefore hoped by Conservative political strategists that the public can 
ultimately be ‘nudged’ towards gradually accepting the apparent necessity of more 
devolution and diversified provision within the delivery NHS policy without the need for any 
further excessive interventionist legislation. It has been a matter of fierce political debate as 
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to whether such devolution is a practical means in itself, or whether it is part of the long-
term process of ultimately creating a less statist and quasi-privatised health service. It can 
be argued that such an approach bears some of the hallmarks of the pragmatic reformist 
Conservatism of Edmund Burke665, whose 18th century works accepted the necessity of 
cautious government reform in order to preserve key institutions and allow them to evolve 
in a preferred way, Burke being someone who was ‘optimistic about the ability of parties 
(and politicians) to make things better’666. This outlook firmly rejected revolutionary 
upheaval but instead embraced the need for steady, evolutionary political change initiated 
and controlled by the government.  The Burkean alignment to recent NHS reforms can be 
made on the basis that the service arguably needs to reform and adapt in order to survive, 
and that ‘a sequence of nudges of sufficient strength amounts to a push’, with the 
government’s role in such key reforms based on the over-arching premise of Big Society 
thinkers ‘that interference is in principle a good rather than a necessary evil’667. This 
argument would seek to counter the critical viewpoint that the government’s post-2010 
approach to NHS policy-making is overtly ideological, and it subsequently appears to suggest 
a detachment from the traditions and principles of the New Right in such an acceptance of a 
pro-active role for the state. However, the particular direction for the re-imagined state to 
push the health service towards, or the eventual organisational form that this approach 
envisages has not yet become fully apparent.  
 
The post-2010 government has therefore sought to create a choice-based 
framework for socio-economic activity in key social policy areas such as the NHS, but in 
order to achieve this desired goal it has also embraced an approach that includes a notable 
role for government in seeking to ‘steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their 
lives’668, yet without being excessively overbearing. This is particularly prevalent in the 
sphere of contemporary healthcare policy and the way that the NHS is organised and run on 
a practical basis. Given that government health reforms from 2010 contain individualistic 
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and neo-liberal choice-based elements that are controversial and provocative from the 
perspective of some prominent opinions within the established medical profession, the 
political classes and the media, the government is conscious of not provoking any further 
unnecessary opposition, particularly given its vulnerable parliamentary position within the 
context of coalition government. It has therefore approached this policy-making dynamic 
with some caution; establishing a House of Lords Committee to look into the nature of 
‘nudge’-originated policy in 2011669, and this specific approach of governance has therefore 
adopted a libertarian ethos in its core message, seeking to limit the need for extra 
legislation and excessive government intervention to achieve its desired outcome, as the 
strategy of changing people’s attitudes ‘cost(s) little or nothing….. impos(ing) no burden on 
taxpayers at all’670.  Therefore while the nature of the post-2010 NHS reforms may endure 
some short-term hostility, in practical terms this government emphasis on addressing and 
analysing wider social behaviour seeks to ‘nudge’ popular culture and the mood of broader 
society in a specific long-term direction in order to bolster the socio-political outcome that 
the government wants, namely a more streamlined, marketised and autonomous policy 
vision for the health service. This approach ultimately aspires to erode the structural 
constraints and social obstacles attached to the health service that have in the immediate 
term limited the scope of such reforms, and it therefore seeks to achieve this without 
resorting to interventionist, coercive or expensive government activity to do so. However it 
remains to be seen as to whether this approach will eventually create a scenario that will 
result in the type of service structure that the post-2010 government desires, as well as 
increasing the levels of popular support for such reforms and their associated outcomes. 
This long-term approach therefore seeks to ultimately persuade people that the reforms to 
the NHS are effective and necessary measures on both a practical and financial level in the 
long-term, and in doing so aim to suppress the high degree of initial opposition and 
controversy that such proposals have generated in the short-term at least. 
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The influences and aims that have driven the Conservative-led government’s reforms 
of the NHS after 2010 are therefore varied and multi-dimensional, with competition and 
tensions evident between the significance of vigorous ideological factors, the pressures of 
cost and economic factors as well as the pragmatic statecraft and cautious and gradual 
‘Burkean’ reform, all of which have been at the heart of how this social policy has evolved. 
The party has also faced institutional and structural limits within the NHS organisation itself 
in pursuing its specific policy agenda while in government, alongside commercially-driven 
external lobbying and the recurring New Right desire of reducing and removing statist and 
managerial bureaucracy and instilling greater choice within a monolithic state service, which 
has lingered on from the 1980s and has again been evident since 2010. The more radical 
elements of the New Right legacy have not been wholly rejected, but they have been 
tempered by the party’s strategic desire and electoral need to both emphasise its 
compassionate credentials and appease its coalition partners in such social policy matters. 
Such various influences and factors has led to the 21st century Conservative Party making 
explicit and somewhat unprecedented pledges in government to protect and maintain 
investment in the NHS, and this has alienated many within the party’s New Right tradition in 
the process. However in a somewhat quixotic manner that indicates a lack of clear and 
coherent short-term political direction on this social policy issue, the Conservative-led 
government has also sought to use the powers of the state to simultaneously and 
progressively ‘nudge’ public opinion towards accepting a more marketised, diversified and 
devolved organisational structure as a price for securing the long-term future of the NHS in 
some form or other. Within this process of organisational and institutional reform there has 
been some considerable debate as to whether the post-2010 coalition government is 
genuinely committed to devolved decision-making within the NHS or whether it will revert 
to the tendency of many governments of imposing policy from the centre in order to meet 
its key political aims, while also seeking to reduce overall costs in line with the austerity 
agenda. Again, like educational policy, there have been clear movements and gestures 
towards a changed social policy in this specific sphere, but it is open to conjecture as to 
whether the Conservative-led government’s overall approach to NHS policy and its desire to 
radically transform the nature of service delivery will eventually emerge from the shackles 
of austerity into the formation of a clearer and more streamlined, de-centralised and 
rationed version of the current organisational model, which can deliver in a functional and 
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practical sense. This challenging task is further complicated by the desire of Conservative 
modernisers to seek to maintain an adherence to an enabling, co-ordinating yet not 
hegemonic state structure, while simultaneously embracing an ethos and framework within 
the NHS that promotes the communitarian tendencies of the Big Society’s broad socio-
political agenda.  
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Diagram One- Previous NHS Structure (pre-2010), Adapted from source:  
http://offlinehbpl.hbpl.co.uk/NewsAttachments/PG/Previous%20NHS%20structure.pdf, GP Online, 5th July 2011, ‘How clinical commissioning groups will work’, 
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Diagram Two- (David Cameron’s New NHS Bureaucracy after 2010): 
Adapted from source: http://offlinehbpl.hbpl.co.uk/NewsAttachments/PG/new%20NHS%20bureaucracy.pdf, GP Online, 5th July 2011, ‘How clinical commissioning 
groups will work’, 
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Conclusion- The nature and evolution of Modern Conservative social policy 
 
The focus on De-Bureaucratization and ‘Progress’ 
 
This thesis has ultimately aimed to identify and address the extent of change that has been 
evident in the shaping and formulation of Conservative Party social policy since the party 
emphatically lost national office in 1997. Having assessed a range of theoretical, ideological 
and practical social policy developments over recent years, a concluding overview needs to 
be reached in order to bring the various factors and components identified together.  In 
seeking to develop a clear and coherent concluding position within the overall thesis, it 
needs to be explicitly observed and acknowledged that a new generation of 21st century 
Conservative politicians and theorists have been at the forefront of seeking to reform and 
modernise the party’s social policy agenda since the late 1990s, and on a basic level this 
indicates a degree of change. In doing so they have faced internal political opposition and 
wider public and media scepticism, but they have persisted in determinedly pursuing this 
socio-political strategy that has actively sought to promote the ultimate and pivotal aim of 
innovating and developing the party’s image and stance in relation to the intricacies of a 
range of welfare policy spheres such as Education, the NHS and broader public service 
delivery and reform. In adopting such an approach they have sought to reflect the changing 
nature of British society by engaging with such new socio-political moods and attitudes by 
embracing new and diverse means of service delivery, with particular emphasis on private, 
community and charitable sectors that are detached from the centralised state. They have 
therefore aspired to instil such associated policy initiatives with a specific localist and 
grassroots angle, ensuring that they are located within an overarching model of governance 
that is aligned with the broad theme of a de-bureaucratized ‘leaner state’671.  
 
As a practical consequence of such an approach, this has suggested that public 
services and social policy that have been traditionally provided by central government could 
be fragmented, outsourced or sub-contracted to potentially more efficient and devolved 
bodies, ostensibly empowering individual citizens and local communities in the process. 
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While this approach has echoes of the New Right’s neo-liberal agenda for public service 
provision during the 1980s, an expressed and re-emphasised desire of the post-2010 
coalition government has apparently been to achieve the reinvigoration of a decentralised 
model of the state that is not about dismantling institutions on purely ideological grounds, 
but which instead seeks to focus on practicality while maintaining a compassionate tone and 
to devise a pro-active, strategic and co-coordinating role for a more limited and re-
constituted state structure. Within this context, the more durable and flexible components 
of the state can continue to function effectively and more efficiently in practical terms, 
albeit within a more streamlined model of service delivery. This approach has in turn sought 
to encourage the emergence of a revived and revitalised civil society that has been 
identified as the key mechanism for the empowerment of individuals and communities, and 
which seeks to generate growing levels of social action emanating from ‘civic institutions 
and forms of collective activity that are not state activity’672, and in the process evolve from 
and genuinely transcend the post-1945 model of centralised, bureaucratic universalism.  
 
This approach to re-moulding governance and related best practices has manifested 
itself in practical terms under the auspices of the so-called ‘Big Society’, a symbolic policy in 
itself that has reflected a concerted and focused agenda to generate enhanced innovation 
and ‘progressive’ new thought into the provision of social policy via a diverse range of 
providers from across the public, private and third sectors, with such an ambivalent term as 
‘progress’ reflecting an optimistic approach that ‘things could get better, problems were not 
intractable and things weren't just inevitably getting worse’673. The aspirations for such a 
socio-political agenda are succinctly contained within two key documents produced by the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition-namely the White Paper ‘Open Public Services’674 
(July 2011), alongside the 2011 Localism Act675- both of which focus on choice and control, 
decentralisation, diversity, fairness and accountability; a range of vocabulary that 
symbolises a collective dynamic to promote the mantra of ‘collaboration and diversity in the 
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provision of public services’676.  Within the wider context of rising financial costs within the 
provision of welfare and social policy, both documents appear to form the bedrock of the 
government’s ongoing programme of public service reform for the remainder of its 
proposed term of office up to 2015, although how successful such ‘progressive social 
conservatism’ has actually been in social, economic and political terms has been open to 
some scepticism and criticism as the coalition government has evolved677. In particular, 
evidence has emerged from the fairly radical reforms since 2010 to key public services such 
as the educational system and the NHS, that attempts to ‘de-bureaucratize’ these key areas 
of social policy have failed to liberate public service provision from the tentacles of state 
control and have actually created additional layers of bureaucracy in the process.  
 
The state vs. voluntarism as a vehicle for social justice 
 
Alongside the unerring drive towards achieving improved levels of economic efficiency, 
progressive innovation and streamlined bureaucratic performance within the government’s 
delivery of key social policies, the need to achieve outcomes perceived to be positive and 
constructive such as the pursuit of a fairer society or the achievement of greater social 
justice have also been prominent aspects within the contemporary social policy debate. This 
has been particularly so in the post-Thatcher political climate from the early 1990s onwards, 
given the criticism that the divisions between rich and poor grew considerably during this 
particular period under governments of both major parties, continuing a socially divisive 
trend that began during the 1980s. However, the means and methods of achieving such 
‘socially just’ ends have been the subject of significant political conjecture, with the 
competing yet overlapping roles of the state, the voluntary sector and the private sector all 
active components of the contemporary policy debate. Indeed, the need to strike an 
appropriate balance between their key functions and interests appears to be an integral 
feature to this specific political dialogue. Although such key terms and concepts associated 
with social justice have been broadly associated with the left of the political spectrum and 
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were exploited by New Labour to its political advantage from the mid-1990s onwards, 
mainstream British Conservatism has attempted to re-invent and de-toxify its image in the 
early years of the 21st century, and many pragmatic right-of-centre politicians and think-
tanks have sought to adapt to and re-mould the tone of this more leftist vocabulary, seeking 
to develop their own version of social justice and initiating innovative and electorally 
attractive policy responses in the process. Despite a historical Conservative acceptance of 
the reality of socio-economic inequality there has been instilled an appropriate fusion of 
influences into this modern Conservative social policy agenda, and this has exposed some 
key factors behind the formulation of such policies, on the one hand acknowledging the 
influence of the vigorous ideology of the ‘New Right’ and its more radical critique and 
proposed reforms of the bureaucratic state, yet also accepting the reality of the impact of 
thirteen years of New Labour rule and its steady, yet allegedly inefficient, investment into 
key public services nestled within local communities. Given this latter legacy, the 
Conservative modernisers have accepted this development and cautiously embraced some 
functional aspects of existing public policy provision, while also seeking to steadily ‘nudge’ 
public opinion in a slightly different and more ‘conservative’ direction, in an approach that is 
aligned with gradual ‘Burkean’ tendencies, and which has sought to maintain aspects of the 
existing state and its ‘organic’ nature, as well as its associated community values where both 
practical and appropriate.  
 
The former neo-liberal influence has led some academic commentators to make links 
between the Thatcher agenda of the 1980s and the Cameron programme since 2010 in 
relation to ostensibly shared attitudes towards key public services traditionally provided by 
the state. This viewpoint suggests that despite their contrasting rhetoric in relation to key 
terms such as ‘society’ and ‘community’, both the Thatcher administration and the post-
2010 Conservative-led coalition are ‘founded on the same neo-liberal antagonism towards 
the public sector which is seen as crowding out the private sector’678, and both 
administrations can be viewed as being broadly hostile to ‘the state’.  However the Burkean 
tradition could be said to  retain some influence over post-2010 social policy direction, 
accepting the need to maintain and preserve the existence of key public institutions and 
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services which have the necessary capacity, utility and flexibility to be able to function 
within a more limited and peripheral role for the state. This approach retains a key streak of 
Conservative pragmatism and adherence to tradition, adhering to the view that British 
society and its overall political structure is an evolutionary and organic entity which 
therefore seeks to maintain and conserve the best aspects of the existing socio-political 
order while continuing to develop and improve in terms of its functionality, efficiency and 
value-for-money. This has been evident in the context of contemporary Conservative 
attempts to adopt a renewed and high-profile enthusiasm for delivering quality public 
services in a more original and decentralised manner, an approach that symbolises the focus 
of modern Conservatism that seeks to emphasise and align with the perceived 
communitarian and associated altruistic values of wider 21st century society. In therefore 
seeking to utilise and adapt traditional and viable public institutions, such a socio-political 
approach has ultimately sought to utilise the energy of charitable activity, the vibrancy of 
voluntarism alongside more emphasis on the commercial values of private sector providers 
in preference to monolithic state power where possible, and has been summarised by a 
contemporary Cabinet Minister as follows: 
 
‘Conservatives believe that voluntarism is a good thing, and sometimes the state can 
be an obstacle to effective voluntarism, but at other times such voluntary 
organisations need support from the state. Your value system has to be that 
voluntary support comes first’679.  
 
Such concerted and spirited recent attempts to specifically revive the values of voluntarism 
and its functionality, alongside more diverse private service providers as a complementary 
and alternative source of public service provision to the formerly hegemonic and centralised 
state, has therefore been central to attempts to create a ‘re-imagined’ or revised role for 
the post-war state within this more devolved approach to social policy. However it remains 
a subject of some conjecture as to whether social entrepreneurs along with smaller, 
voluntarist and localised bodies can realistically and effectively compete with the financial 
might of established multi-national private bodies and existing public agencies in the supply 
and provision of quality public services while maintaining adequate value for money for the 
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taxpayer, as such larger providers may often ‘provide the cheapest option….. and this may 
drive out smaller providers who are more local and accountable’680. This suggests that what 
is being proposed in terms of more diverse public service provision does not equate to a 
level playing field, and such practical issues do offer potential obstacles to this policy 
approach, yet it ultimately still appears to be the case that the gut instinct of mainstream 
British Conservatism continues to be sceptical of the role of the state, and therefore rejects 
the likelihood or practicability of achieving greater state-induced levels of equality and 
conventional interpretations of ‘statist’ social justice as a feasible aspiration for modern 
society. This indicates ongoing tensions within Conservative social policy-making, and it 
perhaps reflects an inherent dilemma of contemporary British Conservatism of the need to 
find a more viable and dynamic role for the state alongside other viable components of 
public service delivery. The party seems to retain a scepticism towards pre-determined and 
rationalist outcomes moulded by statist influences, based on the fundamental premise that 
an enhanced degree of social autonomy and more variable individual responsibility is always 
a better alternative to the overbearing power and ‘meddling’ of the state, which can be 
viewed from this perspective as creating greater levels of dependency, bureaucracy and 
state influenced social ‘injustice’ across society, while being ‘highly centralised and 
paternalistic….. intrusive (and) pervasive’681.   
 
This position can again be linked to the writings of Edmund Burke, who in analysing 
the tumultuous French Revolution from a conservative angle in the late 18th century, praised 
the value of a multitude of devolved ‘little platoons’682 of social activity, as opposed to a 
‘monolithic, top-down, repressive society’683 that he believed the post-revolutionary French 
state had developed into. According to a right-of-centre libertarian perspective therefore, 
the state’s role has the capacity to evolve negatively into a corrosive social influence over 
time, which in its  centralising tendencies ‘not only destroys the sense of community spirit 
and individual initiative, but also destroys the very possibility of their revival’684. In 
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embracing this theory of ‘little platoons’ of localised activity that are valued for providing 
the ‘bottom-up’ dynamism to generate society and communitarianism, the state was 
viewed as a negative influence that was expected to ‘retreat to the role of regulator instead 
of being a direct provider of services’685.  In many contemporary western societies such a 
scenario has not happened, to the chagrin and frustration of many Conservatives. However, 
notable contemporary books such as the Spirit Level686 have challenged this pessimism and 
scepticism of the state’s effectiveness, developing the alternative argument that a more 
egalitarian society is both achievable and indeed a more desirable aspiration via an active 
and interventionist state that is co-ordinated at a more central than localised level.  
However such a rationalistic and deterministic outlook continues to be at odds with 
traditional Conservative opposition to centralised planning alongside abstract ideals and 
associated imposed outcomes.   
 
Social Conservatism under David Cameron: A fusion of Autonomous Localism, 
Communitarianism and Fiscal Retrenchment 
 
The rhetoric and emphasis of the Cameron leadership since its emergence at the end of 
2005 has ultimately marked a departure from the sharp and explicit economic edge of 
Thatcherism, acknowledging the importance of a communitarian focus and the need for a 
revitalised civil society that had arguably been neglected by Thatcherism and suffocated by 
New Labour. This new Conservative viewpoint accepted the requirement for an element of 
regulatory pro-activity by the state, yet at the same time aspiring towards a more financially 
efficient, devolved and localised level of public service delivery. There is subsequently 
evidence of some flexibility and distinctive approaches within modern Conservatism, which 
does appear to distinguish its message and overall approach in relation to the delivery of 
key social policies within the context of the party’s Thatcherite legacy. In attaching the 
concepts of localism, autonomy and community to the agenda of modern social 
Conservatism, this revised viewpoint does appear to acknowledge a constructive and 
positive function for the state within a more streamlined model of government in the 21st 
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century. However in their adamant rejection of the model of a hegemonic state as sole 
provider of public services (as has existed for most of the post-war era), advocates of New 
Conservatism who wish to instil the doctrine with a more compassionate and moral tone 
argue that it is essential for people to fundamentally review and revise their relationship 
with the state in order for both themselves and the machinery of government to work at 
their most efficient and productive level, and which will lead to the emergence of a: 
 
‘connected society….. (a society) that was organised horizontally, not vertically, so as 
to place these intermediate institutions at its heart687. 
 
This specific aspect provides the policy agenda with a more radical edge, but again it 
is questionable as to how such a localist and ‘connected’ society will emerge in practical 
terms, particularly given the drive towards austerity and the lack of supporting public funds 
since 2010. Such difficulties of practical realisation have led to frustration within the inner 
circle of Cameron’s Conservatives at the failure of this policy agenda to fully launch, with 
prominent advocates such as Steve Hilton688 and Baron Wei689 departing from the political 
frontline within a year of each other due to their apparent frustrations with the various 
bureaucratic and institutional obstacles that this policy agenda has faced.  Nevertheless, the 
inherent desire for a more horizontal model of society in relation to the state is an 
interesting one, and in philosophical and theoretical terms at least this view as recently 
espoused by Norman and Ganesh represents a socio-political approach that envisages the 
natural linkage of people ‘horizontally’ alongside each other in society, communally bonded 
by the key institutions of a more voluntarist model of civil society rather than looking 
upwards towards an invasive and overwhelming interventionist and ultra-prescriptive state. 
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This vision ultimately involves the creation of semi-autonomous bodies such as Free Schools 
and devolved sectors within the NHS, which are essentially: 
 
‘autonomous institutions governing themselves but publicly funded, providing their 
own identity as a hospital or school but not be seen as the arm of a local authority or 
a district health authority’.690  
 
The new variant of social Conservatism of the Cameron era argues that such bodies will seek 
to ensure enhanced value for money and guarantee the necessary financial savings while 
maintaining an adequate public service provision. There does however appear to be some 
practical dangers in aspiring to achieve such a radical reorientation and re-alignment of 
society’s basic structure and the subsequent delivery of key social policies, namely that if 
this fairly ambitious experiment towards greater autonomy and a revived civil society fails to 
overcome existing structures and an austerity agenda, it could result in newly-devolved 
public services such as free schools and a less bureaucratic NHS failing in their delivery and 
practical implementation, and the government may then ironically end up even more reliant 
on the centralised state’s utility. This may result in it ultimately having to ‘fall back on the 
more authoritarian policies of its predecessors’691 being forced to impose less flexible 
variants of social policy from the centre again, with further expense generated in the 
process.  
 
The likelihood of such policy failures has been heightened and exacerbated by the 
austerity agenda and fiscal restraints imposed by the coalition government since 2010, and 
some former supporters turned critics of the coalition’s agenda in this social policy sphere 
(such as Philip Blond), have implied that such failings are already evident as of late 2012. 
This viewpoint claims that Cameron’s grand social project has already met with failure in its 
social impact, and it accuses the Conservative Leader of baulking at the prospect of genuine 
social policy reform and instead appearing to endorse a programme fuelled by 
retrenchment rather than social radicalism, which in the process has re-toxified the party 
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brand692 rather than re-invigorating it.  In a purely practical sense therefore, this new 
Conservative social policy agenda has therefore represented a major political gamble in its 
attempts to re-define the role of the state and public service provision while at the same 
time seeking to revise and re-brand the party’s formerly tarnished image in this particular 
policy area. Within such an apparently fluid and flexible contemporary approach it could be 
argued that Cameron’s various social policy initiatives, shaped in the wake of three 
successive electoral defeats and focusing on greater mutualism, co-operation and devolved 
social action, could be seen in political terms as a risk-laden yet genuine attempt to achieve 
a renewed and more efficient balance between the state and the individual in modern 
British society, and in this sense seek to ‘develop public policies that recognise, protect and 
enhance our connected society, and that enrich the cultural conversation within it’693. While 
this approach therefore seeks to both reject ‘big government’ while also retain some 
aspects of the moral and individualistic imperatives of the New Right socio-economic 
agenda of the 1980s, it does at least accept and acknowledge the need for a co-ordinating 
role for the state in initiating the delivery of social policies that aspire to achieve improved 
and more individualistic variants of social justice, an enhanced culture of citizenship and 
greater opportunities to increase social mobility. This civil and cultural emphasis, alongside 
the promotion of a more diverse, radical and innovative range of public-private methods for 
policy delivery, suggests a degree of detachment from the more wholly marketised focus of 
the New Right during the 1980s, although not a complete abandonment of this approach 
due to the persistent attachment to the neo-liberal notion of a more autonomous and 
diversified public service provision.  
 
In embracing and addressing this contemporary socio-political challenge therefore, 
the Cameron leadership has appeared to influence the development of a further variation 
on Conservative typologies and subsequently contributed to ‘the complex ideological 
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configurations within contemporary British conservatism’694, although whether his specific 
form of Conservatism is a genuinely new variant is open to debate.  In rhetorical terms at 
least, he appears to have rejected calls from the right of his party for a more explicit 
embrace of neo-liberal economics and deregulation, and in rejecting this position and 
acknowledging and ‘rediscovering’695 the significance of ‘society’ as a specific alternative to 
the state, he has embraced a softer and more compassionate tone. From this approach has 
stemmed the notion of a ‘re-imagined state’, and this particular stance appears to align with 
the more communitarian and socially-focused ‘Red Tory’ agenda of Phillip Blond. In wholly 
electoral terms Cameron and the Conservative ‘modernisers’ have therefore acknowledged 
the importance of ‘crossing a political boundary’ in relation to previously negative images of 
the Conservative Party in office, resulting in the determined pursuit of a revived brand of 
Conservatism that is associated with a more compassionate and communitarian image696, 
and which also accepts the need for a distinct yet limited role for a re-modelled state in 
order to secure for the party a broader ‘appeal across the political spectrum’697.  
 
However in practical terms, such compassionate and communitarian rhetoric is 
coupled with an agenda of fiscal austerity since taking office in May 2010, and this has 
proved to be a major stumbling block in turning such aspirational socially-focused rhetoric 
into political reality. This is because it is arguably the case that if the Big Society agenda is to 
work and function broadly how Cameron and his allies envisage, it requires sufficient public 
funds to support and achieve its aims (at least in the short-term), and these have not been 
forthcoming.  Indeed, such has been the scale of retrenchment since 2010 that a consensus 
is growing that the scale of cuts is much greater than the 1980s, with the post-2010 
government presiding over ‘the biggest cuts in public expenditure since the 1920s’698. In the 
context of this agenda of financial cutbacks therefore, this lack of investment to stimulate 
                                                          
694
 Heppell, T. and Hill, M., ‘Ideological Typologies of Contemporary British Conservatism’, Political Studies 
Review, Vol. 3, p.335, (2005).   
695
 See M.Glasman, ‘Society not state: the challenge of the Big Society’, Public Policy Research (June-August 
2010), p.61 
696
 Allegra Stratton, ‘David Cameron: Tory Party is “modern and compassionate”’, The Guardian, 2
nd
 October 
2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/oct/02/cameron-tory-party-modern-compassionate 
697
 Alan Ware, ‘The Big Society and Conservative Politics’, cited in Jason Edwards (ed). Retrieving the Big 
Society, (Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2012), p.87 
698
 Steve Corbett and Alan Walker, ‘The Big Society: Back to the Future’, The Political Quarterly, Volume 3, 
Issue 3, (July-September 2012), p.490 
  244  
 
the desired grassroots activity has undermined Cameron’s promise of a revised and 
reinvigorated social Conservatism working in harmony alongside a more diverse, devolved 
and flexible range of public service providers. Indeed, some alarmist warnings from the 
frontline of local government have warned that such a culture of financial austerity runs the 
risk of instigating the collapse of civil society699 that the Cameron leadership has placed so 
much emphasis on revitalising since the end of 2005. The austerity agenda has therefore 
ensured that the vision of a flourishing ‘Big Society’ emerging to replace a creaking 
centralised state has been subject to significant questioning and scepticism in terms of 
practical delivery in the months and years that have followed.  
 
It is within this overall context that at a fundamental level, the Conservative Party’s 
approach to such policy matters since 1997 has featured a fusion of pressures that have 
culminated in a ‘debate between modernisers and traditionalists on social issues (that) has 
also become inextricably intertwined with the wider question of how the party should seek 
to revive its electoral fortunes’700. While the rhetorical focus and emphasis on social issues 
has certainly become more ascendant and appears to have developed and evolved in a 
more distinctively communitarian manner since the last period of Conservative government 
in the 1980s and 90s, challenging financial realities have often meant that such well-
meaning rhetorical sentiments have been crushed by the realities of everyday politics and 
have failed to deliver in practical policy terms.  Such practical financial aspects have 
certainly hindered the promotion of The Big Society agenda since 2010, and this has meant 
that aligning fiscal conservatism to the delivery of enhanced social justice has proved to be 
an extremely challenging scenario for Conservative modernisers. According to one academic 
observation, this agenda is therefore one which will struggle to deliver such socially just 
outcomes, on the basis that it is primarily ideologically-driven by a: 
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‘neo-liberal economic agenda which prioritises cuts in public expenditure and, 
therefore, fails to deliver even the minimum resources necessary to transform 
rhetoric into reality’701.  
 
This in turn raises the ultimate question as to whether the pivotal factor in shaping 
revamped and re-branded social Conservatism in the 21st century is in fact a renewed sense 
of ideological vigour that has been subtly promoted and which has sought to achieve a 
revised clarity and focus on social policy matters, and which has in turn generated a distinct, 
original and re-marketised style of political language. Also evident has been the unerring 
presence of flexible and pragmatic Conservative manoeuvring and measured calculation in 
its reaction to changing socio-economic circumstances since the 2008 recession, and these 
are developments that have that favoured the party’s fiscal conservative instincts, and 
which once again illustrate the party’s atavistic pursuit of political power and desire for 
enhanced levels of electoral popularity in order to pursue an agenda that remains aligned 
with a post-1979 ideological emphasis  and which has been heavily shaped by neo-liberal 
influences. According to Phillip Blond, who since 2010 appears to have lost faith in 
Cameron’s ability to deliver The Big Society agenda within a more devolved governmental 
structure attached to a ‘fairer’ and ‘progressive’ social model, the Cameron leadership is 
said to be ‘surrounded by pragmatists who constantly behave as if short-term electoral 
advantage is long-term strategic thinking’702. This would suggest a lack of an overarching 
vision to the party’s social policy agenda, and in turn suggesting a cosmetic and artificial 
element to the party’s revised ‘compassionate’ image and which has undermined its desire 
to attract a broader range of socio-poliical support. Difficulties in this sphere appeared to be 
evident in late 2012 when George Osborne recruited to his staff Neil O’Brien of the think-
tank Policy Exchange, who has ‘warned that the party is still seen as the champion of the 
rich’703, an indicator that the de-toxfication strategy  has not been an absolute success.  
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Overview: The Impact of Coalition with the Liberal Democrats on Conservative social 
policy 
 
As has been suggested at various points within the thesis, the fact that the Conservatives 
have governed since 2010 at the head of a formal coalition arrangement with the Liberal 
Democrats would appear to be a significant factor in how government policy has practically 
evolved in general. There has indeed been much speculation within media and political 
circles as to what extent social and economic policy would have differed if the Conservatives 
had governed alone and whether the general thrust and direction of the government’s 
policy agenda would have been different if there had been a majority Conservative 
government. While some modernising and moderate Conservatives appear to have 
welcomed the coalition as a means of pursuing a more moderate socio-political course with 
‘the position of the right wing of the Conservative Party….. notably weakened’704, others 
from the party’s traditional right-wing factions have become frustrated by the party’s post-
2010 blurred identity. However a number of commentators and observers have argued that 
the key reason for this electoral outcome was that the party had failed to sufficiently 
modernise and ‘de-toxify’ its policy agenda and image up to this point: 
 
‘because the modernisation process was stalled when it was – at best – half-
complete, the voters were still unsure about the Tories on May 6, 2010’705. 
 
In this sense, the coalition with the Liberal Democrats can be seen as the catalyst for the 
final thrust of attempted modernisation and detoxification within the contemporary 
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Conservative Party, based on the principal premise (accepted by pragmatic Conservatives) 
that: 
 
‘Mr Cameron may have tried hard to change his party during the previous five years, 
but it seems that it still left many voters less then impressed’706. 
 
 On this basis the Conservatives have rhetorically at least, embraced a more ‘liberal’ 
line on various such social policy issues covering both public service and lifestyle, ranging 
from enhanced investment in the NHS, supporting same-sex marriage and promoting the 
pupil premium in educational policy, prompting the Liberal Democrat leadership to accept 
during coalition negotiations that ‘we could agree sensible positions with the Conservatives 
on most issues’707. The coalition agreement could therefore be viewed from one perspective 
as a direct and natural consequence of the Conservative Party’s failure to sufficiently change 
its image and win both a parliamentary majority and a more convincing proportion of the 
national vote, despite somewhat paradoxically having adopted a clearly more ‘liberal’ and 
compassionate tone, with David Cameron regularly referring to himself as a ‘liberal’ 
Conservative708. Such factors will however have further accelerated the likelihood of a 
constructive and viable governmental arrangement with the Liberal Democrats, and this 
thesis has subsequently offered significant evidence that although the Conservatives are 
clearly the majority players within the post-2010 coalition and have sought and succeeded 
to instigate the agenda on many policy fronts, the outcome and product of certain aspects 
of social policy in particular has appeared to be modified and amended due to intervention 
from the junior coalition partners. In terms of economic policy many within the ‘Orange 
Book’ Liberal Democrat faction and across the wider party have adapted to support the 
fundamental agenda of tackling the legacy of New Labour’s ‘big government’ and 
subsequent programme of ‘deficit reduction’, and from this perspective they have also been 
willing to embrace some aspects of welfare reform since 2010.  
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However in some key aspects of social policy reform they appear to have been less 
convinced or willing to do so, and this has notably been evident in the dilution of some of 
the more libertarian aspects of the free schools programme709 and the scale of the re-
organization of the NHS. While in theory both sides appear to share common ground in 
terms of ‘localism’ and devolution of services, many from the social democrat tradition of 
the Liberal Democrats have seemed to preferred to retain a more ‘statist’ and explicitly 
regulatory emphasis in relation to areas of core social policy provision, principally for fear of 
creating a potential ‘postcode lottery’ in the process, and claiming that ‘the problem with 
localism is that the government is applying localist principles to issues in which there are also 
universal rights’710, which thus potentially erodes such rights and levels of public services as 
a consequence. This has been a broader criticism of the overall Big Society socio-political 
agenda since 2010.  
 
It could therefore be argued that the Conservative social policy agenda has been 
blunted as a result, which some of the party’s politicians appear to have welcomed while 
others have not, and such developments and apparent dilution may explain comments 
made during the coalition’s negotiations that ‘Nick (Clegg) was doubtful about Conservative 
social policies’711. However as the coalition has persisted beyond the halfway point of the 
scheduled five year Parliament, some grassroots elements of the Liberal Democrat Party 
have suggested in pragmatic terms that there remain ongoing areas of compatibility and 
dynamic policy movement between the parties in key areas of social policy, evident in 
comments from party activists such as: 
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‘I don’t have a problem if the profit is ploughed back into the school like a social 
business….. (and) if we are liberals and believe in diversity, we ought to be supporting 
a range of schools’712. 
 
Whether further ‘fusion’ on such key social policy matters continues to significantly 
develop and filters back up the national party leadership to impact on coalition policy 
remains to be seen, but there do appear to be some areas of common socio-political ground 
that have been established between the coalition partners, notably in relation to a less 
centralised concept of the state that rejects the perceived micro-management of the 
previous Labour government, and which in social policy terms has entailed a combined 
focus on localism and a ‘common shared instinct which is about giving people the chance to 
not be told every minute of every day what needs to happen’713. This shared rejection of a 
‘one-size-fits all’ range of social policies imposed from a bureaucratic and centralised state 
indicates a sense of common ground and would suggest the potential for an evolved and 
more pragmatic approach to social policy for a Conservative-led government, appearing to 
transcend the more prescriptive and ideological aspects of the ‘strong state’ evident during 
the Thatcher period of government during the 1980s, and towards a more liberal socio-
political agenda in the process.  
 
Social policy has therefore certainly seemed to take on a distinct and perhaps more 
libertarian shape and flavour as a result of the existence of a coalition government, and 
within this context a significant range of Conservative politicians714 and political 
commentators have viewed such a development in a negative sense and have repeatedly 
called for an ending of the coalition and for a minority Conservative administration to be 
established as an alternative basis for governance, although this does not make the passage 
of ‘purer’ Conservative policy any more likely in practical terms. Such demands have 
stemmed from a belief that it was a specific lack of traditional ‘Conservatism’ that cost the 
party the necessary votes to secure a clear parliamentary majority at the 2010 general 
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election, leading to a growing frustration within some Conservative circles at what they 
perceive to be the lack of a clear ideological direction at the heart of government after 
2010, too much policy compromise with the coalition partners and the erosion of the vitality 
and vigour of their party’s specific socio-political agenda in the process. It has therefore 
been acknowledged that the Liberal Democrats have effectively shaped the nature of 
government policy-making in various ways715 that many Conservatives disagree with, 
although in some high-profile social policy areas such as tuition fees and welfare benefits 
reform it has not been so apparent that they have diverted the Conservatives off their 
original course. On this basis it therefore appears to be the case that common ground has 
existed between the coalition partners in social policy matters, and that the Liberal 
Democrats have shaped this broad sphere of policy in some ways after 2010, although the 
precise extent of this influence has been a matter of significant political debate and has 
been variable from issue to issue.  
 
Concluding Overview: New and changed Conservatism? 
 
Given such ongoing problems with perceptions about the Conservative Party’s image and 
inherent socio-political agenda, it appears that since returning to national office in 2010 
modern Conservatism has offered the rhetoric of change with regard to its social policy 
agenda, but has so far failed to convince the broader media and public opinion about the 
precise nature of such change, as well as the nature of its broad political direction, 
contemporary identity and specific values. By engaging in a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats due to the vagaries of electoral fortune, the party has subsequently displayed 
statecraft-fuelled motives to achieve and maintain political office, while also provided some 
suggestion of the emergence of its own more ‘liberal’ values due to its new rhetorical 
emphasis and the very nature of its specific coalition partner. However whether such liberal 
influences have genuinely prevailed to shape a fundamental long-term change in social 
policy-making is a matter of some conjecture. In the period that has followed the coalition’s 
formation, the Conservative-led government has appeared to make some gestures towards 
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a more explicitly ideological and more focused emphasis in economic policy at least, 
motivated by a clear desire to tackle the national deficit alongside the need to restore its 
former reputation for financial prudence and fiscal conservatism that was damaged during 
the 1990s. In the context of addressing the national deficit, such an approach to economics 
may indeed produce enhanced electoral appeal in the long-term within some parts of the 
electorate, but whether it is alone sufficient to secure outright electoral success is a matter 
for debate, particularly given that such an austerity-driven economic approach has 
antagonised and provoked heightened opposition within the centre-left.  In social policy 
terms the approach has diverged in a less focused and more ambivalent direction in 
practical terms at least, and can therefore be described as gradual, hazy and cautious in 
nature, at times seeking to ‘nudge’ public opinion in a preferred general direction that seeks 
wider approval for a more diverse dynamic within public service delivery, yet without 
necessarily delivering a definite vision and fundamental ‘modernization’ of the party’s 
identity and image within this sphere. The liberal rhetoric and communitarian focus of the 
Cameron leadership has therefore not always delivered in practical terms, primarily due to 
the imposition of financial austerity, as mentioned in earlier parts of this conclusion. 
However its focus, albeit a vague one, on utopian visions of a much-vaunted ’Big Society’ 
within a somewhat teleocratic and determinist outlook, has made its approach and agenda 
somewhat distinct from other modern periods of Conservative governance in terms of social 
policy-making.  
 
Since 2010, there has certainly been evidence of compromise and retreat from 
original proposals in some areas of social policy, inflicted by a combination of ideological 
uncertainty, public criticism and Liberal Democrat scepticism, although some radical tenets 
have been maintained due to the determination of politicians such as Education Secretary 
Michael Gove in particular, whose free schools agenda appears to have taken on the 
dynamism and ethos of a ‘permanent revolution’ according to some observers716, and which 
he has continued to promote in a more radical guise in the run up to the 2015 general 
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election717. Indeed the need to extensively revolutionize and restructure social policy has 
been demanded by the more radical thinkers, reformist groups and commentators from the 
Conservative perspective718, and such full-blown modernization of both social and political 
attitudes is the desired requirement for those that seek the outright 'de-toxfication’ of the 
Conservative Party’s formerly negative and regressive image on social policy matters, 
aspiring to create a form of ‘Popular Conservatism’ in social terms in the process.  The 
ultimate aspiration of this viewpoint is therefore the emergence of a genuinely distinct 
Conservative vision for the 21st century that focuses on improved compassion and socio-
economic outcomes, enhanced levels of ‘fairness’ and social mobility combined with a 
distinct and more ‘individualistic’ version of social justice. This socio-political model is to be 
complemented by a streamlined and more efficient state structure infused with a more 
commercial ethos, yet crucially aligned with a heightened degree of communitarianism and 
such associated values719.  
 
This fused model for policy-making therefore appears to entail the need for a 
reformulated version of Conservative ‘ideology’ for the 21st century, and while this appears 
to represent change in theory, in practical policy terms it has struggled to come to fruition 
and appears to be an extremely ambitious and difficult project to fulfil. Such difficult 
challenges stem from the fact that it seeks to reject the extremes of neo-liberal 
marketisation while also distancing itself from the ‘big government’ of the state that was 
said to prevail both during the New Labour era as well as during the ‘years of consensus’ 
that dominated the post-war era until the mid-1970s.  On the basis of evidence within this 
thesis there has clearly been some re-marketised rhetoric and practical policy gestures in 
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the direction of a form of New Conservatism in the sphere of social policy, as the 
Conservatives have sought to reduce the extent of state monopoly in the provision of key 
public services. Although some specific policy initiatives have made an impact, this ‘new’ 
approach has generally struggled to reach sustained fulfilment in a coherent sense by the 
mid-term of the 2010 Parliament, and whether it ever achieves its bold aspirations is a 
matter of serious conjecture due to ongoing conditions imposed by the austerity agenda. 
There has been some clear evidence of practical policy in action in the form of innovations 
such as free schools and the reformist aspirations for a post-bureaucratic NHS, and aligned 
with the theoretical framework of The Big Society, such measures have collectively 
attempted to re-position and re-mould the party’s message on key social policy matters.  
 
However these ‘liberating’ measures of public service reform have evidently failed to 
convince much of the British public in terms of their practical aims and principles, with the 
perception that such terms are merely a cloak for spending cuts being a common one720, 
despite this viewpoint being dismissed by advocates of the Big Society who claim that this 
specific concept of a revised and renewed approach to governance pre-dated ‘the economic 
crisis of 2008 and the imposition of budget cuts and austerity, so it’s obviously not purely 
about justifying cuts’721. However as part of the overall process of adapting to survive and 
evolving in classic conservative style, while also specifically seeking to meet the pivotal 
challenge of embracing a revived socio-political image and agenda to capture the mood of 
21st century British society, the Conservative Party appears to have been either unwilling or 
unable to support the full-blown evolution of such policy gestures with the necessary 
funding or practical support. This resistance to the scale of social policy renewal is possibly 
due to the party’s shift in emphasis from full-blown policy and image modernisation to the 
more mundane reality of fiscal responsibility following the economic downturn from 2008 
onwards. On the basis of the evidence within this thesis, in fundamentally attempting to 
address the long-term shifting social attitudes of the wider British public within the context 
of a prolonged economic recession, it can be argued that some elements of the 
Conservative Party and its more individualistic heritage and economic focus appear to be 
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de-aligned from the more communitarian and state-centred instincts of much of the British 
public, shaped to an extent by thirteen years of New Labour government. The modernising 
faction of the Conservative Party can therefore demand on this basis that further internal 
changes of attitude within the party are urgently required in order for it to be more in tune 
and synchronised with similar shifts in attitude across the wider British public, as at times 
since 1997 they clearly have not been, although attempts to ‘nudge’ the public mood since 
regaining national office in 2010 may hasten such a correlation on right-of-centre terms. 
 
It is perhaps ultimately the case that the practical restraints of coalition government 
and the intermittent moderating presence of Liberal Democrats as junior partners since May 
2010 has had a significant influence in hindering and blunting the likelihood of the re-
emergence of a distinct and revived form of Conservative ideology in all of its vigour, and 
this may explain the more adaptable and pragmatic aspects of David Cameron’s political 
focus since coming to power in 2010. At the same time, such circumstances may have 
provided Cameron and his inner-circle with the pretext for a more moderate and 
modernising socio-political agenda that they would have preferred to pursue anyhow, yet 
which still retains a softer tone than the 1980s model of Conservatism, in social policy at 
least. How different in an ideological sense or how more or less vigorous in policy terms a 
majority Conservative government would have been is a matter of debate, and whether the 
Cameron leadership would want to explicitly align with the party’s ideological heritage of 
the 1980s (in both political and strategic terms), is open to question in terms of maintaining 
long-term electoral popularity. It can however be a convenient political tool for some 
Conservatives to blame the junior coalition partners for what has been viewed by some 
critics as an often bland and uninspiring policy agenda,  and this has arguably bolstered the 
premise that in order to indicate a real and significant change within the Conservative 
Party’s socio-political approach, the subsequent social policy reforms have needed to be 
significantly deep-rooted and more fundamentally radical in nature if they are to reflect 
contemporary social changes and result in a genuinely new approach to social policy in both 
theory and practice, and both critics and party modernisers722 would claim this has been not 
been sufficiently the case.   
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While the rhetoric has at times been bold and suggested that real change is a central 
feature within the party’s modern social policy agenda, the practical delivery has often 
significantly faltered. Although there is evidence that the political opposition has had to 
adapt and react to the Conservative social policy agenda, in office the party’s attempts to 
fundamentally re-define the role of the state and streamline bureaucracy have met various 
obstacles and ultimately failed to convince some significant opinion–formers within the 
media and across society. Such stuttering developments arguably strike at the heart of the 
Conservative Party’s fundamental and often problematic approach to responding and 
dealing with socio-political change and how best to manage it in line with Burkean 
gradualism, and this dynamic has been addressed with varying degrees of success across 
modern history. Such an apparently revised and refreshed social policy agenda has 
therefore struggled to flourish and deliver the necessary change in policy terms, and it may 
ultimately need to be put to the absolute test in a practical sense by the fulfilment of the 
first majority Conservative government for over twenty years723. Therefore in order for its 
revised approach to governance alongside its desired ‘change’ in terms of both ideology and 
policy be able to flourish to its maximum extent, party strategists and modernisers would 
therefore ultimately desire a more favourable parliamentary scenario in order for the wider 
public to accept and acknowledge the true nature of modern Conservatism and to observe 
its viability as a political project, and to what extent it really does aspire to empathise with 
wider British social attitudes and values.  
 
However there is ultimately something of a challenging paradox in the likely 
achievement of such a scenario, as the Conservative Party’s determined drive to tackle the 
national deficit after 2010 has led to the imposition of severe austerity measures 
throughout the first half of the 2010-15 government (and beyond), as the government 
attempts to re-balance what it believes to be an over-inflated state structure with a greater 
emphasis on private sector growth. However such a strategy has appeared to undermine 
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aspects of its revived social policy agenda in terms of the required funding and financial 
support, which in turn has created clear potential to alienate a significant number of voters 
that would make the prospect of a majority Conservative administration in the near future a 
more distant likelihood than ever724.  In this sense, economic policy continues to fuse with 
social policy and in turn mould the specific socio-political consensus of the day, and the 
economic agenda has arguably taken precedence over social policy in terms of urgent 
political priorities since 2010, with negative implications for social policy in the process.  One 
prominent political commentator has explicitly argued that this relentless focus on austerity 
has resulted in the further neglect of the Conservative Party’s formerly innovative 'Big 
Society’ social agenda, and that ‘austerity has produced a Pavlovian dog reflex, and it’s 
recreated the Thatcherite dog, and that’s a real shame’725, with a clear reversion to the 
party’s fiscal conservative instincts as a consequence.  
 
 In this context, parallels can be made with the socio-economic trends and 
developments that occurred during the early phase of the Thatcher government in the 
1980s, which also identified the primary need to address fundamental and deep-rooted 
economic issues on taking office. Besides such major financial issues fusing with the 
practical limitations of coalition government, at the heart of this approach to social policy 
reform there appear to be clear theoretical tensions between the Conservative-led 
government’s rediscovered desire for altruistic, civic engagement alongside simultaneous 
preferences for competitive, profit-orientated public service provision amidst a ‘reimagined’ 
state, and it has been increasingly open to question as to whether these dimensions can 
effectively work together in harmony. It is therefore the case that if such a revised party 
image and renewed policy emphasis is perceived as being unclear, thin and artificial in 
nature and is coupled with an unpopular period of ‘statecraft’ amidst an aura of ideological 
haze and austerity, such a scenario will almost certainly entail future policy and electoral 
failure despite the 21st century Conservative leadership embracing a rhetorical emphasis on 
change and a revamped style and model of governance. Given that a Conservative-led 
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725 Phillip Blond, Respublica think-tank, interview with author, 19th February 2013 
  257  
 
administration is highly likely to continue to be at the forefront of British government and 
be exposed to the harsh realities of electoral politics and media scrutiny up to 2015 at least, 
this perceived failure of modern Conservatism to sufficiently ‘change’ in relation to its 
ideological renewal, revised party image and practical social policy delivery has some 
potentially severe implications for the party’s fortunes. Despite such determined attempts 
to restore the foundations of a bygone electoral hegemony, the failure of the Conservative 
Party to convincingly re-brand and impose a coherent social policy agenda since 2010 has 
created the potential for a phase of dysfunctional statecraft which could lead to further 
long-term electoral damage and another sustained exile from national office726. This is a 
somewhat ironic development given its energetic and concerted attempts at significant 
social policy re-formulation and renewal since the party’s cataclysmic electoral nadir of 
1997, and such a scenario has the potential to trigger further internal disputes in relation to 
what extent the party has appropriately revised its broader public image, alongside the 
precise nature of its policy reforms and pace of modernisation in recent years, particularly 
as to whether it has been too extensive or insufficient overall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
726 
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